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I. INTRODUCTION
On a surprisingly routine basis, Americans are exposed to evidence of contem-
porary incidents of infanticide.' Occasionally, stories of infanticide become
headline news, spread across the nation's papers day after agonizing day. Susan
Smith's confession to drowning her two children by driving her car into a South
Carolina pond is but one recent example. More often, though, coverage is limited
to a fleeting mention in the local news: missing infant found in trash; mother
charged with murder; teen mother delivers baby into toilet; eighteen-year-old
accused of drowning her toddler. Despite the commonplace nature of these
incidents, we are so mystified and horrified by the stories of mothers killing their
I. Infanticide refers to the homicide committed by a mother against her infant child. From the time of the
earliest laws against infanticide, the term has pertained only to women who kill their children. See Katherine
O'Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REv. 259, 259 (stating that the first infanticide
statute applied only to women). In many countries, the gender-specific crime of infanticide is codified as a distinct
form of homicide. See infra notes 67 through 72 and accompanying text. In the United States, however, state
criminal codes do not differentiate between infanticide and other forms of homicide, and thus, the issue of
gender-specificity does not arise. Nevertheless, for purposes of this Article, infanticide refers solely to children
killed by their mothers.
[Vol. 34:1
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offspring that we perceive each story as isolated, as disconnected from-rather
than consistent with-what we know about human society. So we are surprised to
learn that in the United States and throughout the world, the population under one
year of age is at great risk of death from homicide.2 Their killers are more likely to
be their own mothers than anyone else.3
To the extent that Americans are familiar with the term infanticide, they
associate the phenomenon with developing nations struggling with the twin
burdens of poverty and "overpopulation." It seems strange to associate this term
with the thousands of American infants who are killed each year by their mothers.
Additionally, although the word infanticide would seem to refer to the killing of
infants, there is no established age limit for victims of this crime.4 Clearly there are
significant differences between the circumstances surrounding a mother's killing
of a three-year-old child, and that of a three-month-old, or for that matter, her
killing of a three-minute-old baby. And yet, other than drawing an arbitrary
chronological line, there is no readily apparent principle by which one might
distinguish amongst these cases. Moreover, drawing a line at one year of age, for
example, eclipses the important similarities linking cases involving older victims
to those involving children under the age of one. When evaluated from the
perspective of the circumstances surrounding the mothers who kill their children,
as well as from the perspective of the nature of the criminal justice system's
disposition of these cases, the differences due to the victim's age seem far less
significant than one might expect.
5
2. In fact, in England, this age group runs the single highest risk of death by homicide. Ania Wilczynski &
Allison Morris, Parents who Kill Their Children, 1993 CmiM. L. REV. 31, 32. Furthermore, in the United States,
between 1980 and 1985, homicide was the leading cause of injury-related death for children below age one. N.
Prabha Unnithan, Children as Victims of Homicide: Part I-Historical and Anthropological Research, CRiM.
JUST. ABSTRACTS 146 (Mar. 1991) (discussing research on historical, anthropological, and biological factors
relating to infanticide). According to the U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, "[m]ore babies and
young children die at the hands of their parents than in car accidents, house fires, falls or drownings." At Least
2,000 Children Under Age 5 Die of Abuse Each Year, U.S. Study Says, CHI. TI., Apr. 27, 1995, at 21, zone N
[hereinafter At Least 2,000].
3. Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 2, at 33.
4. This may be observed in infanticide statutes' from around the world, which pertain to victims of a
surprisingly broad range of ages. For example, British infanticide laws apply to any homicides committed by a
mother against her child within the child's first year of life, while New Zealand's infanticide statute includes any
child killed by its mother before age ten. Compare Infanticide Act, 1938, 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.), with Criminal
Act of 1961, in SPENCE & GARROW'S CRImINAL LAW 135 (W.S. Spence, ed., 1962) [hereinafter New Zealand
Criminal Act of 1961]. See infra notes 67 through 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of
infanticide statutes from around the world.
5. Likewise, a focus on the circumstances surrounding the perpetrators of infanticide reveals the gendered
nature of this offense. Although fathers, boyfriends, baby-sitters, strangers, and others may kill children, killings
by mothers arise out of different circumstances-those of a primary caretaker. Because they reflect the mother's
response to biological and sociocultural experiences surrounding pregnancy, labor, and delivery, the killings of
infants in the first twenty-four hours of life are gendered phenomena. See infra notes 85 through 104 and
accompanying text (describing these circumstances). Killings that occur after the first day of life, however, are
gendered primarily because of society's allocation of caretaking duties to mothers. Thus, although I refer to
infanticide as a crime committed by mothers, it is possible to imagine a parent, grandparent, or step-parent of
1996l
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I first became aware of America's infanticide problem several years ago when I
received a phone call about a case involving a fourteen-year-old girl who claimed
she never knew she was pregnant, yet was charged with murder after delivering a
baby into a toilet.6 Her lawyer called to enlist my help in locating experts who
might testify on her behalf. Shortly thereafter, the lawyer called back to say that I
could discontinue my search, because the case was not going to trial. The
prosecutor had announced his intention to subpoena the girl's male eighth grade
classmates, many of whom claimed to have had sex with her. Faced with the
prospect of this public humiliation, the girl had opted to plead guilty to involuntary
manslaughter.
This girl, whose name I never learned, has haunted me. Without exactly
knowing why, I found myself gathering stories like hers-seemingly inexplicable
accounts of girls and women who, by killing their offspring, violate our most
cherished notions of life, safety, and trust, and shatter the stereotype that univer-
sally casts mothers as the altruistic protectors of their children.7 Once I began
looking, I found signs of these stories everywhere.
These cases came to evoke a profound ambivalence in me. On the one hand, the
killings seemed uniquely horrific, unprovoked, and incomprehensible. Yet the
more I thought about them, the less I knew where to direct my anger. Although the
babies died at their mothers' hands, many others should be implicated in their
deaths-the fathers, grandparents, friends, schools and workplaces, and society as
a whole. As puzzling as it was undeniable, I often found myself empathizing with
these killers.
In an effort to come to terms with both the commonplace nature of these killings
and the ambivalence they evoked in me, I undertook a systematic collection of
infanticide cases. Over the course of several years, I searched media data bases and
had friends in small towns send me news clippings. I found hundreds of cases,
most of which received only a brief mention in the press. Those cases that the
media discussed in any detail became my data base.
Read together rather than as isolated occurrences, these cases provide a canvas,
painted in admittedly broad strokes, that depicts a vivid picture of modem
American infanticide. These stories emerge as distinctly patterned in nature, with
marked similarities in the lives of the mothers at the time of their infants' deaths.
But the pattern does not stop there; as my collection of stories grew, I discovered
that my empathy for these women was shared by the judges and juries who
determined the fates of the girls and women charged with killing their offspring.
either gender fulfilling the role of mother, and in that capacity, under the circumstances described herein,
committing the crime of infanticide. See infra notes 297 through 323 and accompanying text (detailing the
circumstances surrounding infanticide).
6. For a fuller description of this case, see Michelle Oberman, The Control of Pregnancy and the Criminaliza-
tion of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 2-4 (1992) [hereinafter Oberman, Control].
7. Ania Wilczynski, Images of Women Who Kill Their Infants: The Mad and the Bad, 2 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST.
71,73 (1991).
[Vol. 34:1
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 4 1996-1997
MOTHERS WHO KILL
The rhetoric of moral outrage expressed by society at large and by judges and
juries in individual cases is accompanied by an equally strong tendency to view
these crimes as arising out of external circumstances, and therefore to resist
equating these homicides with murder.
What does not emerge from this review of cases is an explanation for why we
treat infanticide differently from any other type of homicide. And yet, this result is
not at all unique to modern American culture. The same pattern of condemnation
for the act and mercy for the actor can be observed at various points in Western
history, and in various cultures today.
In order to place modern American infanticide cases in context, Section II of this
Article provides a brief historical and cross-cultural perspective on the punishment
of infanticide. The section focuses in detail on the tension between the demand for
condemnation and the impulse toward mercy as revealed in the evolution of
infanticide laws over the course of four hundred years of British legal history.
Section III provides a detailed description of infanticide in the United States in the
late twentieth century. After exploring the various patterns emerging from contem-
porary cases, this section illustrates the persistently ambivalent response toward
punishing those convicted of infanticide.
Ironically, in both historical and contemporary societies, the tendency to treat
infanticide as less heinous than other forms of murder seldom is acknowledged, let
alone explained. Section IV describes the problematic legacy of this ambivalence
and undertakes a direct exploration of the ways in which infanticide cases tend to
be exceptional. Focusing on the circumstances surrounding most infanticide cases
reveals with greater clarity the legitimate justifications for partially excusing these
homicides and reveals society's contributory role in tolerating and even perpetuat-
ing infanticidal situations. Therefore, Section V of this Article proposes two
normative responses to infanticide. The first response is to explore ways in which
society diminish what is fundamentally a preventable modem epidemic. The
second response is to articulate a coherent criminological resolution to these cases.
A brief word about methodology is necessary. I had descriptive, analytic, and
normative goals in writing this Article. Ideally, I would have found a rich literature
in the areas of history, anthropology, demography, sociology, psychology, medi-
cine, and criminal justice that would have provided the descriptive foundation for
this Article, enabling me to focus on the analytical and normative aspects of the
subject. Unfortunately, the literature on contemporary American infanticide is
remarkably scant, whatever the academic discipline, forcing me to undertake
documenting and describing the problem, as well as attempting to analyze and
resolve it. In order to accomplish this task, I utilized a broad range of methodolo-
gies that seemed best suited to depicting the phenomenon of modern infanticide.
As a result, this Article draws on a variety of traditions-historical, cross-cultural,
narrative, sociological, and medical-as well as the more conventional doctrinal
analysis of the law. My hope is that this Article will generate sufficient curiosity
19961
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about the subject that persons more expert in these traditions than myself will
undertake further studies and analysis, thereby enriching our understanding of, and
our ability to eradicate, modem American infanticide.
II. AMBIVALENCE ABOUT INFANTICIDE ACROSS TIME AND PLACE
There is every reason to believe that infanticide is as old as human society itself
and that no-culture has been immune to it.8 Infanticide was legal throughout the
ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome, and was justified by
reasons ranging from population control to eugenics to illegitimacy.9 Although
Constantine declared infanticide a crime in 318 A.D., all indications are that
throughout much of the history of Western civilization, infanticide remained
commonplace. o
8. PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAND
1558-1803, at 3 (1981) (describing infanticide practices among hunting and gathering cultures, including one
where 38 out of 96 female children born were killed) (citing E.A. WRIGLEY, POPULATION AND HISTORY 42-43
(1969)).
9. Historian William Langer notes that '[in ancient times, at least, infanticide was not a legal obligation. It
was a practice freely discussed and generally condoned by those in authority and ordinarily left to the decision of
the father as the responsible head of the family." William L. Langer, Infanticide: A Historical Survey, 1 HIST.
CHILD. Q. 353, 354 (1974); see also Kathryn L. Moseley, The History ofInfanticide in Western Society, 1 IssUEs L.
& MED. 345, 346-51 (1986) (exploring the social and personal motivating factors leading to infanticide from a
historical perspective).
10. Langer, supra note 9, at 355; see also Moseley, supra note 9, at 352 (discussing infanticide of female and
disabled children during the early Middle Ages). Although it is difticult to estimate infanticide's prevalence,
historians have documented its persistence through a variety of genres. Demographic studies relying on civil,
church, and hospital records yield information about sex-selective infanticidal practices as well as infanticide's
widespread incidence. Barbara A. Kellum, Infanticide in England in the Later Middle Ages, I HIST. CHILD. Q.
367, 368-69 (1974); Richard Trexler, Infanticide in Florence: New Sources and First Results, I HIST. CHILD. Q.
98, 100-01 (1973).
For example, in a normal population, a ratio of 105-106 baby boys are born for every 100 girls. Nicholas D.
Kristof, A Mystery From China's Census: Where Have Young Girls Gone?, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1991, at Al.
During the first year of life, male babies are more vulnerable to infection and disease than are female babies;
therefore, by age one there should be an equal number of boys and girls. Trexler, supra, at 101-02. As a result,
whenever a community reveals sex ratios that diverge significantly from the norm, there is reason to suspect
infanticide. Id. at 101-02; Kellum, supra, at 368-69. Modern demographers utilize this same reasoning to
document the extent of sex-selective infanticide in modem China and India. Thomas Poffenberger, Child Rearing
and Social Structure in Rural India: Toward a Cross-Cultural Definition of Child Abuse and Neglect, in CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CROSS-CULTtAL PERSPECTIVES, 71, 78-79 (Jill E. Korbin ed., 1981); Kristof, supra, at Al;
Michael Weisskopf, China's Birth Control Policy Drives Some to Kill Baby Girls, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1985, at
A 1. Thus, data from fifteenth century Florence indicating 114.6 boys per every 100 girls, with the ratio jumping to
124.56 boys per 100 girls in upper class families, Trexler, supra, at 100-01; 100 boys per every 87 girls in 1971 in
Punjab, Poffenberger, supra, at 79; and 111.3 boys per every 100 girls in 1990 in China, Kristof, supra, at Al, all
demonstrate a pervasive practice of infanticide.
Other evidence of infanticide's prevalence comes from occasional references to infanticide found in historical
documents. For example, medieval handbooks of penance describe the sin of "'overlaying" a child by laying on
top of it and suffocating it. Kellum, supra, at 369. This sin is included in a list of the venial or minor sins, such as
failing to be a good samaritan or quarreling with one's wife. Id. at 368. From the ninth to the fifteenth century, the
standard penance for overlaying was three years, one of these on bread and water, compared with five years, three
of these on bread and water, for the accidental killing of an adult. Id. at 369. Scholars consider this casual mention
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There are a host of factors that give rise to infanticide. Other than the
perpetrator's relationship to the victim, there may not be a tremendous amount in
common between a mother who kills her female child in one culture and a mother
who kills her illegitimate offspring in another. Nevertheless, across a startling
expanse of time and place, one remarkably consistent observation may be made:
infanticide is not treated like other homicides. Despite the moral condemnation of
infanticide, there is considerable evidence that societies have refused to punish it
as they do other homicides. When societies enforce laws against infanticide, they
do so in a selective or even targeted manner. In the modem era, many societies
have elected to codify the distinctive treatment of infanticide in specific statutes,
the overwhelming majority of which articulate lesser penalties for homicides
committed by mothers against children. The following two subsections will
illustrate both the de facto and de jure mechanisms by which societies have
exceptionalized infanticide.
A. Infanticide and the Pattern of Lenience: A Study in British Legal History
From the time of the Roman Empire, laws against infanticide have been
under-enforced." Despite the solidification of a moral norm condemning infanti-
cide in Western Europe from the Middle Ages through the early seventeenth
century, prosecutions and convictions for the crime remained relatively rare.' 2
Although the overall pattern of lenience in prosecuting infanticide may have been
due in part to sympathy for the defendants, it also derived from the difficulty of
distinguishing murder from infant mortality. Infant mortality was commonplace in
and lenient treatment of infanticide to be evidence of its relatively commonplace nature. Mosley, supra note 9, at
356.
In eighteenth and nineteenth century France, England, and Russia; growing public awareness of the problem of
abandoned newborns, both dead and alive, led to the creation of "foundling homes." See RACHEL G. FUCHS, POOR
AND PREGNANT IN PARIS: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992) (detailing history of
Parisian women who delivered and abandoned their babies at the largest foundling home in France); Langer,
supra note 9, at 357-59 (providing a brief history of the foundling homes). By the mid-eighteenth century, most
large European towns established homes devoted to caring for abandoned children and providing an alternative to
infanticide for those mothers who could not afford to raise their children. Langer, supra note 9, at 358. Although
they were notoriously bad at saving infants' lives, these homes were so popular that, ultimately, they became too
costly to maintain. For example, in France in 1833
[tihe number of babies left with the foundling hospitals reached the fantastic figure of 164,319.
Authorities were all but unanimous in the opinion that the introduction of the tours had been
disastrous .... Thereupon the tours were gradually abolished until by 1862 only five were left.
Instead, the government embarked upon a program of outside aid to unwed mothers.
Id. at 359.
11. The breakdown of the Roman Empire returned to local jurisdictions the task of law enforcement.
Historians have noted the paucity of infanticide prosecutions and speculated that the local law enforcement
officials were "generally unwilling to prosecute an 'innocent' woman for the murder of her child, especially if she
was married." Moseley, supra note 9, at 355.
12. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 4-6.
1996]
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this period, as a result of both natural causes and improper medical treatment. ' 3
In medieval Europe, married women so often escaped prosecution for infanti-
cide that one historian concludes that "[tihey could kill their infants with relative
impunity." 14 The same was not true for unmarried women, who often were singled
out by the law. 15 Although infanticide prosecutions remained uncommon, unmar-
ried women who were convicted of infanticide generally received capital sen-
tences that were carried out in excruciating manners.' 6
In seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, several factors combined to
generate pressure toward a more vigorous enforcement of laws against infanticide.
By the start of the seventeenth century, rapid population growth and increasing
poverty led to the perception of a growing social disorder.17 In response to that
fear, crimes involving sexual offenses such as bastardy and fornication, which
13. Constance B. Backhouse, Desperate Women and Compassionate Courts: Infanticide in Nineteenth-
Century Canada, 1984 U. TORONTO L.J. 447, 449. This became a serious impediment to convictions in England,
where the law required the state to prove both that the newborn had been born alive and that the mother had
intentionally caused the baby's death. The state's case could be aided if there was evidence of violence on the
corpse, or if there were witnesses who could testify that the baby had been born alive. However, decomposition of
the body often concealed any signs of violence, and secret delivery made the availability of witnesses unlikely.
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 9.
14. Moseley, supra note 9, at 357. During the witchcraft inquisition, some women, especially married women,
escaped prosecution because the crime of infanticide was widely attributed to witches. For a fascinating historical
account of the witchcraft inquisition in Europe, see ANNE L. BARsTow, WlTCHCRAZE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE
EUROPEAN WITCH HuNTs (1994). Witches were thought to exercise enormous power over newborns. One historian
of the Middle Ages notes that "[i]nfanticide was far and away the most common social crime imputed to the aged
witches of Europe by the demonologists." Trexler, supra note 10, at 103. A second source found that "[a] full
quarter of all the indictments brought against witches in England from the fourteenth through the eighteenth
century was for bewitching infants." HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 28.
As was the case with most of the accusations brought against witches, there was little evidence linking the
accused to the crime. BARSTOW, supra, at 23-29. Although it is possible that some of the infants died at the hands
of these women, it is far more likely that the majority of these accusations were made in order to avoid casting
blame on the child's parents. Historian Richard Trexler, in his comprehensive study of infanticide in medieval
Florence, concludes that the selective punishment of infanticide, aided by allegations of witchcraft, reveals a
society that had internalized a norm condemning infanticide, even though it attributed its commission exclusively
to those who were outsiders, guilty of sexual immorality and social deviance.
The law and conscience of Europe in the sixteenth century vented its force upon old women and
unwed mothers. There was no attention given to married women and their spouses. How could one
prove infanticide within the walls of the family home? ... It was more reasonable to assume that
witches passed through locked doors in the dead of night to suffocate infants than to believe that
man and wife.., would do such a thing.
Trexler, supra note 10, at 105.
15. Many of the earliest statutes outlawing infanticide refer solely to the crime of bastardy neonaticide-
infanticide committed by an unmarried woman. See infra note 23 (providing the text of An Act to Prevent the
Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, 1623, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 27 (Eng.)).
16. Medieval sources recount stories of women who, following conviction, were tied into sacks, along with a
dog or a cock, and then thrown into a river. Langer, supra note 9, at 356. One city's court and prison records from
1513 to 1777 document punishments ranging from burial alive to drowning and decapitation for 87 women
executed for the crime of infanticide; all but four were unmarried. Id.
17. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 12-13; Langer, supra note 9, at 355, 357.
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formerly had been tried in church courts and punished by a moderate penance,
became secularized.18
Those who supported the regulation of sexual and reproductive behavior
through the criminal law recognized that, to the extent that infanticide went
unpunished, women who were guilty of crimes of sexual "deviance" could evade
punishment by disposing of the "evidence."' 9 Thus, if a jurisdiction wished to
insure obedience to laws regulating illicit sexual and reproductive behavior, they
also had to insure the strict enforcement of laws punishing infanticide. Therefore,
it is unsurprising that in England, where the laws governing sexual misconduct
were most severe, the Parliament passed legislation aimed at increasing the rate of
infanticide convictions. 20 Because the British used the law in a conscious effort to
reverse the tendency toward lenient treatment of infanticide defendants, and
because lawmakers continually failed in these efforts,21 this legal history provides
ample evidence of the ambivalence generated by this crime.
1. The Jacobean Law of 1623: A Presumption of Guilt In British Infanticide
Cases
In 1623, Parliament passed An Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of
Bastard Children, or as it came to be known, the Jacobean Law of 1623.22 The law
focused exclusively on the concealment of the death of "bastard" children by
"lewd" women, or infanticides committed by unmarried women. Although this
may reflect a belief that mothers of legitimate children had no reason to wish them
dead, or at least had husbands who would limit their ability to conceal pregnancy
and infanticide, it also may be seen as evidence that the infanticide law was
responsive to the difficulties in punishing crimes of sexual deviance. The Act made
it a capital offense to conceal the birth of an illegitimate child-whether still- or
live-born-by a secret disposition of its dead body. The law essentially reversed
18. These laws were particularly harsh in England, where the crimes were punished by public whippings and
imprisonment. For example, in 1576 Parliament passed a "poor law" that punished impoverished parents of
bastard children. Mothers of these children were pressed to identify the men who fathered their illegitimate
children, and fathers were required to pay support to the local parish for the child. Noncompliance by either parent
resulted in whippings or prison. HOFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 13.
19. The stigma and humiliation associated with crimes of sexual deviance were so great that they may have led
women to conceal illegitimate pregnancies and commit infanticide rather than acknowledge their conditions and
endure prosecution. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 17. In fact, two historians of the era note a distinct
correlation between the heightening of sanctions against bastardy and the rise in the number of indictments for
infanticide. Id. at 18.
20. See infra notes 22 through 24 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 27 through 50 and accompanying text.
22. 1623, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 27 (Eng.). Similar, if not identical, versions of this act were incorporated into law in
much of New England and Canada. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 59-63 (regarding the 1692, 1699, and
1710 adoptions of the Jacobean law in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia, respectively); Backhouse, supra
note 13, at 449 (regarding Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island statutes of 1758 and 1792, respectively).
1996]
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the presumption of innocence by providing that, unless the defendant could prove
by eyewitness testimony that the baby had been stillborn, the jury must find her
guilty of murder.23 Few women accused could meet this evidentiary test. After all,
the entire purpose of concealing a pregnancy would be defeated by inviting a
witness. Thus, given high infant mortality rates, the law had the effect of
"sentencing innocent women to death in the many cases where a woman attempted
to conceal her childbirth but the foetus was stillborn or died of natural causes.",
24
The years immediately following the enactment of the Jacobean Law of 1623
witnessed a dramatic increase in the conviction rates of those prosecuted for
infanticide. In their comprehensive empirical study of infanticide in England from
1558 to 1803, Professors Hoffer and Hull compare conviction rates for both
ordinary homicide and infanticide. One part of their study reviewed homicide and
infanticide prosecutions in the Essex assize by contrasting the forty-eight years
prior to the passage of the 1623 statute with the twenty-eight years following its
passage.2" Although they found no demonstrable change in homicide indictment
rates, they discerned a 225% increase in the rates of infanticide indictments.26
Despite the law's effectiveness in obtaining convictions, the threat of conviction
and punishment had seemingly little deterrent effect on the prevalence of infanti-
23. The statute read:
An act to prevent the destroying and murthering of bastard children.
WHEREAS, many lewd women that have been delivered of bastard children, to avoid their shame,
and to escape punishment, do secretly bury or conceal the death of their children, and after, if the
child be found dead, the said woman do alledge, that the said child was born dead; whereas it
falleth out sometimes (although hardly it is to be proved) that the said child or children were
murthered by the said women, their lewd mothers, or by their assent or procurement:
II. For the preventing therefore of this great mischief, be it enacted by the authority of this present
parliament, That if any woman ... be delivered of any issue of her body, male or female, which
being born alive, should by the laws of this realm be a bastard, and that she endeavor privately,
either by drowning or secret burying thereof, or any other way, either by herself or the procuring of
others, so to conceal the death thereof, as that it may not come to light, whether it were born alive
or not, but be concealed: in every such case the said mother so offending shall suffer death as in
case of murther, except such mother can make proof by one witness at the least, that the child
(whose death was by her so intended to be concealed) was born dead.
An Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murthering of Bastard Children, 1623, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 27 (Eng.), reprinted in
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 20.
24. Backhouse, supra note 13, at 450. It was the rare circumstance to find the Jacobean Law of 1623 applied to
married women, and when it was, acquittal usually ensued. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 85 (a "servant,
nurse, and wife" acquitted of murder in 1781 after she had wounded her newborn while untangling the umbilical
cord). In 1803, the Jacobean Law of 1623 was repealed, and by 1828, with the death penalty provision eliminated
and the statute focusing solely on concealment, application was freely extended to married women. Backhouse,
supra note 13, at 454.
25. HoFFE. & HuLL, supra note 8, at 23-25.
26. Id. at 18. Hoffer and Hull's study also demonstrates that the severe punishment of infanticide was reserved
for those defendants whose crimes fit the statute. Their data indicate a guilty rate of 72.7% for women tried for
infanticide whose acts fit the statute-unmarried women who concealed pregnancy-as compared to a 33.3%
conviction rate for those who did not fit the statute-married suspects and/or older child victims. Id. at 25.
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 10 1996-1997
MOTHERS WHO KILL
cide. Evidence indicates that the crime remained relatively commonplace through-
out eighteenth and nineteenth century England, much as it was in the rest of
Europe.2" Moreover, after the first several decades of applying this law, juries
reverted to the familiar pattern of lenience, even in those cases involving
unmarried women who were guilty of concealment.28
The trend away from conviction and toward lenience was facilitated by the
adoption of several defenses that could be invoked against the charge of infanticide
by virtue of concealment. The most common defense was based on a woman's
preparation for the birth of the child, otherwise known as "benefit-of-linen.", 2 9
This defense virtually guaranteed acquittal to any defendant who could demon-
strate that she had made linen for her infant before its birth.30 "Want-of-help" was
a second defense that was invoked to diminish culpability, or in some cases, to
secure acquittal. This defense permitted a woman to argue that the infant's death
had occurred despite her efforts to secure assistance.3'
Armed with these defenses, British juries once again began to resist convicting
women of infanticide. By the early eighteenth century, juries were as likely to
favor the defendant as seventeenth century juries had been to convict.32 Conviction
rates for bastard neonaticide between 1714 and 1722 were not only lower than in
the years immediately following passage of the Jacobean Law, but were "as far
below 50% as the rate for the period between 1614 and 1622 was above 50%." 33
2. Nineteenth Century British Infanticide Law Reform
From the 1720s to the early 1800s, the pattern of under-enforcement and jury
nullification of the concealment law led British lawmakers, who already were
27. Langer, supra note 9, at 355-57.
28. See infra notes 32 through 33 and accompanying text.
29. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 69.
30. Id. at 69. The authors note that in six cases where the mothers of dead newborn bastards pleaded
"benefit-of-linen," five were acquitted. For obvious reasons, the defense was most effective in cases in which
there was no sign of violence on the corpse. Id.
31. The "want-of-help" defense took various forms: "[p]rior arrangement with a midwife, cries for help
drowned out by passing carriages, a mistakenly locked door, a sudden illness preventing the solicitation of
assistance, or a fall on the way to obtain help." Id. at 69. Likewise, juries were increasingly inclined to view a
woman's failure to tie off an umbilical cord or to stop the fall of a child onto a hard floor or into a privy as evidence
not of "murderous intent," but rather, of "a lack of skill or self-possession." Id. at 69-70.
32. ld. at71.
33. Id. Hoffer and Hull also reviewed murder conviction rates from eighteenth century Massachusetts,
comparing jury outcomes in infanticide cases with outcomes in murder trials with adult victims. Their review
shows that
[w]hen ... doubts [about premeditation] disturbed eighteenth-century infanticide juries, they
resolved them in favor of acquittal at a rate even greater than the combined percentages of murder
of adults ending in acquittals and verdicts of murder reduced to manslaughter. These statistics lead
to the conclusion that the eighteenth-century juries were more lenient in infanticide cases than in
murders involving adult victims.
Id. at 77-78.
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troubled by the law's anomalous and unfair nature, to call for its repeal.34 Finally,
in 1803 Parliament passed a revised infanticide statute.35 The new law made
infanticide subject to the same rules of evidence as all other homicides. Thus, the
prosecution had a duty to establish that the victim had been born alive. Contempo-
rary forensic medicine proved ill-equipped to determine live birth on autopsy and,
as a result, the live birth requirement greatly hindered findings of guilt.36 The 1803
statute provided for up to two years in prison in those cases where women had
concealed their illegitimate pregnancies but live birth could not be determined.37
This lesser offense became the overwhelming preference of juries in infanticide
trials, in part because infanticide carried with it a capital sentence. 38 As one
historian of the era notes, "the courts regularly returned verdicts of not guilty
despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.",
39
Rather than correcting the problem of nullification, the 1803 law furthered the
tendency toward lenience, particularly when, in 1828, Parliament expanded the
34. Perhaps the most powerful plea was made in 1772 by Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox, two members
of the House of Commons, who argued that
in the case of women having bastard children, the common [and] statute laws were inconsistent;
that the common law subjected to a fine, to a month's imprisonment, and the flagellation; that this
institution necessarily rendered the having of a bastard child infamous; that the dread of infamy
necessarily caused concealment; that the statute law, in opposition to all this, made concealment
capital; that every mother, who had not at least one witness to prove, that her child, if it was dead,
was born dead, or died naturally, must be hanged; that nothing could be more unjust, or
inconsistent with the principles of all law, than first to force a woman through modesty to
concealment, and then to hang her for that concealment ....
HOFFER & HULL, supra note 8, at 85-86 (quoting PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 17: 1771-1774, at 452-53
(London, 1813)).
35. 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58, § 3 (1803) (Eng.).
36. There were several controversial and ultimately discredited methods that doctors used to determine live
birth. The best known was the Swammerdam test, which was based on Jan Swammerdam's 1667 discovery that
fetal lungs float on water after respiration has occurred. Unlike their European counterparts, who concluded that it
was impossible to infer live birth from floating lungs, British doctors adhered to this test well into the eighteenth
century. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, "even English physicians were conceding that a conviction for
murder should not hinge upon whether lung tissue sank or 'swam'." George K. Behlmer, Deadly Motherhood:
Infanticide and Medical Opinion in Mid-Victorian England, 34 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Scl. 403, 410 (1979).
37. 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58, § 4 (1803) (Eng.). In England in 1828, a new law permitted a direct trial for the crime of
concealment without a prior murder trial. An Act for Consolidating and Amending the Statutes in England
Relative to Offences against the Person, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, § 14 (Eng.); see also An Act for Consolidating and
Amending the Statutes in Ireland Relating to Offences against the Person, 1829, 10 Geo. 4, ch. 34, § 17 (Eng.)
(extending the same statute to Ireland). Similar statutes were passed in the New England colonies. HOFFER &
HULL, supra note 8, at 90-91; see also Paul A. Gilje, Infant Abandonment in Early Nineteenth-Century New York
City: Three Cases, 8 SIGNS 580, 582 (1983) (citing Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York statutes
criminalizing concealment).
38. Behlmer, supra note 36, at 412. One British jurist, testifying in the 1860s to the Commission on Capital
Punishment, stated that "almost every case tried for concealment was a case of murder." O'Donovan, supra note
1, at 261 (citing Commission on Capital Punishment, 21 BRITsn PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1866)).
39. Backhouse, supra note 13, at 448. As Section III of this Article demonstrates, this resistance to convicting
these defendants of murder remains commonplace today. See infra notes 105 through 128 and accompanying text.
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law to apply the crime of concealment to all women, as opposed to just "lewd"
women. 40 Faced with seemingly ordinary women who had committed indisputably
immoral acts, the courts began to entertain for the first time defenses premised
upon the defendant's temporary insanity. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century,
medical experts came to believe that the "disruptive effects of birth on mental
health" could lead a mother to kill her newborn. 4t Two psychological disorders,
"puerperal mania" and "lactational insanity" were thought to cause occasional
infanticidal thoughts and actions in newly delivered and/or nursing mothers.4 2
Although some Victorians objected to the widespread use of this "merciful legal
fiction," juries and j udges generally were willing to believe that the "physiological
and psychological trauma of child-birth" was responsible for most infanticidal
behavior.43
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this lenience again became the subject
of public debate. The growing concentration of people living in urban squalor was
linked to an increased visibility of infanticide. 44 Public officials expressed growing
outrage over the crime and frustration over juries' reluctance to punish it.4 5
Disraeli decried the fact that infanticide was "practiced as extensively and as
legally in England as it is on the banks of the Ganges. ' ' 46 One justice testified to the
40. 1828,9 Geo. 4, ch. 31, § 14 (Eng.).
41. Behlmer, supra note 36, at 413.
42. Id. at 413. The medicalized explanation for infanticide was not limited to England. In France, infanticide
defendants whose newborns had been killed in particularly violent ways explained that their actions were due to
" afureur manique orfolie passagere due to the atrocious pains of the last moments of labor." James M. Donovan,
Infanticide and the Juries in France, 1825-1913, 16 J. FAm. HIST. 157, 169 (1991).
43. Behlmer, supra note 36, at 413. In our own era, evidence of the preference of a medicalized explanation of
infanticide is manifest in numerous statutes from various cultures, and also in the academic world's virtually
exclusive focus on postpartum psychosis in the otherwise sparse literature on modem infanticide. See infra note
141 (listing postpartum psychosis articles). Professor Michael Perlin, an expert on the insanity defense, refers to
infanticide defendants as "empathy outliers," owing to their frequent success in establishing an insanity defense
despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of defendants who raise these defenses are unsuccessful. MICHAEL
L. PEPRLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 192 (1994).
44. During this era, Thomas Malthus posited that human fertility would exceed the power of the earth to
provide sustenance, that premature death of some type would thus affect a large part of mankind, and that "[t]he
vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation." GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 34-35 (1957) (quoting THOMAS MALTHus, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION,
139-40 (Bonar's 1926) (London 1798)). From this premise, Malthus concluded that poverty and its ills were
inherent in the social order. Id. So prevalent was infanticide that "[olne may safely assume that in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries the poor, hardly able to support the family they already had, evaded responsibility by
disposing of further additions." Langer, supra note 9, at 357.
45. Professor Langer documents a number of journalistic accounts from coroners, who said that police thought
no more of finding a dead child than of finding a dead cat or dog; doctors, who said that women in lower ranks left
their babies in the care of 'killer nurses' who made short shrift of their charges by generous doses of opiates; poli-
ticians, who described a seeming "carnival of infant slaughter"; and newspapers that reported dead babies found
in ditches, parks, and cesspools and noted the crime "is positively becoming a national institution." Id. at 360-61.
46. ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 262 (1976). On the other
side of the Atlantic, the incidence of infanticide and infant abandonment were equally dramatic: 483 dead infants
found in Philadelphia streets in one four year period between 1860 and 1900. Id. From 1861 to 1871, 939
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Commission on Capital Punishment in 1866:
It is in vain that judges lay down the law and point out the strength of the
evidence .... [J]uries wholly disregard them and eagerly adopt the wildest
suggestions which the ingenuity of counsel can furnish .... Juries will not
convict whilst infanticide is punished capitally.
4 7
The sympathetic response of nineteenth century juries to infanticide defendants
may have reflected a sense that the mandatory death penalty was too harsh a
punishment in light of the circumstances surrounding the crime. This crime was
overwhelmingly committed by poor women, many of whom were seduced and
then left alone to face the consequences of pregnancy and an illegitimate infant.48
As Adrienne Rich notes, "[tihe Victorian period abounds with cases of the
seduction (read 'rape') of servant girls by their employers; if they refused sex, they
would be fired, and many were fired anyway for getting pregnant.", 49 Thus, there
was a common sentiment expressed by those asked to convict these women of
murder that one of the guilty parties, and perhaps the primary one, was missing
from the trial.50
3. De Jure Lenience: Great Britain's Twentieth Century Infanticide Statute
Eventually, this debate led to the repeal of the 1803 infanticide act in favor of a
law that, for the first time, attempted to articulate a justification for lenience in
cases of infanticide. The new statute was proposed by a series of British judicial
commissions. The commissions claimed that efforts to try infanticide under
homicide laws inevitably led juries and judges to nullify the law, and that this
"foundlings" were reported in New York City alone. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crimes of Mobility, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 637, 655 (1991).
47. D. Seaborne Davies, Child Killing in English Law, 1937 MOD. L. R. 202, 219 (quoting Judge Keating's
testimony before the Commission on Capital Punishment, 21 BRITsH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 103 (1866)).
Judges also were reluctant to convict and they "not merely tacitly acquiesced in the methods used by lawyers to
circumvent the law but frequently played an active part in these conspiracies." Id.
48. Donovan, supra note 42, at 169; see also Friedman, supra note 46, at 655 (describing a common scenario
where young servant girls could not afford to raise unwanted children, and would be fired if they disclosed their
conditions to their employers); Langer, supra note 9, at 357-60 (describing the prevalence of infanticide among
the poor, who could not afford to raise another child).
49. RicH, supra note 46, at 262.
50. One study of French infanticide cases during this era cites several experts who concluded that
many of the accused women were acquitted because the jurors felt that it was unfair that the
females alone should bear the responsibility for the crimes. This was because the men who had
impregnated the women ... often abandoned them and bore no legal responsibility for the
consequences of their lust. Therefore, jurors frequently believed that the male seducers were at
least partly responsible for the infanticides.
Donovan, supra note 42, at 169.
[Vol. 34:1
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reluctance to convict was making a mockery of the criminal justice system.5'
The resulting British Infanticide Act of 1922 is premised upon the belief that a
woman who commits infanticide may do so because "the balance of her mind [i]s
disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving
birth to the child."' 52 As a result, the statute provided that those defendants whose
minds were so disturbed, "notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that
but for the Act the offence would have amounted to murder," shall be guilty only of
manslaughter.53 The definition of "disturbance" of the mind is more fluid and
capacious than the modem insanity defense, thus making this defense available to
virtually all women accused of killing their young children.54
Although manslaughter may be punished with life imprisonment in England,
actual sentencing practices under the infanticide statute have been far more lenient.
So many of those convicted receive probationary sentences that one leading
scholar of the British criminal justice system concluded that the practical impact of
the Infanticide Act has been "the virtual abandonment of prison sentences as a
means of dealing with a crime involving the taking of human life." 55
Interestingly, the most fundamental criticism of the Infanticide Act is not the
law's lenience, but rather its quasi-scientific basis. Professor Osborne echoed the
sentiments of many when she concluded that the Act did not recognize the
51. "It has been convincingly argued that the Act was the product, not of nineteenth century medical theory
about the effects of child-birth, but of judicial effort to avoid passing death sentences which were not going to be
executed." O'Donovan, supra note 1, at 261; see also NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND, VOL. I,
128-32 (1968) (describing objections to the law and efforts at reform).
52. The text of the law reads:
Where a woman... causes the death of her child... under twelve months of age, but at the time of
the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully
recovered from the effect... of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, notwithstand-
ing that the circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would have amounted to
murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with
and punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the child.
Infanticide Act, 1938, 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.). The 1922 Act originally was limited to "newly born" children, but
was amended in 1938 in response to a case that held that the law did not extend to a woman who killed her
35-day-old child. The amended law included any child under the age of 12 months and extended the defense of
lactation-related hormonal imbalance. WALKER, supra note 51, at 131-32.
53. Infanticide Act, 1938, 2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.).
54. For example, one study of 89 British women who killed their children between 1970 and 1975
demonstrated the efficiency of the infanticide statute, as compared with other homicide laws, in obtaining
convictions. P.T. d'Orban, Women Who Kill Their Children, 134 BtIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 560, 566-67 (1979). Sixty
subjects whose victims exceeded the age of one year were charged with murder, yet only two were convicted of
this offense. Id. The vast majority of these defendants were convicted of manslaughter on grounds of diminished
responsibility or lack of intent to kill. Id. Five were acquitted altogether. In contrast, of 24 subjects charged with
infanticide, 23 were convicted. Of the 23 convicted, 18 received probationary sentences (seven with a condition
that they receive psychiatric treatment), two were sentenced to imprisonment (one for 18 months and the other for
two and one half years), one was conditionally discharged, one received a nominal one day sentence, and another
was diagnosed as suffering from postpartum depression and admitted to a mental hospital. Id.
55. WALKER, supra note 51, at 133.
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existence of a link between childbirth and infanticide, but created it.56 Even at the
time of the Act's passage, it was unclear whether the Act was based on an actual
belief that women who killed their children were mentally ill, or whether "a
medical model was adopted to justify moderation in the imposition of punish-
ments.",57 In recent decades, as various English law reform groups have reconsid-
ered the Infanticide Act,58 both supporters and critics of the Act agree that "there is
little or no evidence for an association between lactation and mental disorder," and
that mental disorder is "probably no longer a significant cause of infanticide." 59
Despite the widespread consensus that mental disorders are not the sole cause of
infanticidal behavior, those reviewing the British law have not called for its repeal.
This remains so in spite of the availability of a diminished responsibility defense.6 °
In fact, one law reform committee that has studied the Infanticide Act recom-
mended retaining the law precisely because the mental health act was not broad
enough to cover most women convicted of infanticide.6' Moreover, two of the
three committees studying the law recommended that its medicalized definition of
disturbance of the mind be broadened by adding socio-economic considerations to
the list of factors that might precipitate infanticide. The Fourteenth Report of the
Criminal Law Revision Committee recognized that mental disturbance could arise
from the effects of giving birth or from the socio-economic "circumstances
consequent upon birth," and recommended that the latter phrase be included in the
statute.62
Ultimately, the determination to retain a quasi-medical justification for treating
infanticide differently from other homicides emerges as further evidence of the
56. Judith A. Osborne, The Crime of Infanticide: Throwing Out the Baby With the Bathwater 6 REV. CAN. D.
FAM. 47, 55 (1987); see also WALKER, supra note 51, at 128 (describing the difficulties of fashioning a legal
approach to infanticide); O'Donovan, supra note 1, at 259-62 (same).
57. Daniel Maier-Katkin & Robbin Ogle, A Rationale for Infanticide Laws, 1993 CmM. L. REV. 903, 911.
58. Professor Osborne lists three committees: The Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders; The Royal
College of Psychiatrists' Working Party on Infanticide; and The Criminal Law Revision Committee. Osborne,
supra note 56, at 57.
59. O'Donovan, supra note 1, at 263 (describing the findings and proposals of The Criminal Law Revision
Committee's Fourteenth Report and the Butler Report). Of course, contemporary science does recognize the
medical phenomena of postpartum psychiatric disorders. See infra notes 140 through 154 and accompanying text
(discussing postpartum psychosis). While it is not known precisely what percentage of women who kill their
children suffer from postpartum psychosis, both psychiatric research and analyses of mortality statistics suggests
that it is only rarely the cause of infanticide. Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 2, at 35.
60. WALKER, supra note 51, at 134-36 (describing applications of the insanity defense in England).
61. In 1978, the Working Party on Infanticide of the Royal College of Psychiatrists "recommended that unless
the mandatory life sentence for murder is abolished Infanticide should remain as a separate offence." d'Orban,
supra note 54, at 570.
62. O'Donovan, supra note 1, at 263 (citing CRtMINAL LAW REVISION Coirrrmn , FOuRTEENTH REPORT,
OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON, 1980, Cmnd. 7844, at 105) (emphasis added). The Committee on Mentally
Abnormal Offenders recognized that "the operative factors in child killing are often the stress of having to care for
the infant, who may be unwanted or difficult, and personality problems." Id. (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE
ON MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFFENDERS, 1975, Cmnd. 6244, at 245).
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ambivalence infanticide generates.63 The decision not to repeal the infanticide law
despite widespread criticism of its underlying logic reflects ongoing support for
the view that infanticide is a distinct form of homicide that constitutes a lesser
offense than murder.
B. Contemporary Infanticide Statutes: A Cross-Cultural Pattern of Lenience
Toward Infanticide
Western history reveals that, in spite of the moral turbulence infanticide
generates, communities have withheld harsh punishment from most mothers who
kill their infant offspring. A cross-cultural anthropological survey of contemporary
infanticidal practices is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it is
important to situate Western infanticide within the broader context of cross-
cultural infanticidal practices. In anthropologist Susan Scrimshaw's study of
infanticide in human populations, she notes that infanticide takes on many forms
across human societies and includes "behavior ranging from deliberate to uncon-
scious which is likely to lead to the death of a dependent, young member of the
species." 64 Studying infanticide's prevalence is complicated because societal
definitions of infanticide vary according to normative cultural practices, as do
beliefs regarding the beginning of life; therefore, the starvation-induced death of a
toddler, for example, may not be considered infanticide in some cultures.65
Likewise, the underlying causes of and justifications for infanticide are numerous
and varied, including the age-old preference for sons that contributes to female
infanticide in modern China; poverty; and concerns with witchcraft and sorcery
that lead some cultures to sanction the killing of disabled newborns, twins,
premature and breech birth babies, and/or babies born to mothers who died during
childbirth.66
Despite the variable construction of infanticide across cultural lines, the extent
to which numerous contemporary societies differentiate infanticide from murder
and resist punishing its perpetrators as murderers demonstrates the continuity and
pervasiveness of this practice throughout Western history. A survey of contempo-
63. As one study of current dispositions in British infanticide cases concluded, "women who kill their own
infant children constitute a distinct class of offender in the English system .... The Infanticide Act emerged from
a policy decision to promote leniency for women who murder their own children." Maier-Katkin & Ogle, supra
note 57, at 911.
64. Susan Scrimshaw, Infanticide in Human Populations: Societal and Individual Concerns, in INFANTICIDE:
COMPARATIVE AND EVOLTMONARY PERSPECIIVES 439,442 (Glenn Hausfater & Susan B. Hrdy, eds., 1984).
65. See generally Carolyn F Sargent, Born to Die: Witchcraft and Infanticide in Bariba Culture, 27
ETHNOLOGY 79, 80 (1988) (studying how urban Bariba continued to kill newborns believed to be "witch babies"
as a response to traditional ideas about good, evil, and the social order).
66. See, e.g., Sharon K. Hom, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights Specter and Thoughts Towards
(An)other Vision, 23 COLUM. HuM. Rrs. L. REv. 249 (1992) (regarding sex-selective infanticide in modem China);
Sargent, supra note 65, at 79-93 (describing the practice of infanticide in Bariba culture as a response to signs at
birth that were perceived to demonstrate that a newborn was a "witch baby"); Scrimshaw, supra note 64, at 442
(charting the broad range of religious and cultural beliefs contributing to infanticide in varying societies).
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rary infanticide laws from cultures around the world reveals the manner in which
many modem societies have continued this historical pattern. Evidence of the
differential treatment of infanticide readily is observed in the numerous statutes
that provide distinct definitions and lesser penalties for the crime of infanticide as
opposed to other homicides.67
Many nations around the world have statutes specific to infanticide; all but one
of these makes infanticide a less severe crime than ordinary homicide. 68 The
majority of these statutes provide maximum sentences that are considerably less
than the standard penalties for manslaughter and murder.69 Although the various
statutes all refer to the crime of "infanticide," the definition of this crime is
somewhat ambiguous. At a minimum, infanticide refers to mothers who kill
infants to whom they have given birth.70 Aside from this fact, however, the laws
vary in breadth and leniency. Several jurisdictions limit the applicability of
67. As an empirical matter, it is difficult to ascertain the manner in which a nation punishes infanticide without
considering that country's entire law of homicide. Although this research would be both useful and fascinating, it
would be extraordinarily difficult to compile. Therefore, I have restricted this search to those nations with statutes
explicitly governing the crime of infanticide.
68. Luxembourg specifically provides a more severe penalty for killing a child than for other homicides.
PROVOCATION, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND INFANTICIDE, New South Wales Law Reform Commission
Discussion Paper, August 31, 1993, at 129. The following have criminal codes that recognize infanticide as a
specific, less culpable form of homicide: Austria, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, PENAL Acr CONCERNING FELONIES AND GROSS AND PE'TY MISDEMEANORS 66 (Norbert D. West & Samuel
I. Shuman, trans., 1966) [hereinafter AUSTRIAN PENAL CODE]; Colombia, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES
OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE COLOMBIAN PENAL CODE 106 (Phanor Eder, trans., 1967) [hereinafter COLOMBIAN
PENAL CODE]; Finland, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE PENAL CODE OF
FINLAND 71 (Matti Jousten, trans., 1987) [hereinafter FINNISH PENAL CODE]; Greece, NEW YORK UNIv., THE
AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE GREEK PENAL CODE 148 (Nicholas B. Lolis, trans., 1950)
[hereinafter GREEK PENAL CODE]; India, THE LAW OF CRIMES 855 (Ratanlal Ranchhoddas & Dhirajlal Keshavlal
Thakore, trans., 1966) [hereinafter INDIAN PENAL CODE]; Italy, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 193 (Edward M. Wise & Allen Maitlin, trans., 1978)
[hereinafter ITALIAN PENAL CODE]; Korea, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE
KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE 109 (Paul Ryu, trans., 1960) [hereinafter KOREAN PENAL CODE]; New Zealand, New
Zealand Criminal Act of 1961, supra note 4, at 135; The Philippines, THE REVISED PENAL CODE ANNOTATED 355
(Jose Nolledo, ed., 1988) [hereinafter PHILIPPINE PENAL CODE]; Turkey, NEW YORK UNIV., THE AMERICAN SERIES
OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE 145 (Orhan Sepici & Mustafa Ovacik, trans., 1965)
[hereinafter TURKISH PENAL CODE]; New South Wales, Western Australia, and Tasmania, PROVOCATION, DIMIN-
ISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND INFANTICIDE, supra at 120, 127.
69. For example, in Colombia, parricide (the killing of one's parent) is punishable by 15 to 20 years'
imprisonment, while infanticide is punishable by two to six years' imprisonment. COLOMBIAN PENAL CODE, supra
note 68, at 105-06. In Italy, parricide is punishable by.24 to 30 years, and infanticide is punishable by three to 10
years. ITALIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 193. In Korea, parricide is punishable by death or life imprisonment,
and infanticide is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years. KOREAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 68, at
109.
70. Some also include adoptive mothers, and several include other family members such as fathers and
grandparents. See, e.g., KOREAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 109 (including lineal ascendants); PHILIPPINE
PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 355 (including maternal grandparents); TURKISH PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at
145 (including husband, son, father, grandparent, adoptive parent, and brother).
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infanticide depending upon the defendant's marital status. For example, in Austria
and the Philippines, the punishment for killing an illegitimate child is far less
severe than that for killing a legitimate one.7' Additionally, Korea and Italy specify
that their laws apply to those who commit infanticide in order to save their
honor-surely a tacit reference to maternal marital status.72
The notion of permitting greater lenience in the case of an unmarried mother is
somewhat unexpected in view of Western society's historical tendency to punish
"outsider" mothers, while permitting more "conventional" mothers to avoid the
law. It seems at least possible, however, that the assumption that the laws in fact
are more generous toward unmarried mothers is not borne out in reality. The focus
on illegitimacy, like the focus on medical factors in the British law, may be viewed
as a legislative effort to explain why infanticide occurs, as well as to provide a
justification for not punishing it as stringently as other forms of homicide. By
ascribing to unmarried mothers a motive for this crime, however, these statutes
may serve to cast more suspicion on unmarried defendants while permitting
married defendants facing generic homicide charges to enjoy a greater benefit of
the doubt. Moreover, the dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate births
reflects only the law on the books in these various nations; infanticide prosecutions
against married mothers may well remain a rarity.
With regard to the infants' age, the statutes range from those that govern only
deaths occurring immediately after birth to those that apply to any death prior to
age ten.73 The majority of the statutes explicitly or implicitly follow the British
model and pertain to any infant killed within its first twelve months of life.
The infanticide statutes from around the world evidence a shared sense that it is
both legally and morally wrong for a mother to kill her infant. At the same time,
they evince an equally powerful consensus that, both in terms of its genesis and in
terms of maternal culpability, infanticide is a far different crime from other
homicides.
71. In Austria, the law provides for 10 to 20 years' imprisonment as opposed to life imprisonment, AusTRIAN
PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 66, and in the Philippines, the punishment is reduced from one to six years to one to
three years, PHILIPPINE PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 355.
72. Article 578 of the Italian Penal Code is titled "Infanticide for Reasons of Honor" and begins "in order to
save his own honor or that of a close relative .. " ITALIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 193. Article 251 of the
Korean Criminal Code begins "in order to avoid disgrace ...." KOREAN PENAL CODE, supra note 68, at 109.
73. The Italian statute provides for "the death of a child immediately after its birth," ITALIAN PENAL CODE,
supra note 68, at 193, while the New Zealand statute provides for "the death of any child... under the age of ten
years," New Zealand Criminal Act of 1961, supra note 4, at 158. The New Zealand law is truly an outlier. It not
only applies to any child killed before age ten, but it does so on the basis of the quasi-medical justifications found
in the British statute. Id. It is somewhat mind-boggling to imagine a woman claiming that she killed her
nine-year-old child as a result of a disturbance of the mind due to childbirth or lactation, unless, of course, she has
recently given birth to another child. Still, the law may have been drafted to insure that these particular
defendants, if found guilty, would be spared the manslaughter penalty of life imprisonment, and instead would
receive the statutory maximum sentence for infanticide of three years.
1996]
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III. INFANTICIDE, AMERICAN STYLE: OUTRAGE AND AMBIVALENCE
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CASES
This brief overview of historical and contemporary cross-cultural responses to
women who kill their children reveals a persistent pattern of moral condemnation
coupled with ambivalence about punishment and a tendency toward mercy. This
section will demonstrate that the contemporary American response to infanticide is
entirely consistent with this pattern. The process of identifying the American
response to infanticide is challenging. Unlike England, the United States lacks a
series of legislative initiatives against infanticide. Instead, twentieth century
American infanticide is punished under general homicide statutes.74 Furthermore,
American society lacks a conscious awareness of infanticide as a domestic
problem.
Unlike in other societies throughout history, it is, at first blush, difficult to
fathom the reasons for the persistence of infanticide in our affluent society.
Professor Langer, a social historian, reasons that
[o]nly since the Second World War has the contraceptive pill, the intrauterine
device, and the legalization of abortion removed all valid excuses for un-
wanted pregnancy or infanticide. To the extent that these problems still exist, at
least in western society, they are due primarily to carelessness, ignorance, or
indifference.75
Yet, even if we are uncertain as to what causes an American mother to kill her
child, and even if we are hesitant to view this homicide as evidence of a larger
problem of infanticide, a close look at the American response to cases where
mothers kill their children reveals our tacit understanding that these cases are more
than isolated occurrences perpetrated by careless, ignorant, or indifferent women.
Read together, the cases of modem American infanticide demonstrate a familiar,
patterned nature. Our society, like others before it, responds to infanticide with
anger, empathy, and a profound yet unarticulated sense that these cases differ from
other forms of homicide.
A. Latent Signs of a Modern Epidemic
Outside of homicide statistics documenting homicide rates for infants and
children, very little is known about the nature and extent of contemporary
74. See, e.g., Jones v. Washington, 836 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 32 E3d 570 (7th Cir. 1994)
(discussing the habeas corpus claims of a woman convicted of murder for killing her child); Illinois v. Ehlert, 654
N.E.2d 705 (II1. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 660 N.E.2d 1274 (111. 1995) (same); Illinois v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806
(I11. App. Ct. 1991) (same); Vaughan v. Virginia, 376 S.E.2d 801 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (same).
75. Langer, supra note 9, at 362.
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infanticide.76 Perhaps the largest problem in studying American infanticide is
finding a systematic method for gathering evidence of its occurrence. Underdetec-
tion is a perennial problem in estimating the incidence of infanticide; given the
frequently serendipitous nature of discovery of the crime (e.g., the body is left
exposed, rather than buried), there is little reason to believe that even a small
percentage of the cases are discovered.77 Evidence of modem American infanti-
cide emerges primarily through autopsy examinations. This measure is a fallible
one, due to the limited number of autopsies performed on infants and the failure of
medical examiners to detect signs of abuse that might have precipitated infant
deaths.78
Despite the difficulties inherent in obtaining a precise measure of infanticide,
one gains a sense of its nature by collecting and reviewing reports of identified
cases. As is true for all crimes, the discretionary and variable nature of investiga-
tion and subsequent prosecution renders it impossible to estimate prevalence based
upon the number of cases in which charges are filed. 79 Furthermore, even a study
of reported infanticide cases yields no information about those that ended either in
verdicts that were not appealed or in plea-bargains prior to trial.8 0 Nevertheless, in
76. Unnithan, supra note 2, at 146.
[A] search of the literature ... indicates that, while child homicide has been more frequently
addressed than in the past, it still receives less attention than other forms of homicide and other
types of child abuse and neglect. For example, Psychological Abstracts listed 1,264 entries on
'child abuse' in the last [twenty] years, but only a handful dealt specifically with child homicide.
Id.
77. See generally Lester Adelson, Slaughter of the Innocents: A Study of Forty-Six Homicides in Which the
Victims Were Children, 264 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1345, 1348 (1961) (noting that failure to perform autopsies results
in mislabeling homicides as "crib deaths"); Janine Jason et al., Underrecording ofInfant Homicide in the United
States, 73 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 195 (1983) (attributing a sudden drop in homicide rates of infants from 1967 to
1969 to changes in reporting classifications and revision of the standard death certificate); George A. Little & John
G. Brooks, Accepting the Unthinkable, 94 PEDIATpics 748, 748 (1994) (addressing the evidence that about 5% of
cases diagnosed as SIDS actually are the result of deliberate human actions); Murray A. Straus, State and
Regional Differences in U.S. Infant Homicide Rates in Relation to Sociocultural Characteristics of the States, 5
BEHAV. SCa. & L. 61, 63 (1987) (recognizing that official causes of death of children may underestimate the true
incidence of homicide for children).
78. The U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect reported that "[it has been estimated that 85% of
childhood deaths from abuse and neglect are systematically misidentified as accidental, disease-related or due to
other causes." U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, A NATION'S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES, Washington, D.C.: Department of Health and Human Services xxviii (5th Report
1995) [hereinafter FATAL CHILD ABUSE] (citations omitted).
79. For an excellent description of the limitations inherent in estimating the incidence of a crime from
prosecution rates, see Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in
Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1013, 1025-31 (1991).
80. Of the cases in my sample, only two of 96 were reported to have ended in a plea. This number, however,
most likely underrepresents plea bargains, as many of the cases provided no information regarding outcome. In
several cases the state indicated a willingness to engage in plea negotiations. See, e.g., Robert Modic, Hopfer
Guilty: Teen Sentenced to 15 Years to Life, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 23, 1995, at A l [hereinafter Modic, Guilty]
(reporting conviction of mother for killing her newborn and quoting prosecutor as saying, "the state was always
1996]
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gathering evidence of infanticide cases, one may identify a phenomenon and
demonstrate that it occurs with considerable frequency by showing that the cases
bear marked similarities.
With these goals in mind, I compiled a data base of cases and news reports
describing infanticides by searching in the LEXIS and NEXIS data bases. I
focused my research on cases reported between approximately 1988 and 1995.8 I
make no claims that the ninety-six that I have chosen to study constitute a
statistically valid representation of infanticide cases during the relevant time
frame. 82 The set of cases that I analyze are among the best documented instances
of American infanticide-I am certain that there are many more cases that my
searches failed to detect. I excluded hundreds of cases that contained such scant
detail that I could not trace the circumstances of the pregnancy, the crime, or its
disposition.
Read together, these cases yield two main findings. First, an extraordinarily high
number of infants are killed within twenty-four hours of birth. In medical circles,
these cases are known as "neonaticides," 83 and they constitute almost half of the
cases in my sample. The circumstances that surround neonaticides are remarkably
consistent and, on the whole, entirely distinguishable from the fact patterns
associated with the homicide deaths of older infants and children. As a result, my
analysis is divided into two groups-neonaticide and infanticide-depending
upon the age of the victim. Second, in spite of the factual differences between
neonaticide and infanticide, society's response to both of these crimes reflects a
profound sense of confusion, ambivalence, and general unwillingness to equate
these homicides with murder.
B. Neonaticide
Dr. Philip Resnick identified the phenomenon of "neonaticide" in a 1970 article
in which he described a series of cases involving women who killed their
newborns within twenty-four hours of childbirth.84 Using Resnick's definition of
neonaticide, I selected forty-seven cases of neonaticide reported in the media
between the years 1988 and 1995. Journalistic reports provide unsatisfying,
willing to discuss the case"); see also Robyn Lansdowne, Infanticide: Psychiatrists in the Plea Bargaining
Process, 16 MONASH U. L. REV. 41, 48-49 (1990) (finding evidence of a pervasive pattern of plea bargaining in
Australian infanticide prosecutions).
81. The majority of cases were retrieved via multiple search queries run in the CURNWS file on NEXIS. These
findings were supplemented by articles sent to me by friends and family who found various accounts reported in
their local papers.
82. Virtually every article in the sparse academic literature on modem infanticide struggles with the problem of
quantification and statistical relevance. Ultimately, it seems that the best one can do is to study a sampling of
cases, noting that they may not in fact be representative. See, e.g., Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 73.
83. Resnick defines "neonaticide" as the killing of a neonate on the day of its birth. Phillip Resnick, Murder of
the Newborn: A Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414, 1414 (1970).
84. Id.
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incomplete answers to the haunting question of why these deaths occur. Neverthe-
less, the accounts yield considerable information about both the fact patterns and
the range of legal dispositions reflected in modem neonaticide cases.
1. Neonaticide Described
At first blush, the girls and women accused of neonaticide have little in common
with one another. They come from every race, ethnicity, and socio-economic
class.85 They live in big cities and small towns, in housing projects and suburban
luxury homes. Some are new immigrants who have only recently learned En-
glish.8 6 Others are from families that have been in the United States for genera-
tions. Their ages range widely across the span of women's reproductive years.8 7
Many of the women are of seemingly limited intellectual ability, with low I.Q.s or
poor school records.88 Yet almost as many are above average; many reports
describe quiet, studious, college-bound honor students. 9
Despite these superficial variations, the individuals accused of neonaticide share
many important underlying similarities. Most of the women accused of neonati-
cide are young and single. The modal age of my sample was only seventeen.90 The
vast majority live either with their parent(s), guardian(s), or other relatives. 91 Only
two of the forty-seven subjects lived alone.92 When one considers their financial
resources, as distinct from those of their parents, virtually all are independently
poor.
One particularly striking similarity is the attenuated nature of the women's
85. Although the articles that provide the basis for our research did not provide specific demographic
information on the subjects, the articles included many tacit references to these factors. Many of the women in our
neonaticide sample lived in apartments with several other immediate family members. See, e.g., Brief for
Appellant at 7, Jones v. Washington, 32 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion) (noting that Barbara Jones
lived in a three bedroom apartment with II other family members). Moreover, none of the articles reported that
the subjects were homeowners; most either lived with their parents or in rented housing. Very few articles mention
the race or ethnicity of the subjects.
86. See, e.g., Ron Soble, Woman Convicted of Killing Baby in Toilet, Los ANGELEs TIMES, May 30, 1992, at B 1
(noting that the woman accused of this crime, a farm worker in the Saticoy onion fields, was illiterate and did not
speak any English).
87. The ages of the women in my neonaticide sample ranged from 15 to 39. See APPENDIX, Age Data.
88. Information regarding educational level was found in only 19 of the 47 cases in my sample. Of these
subjects, 11 women/girls had not completed their high school education. See APPENDIX, Coding Result Totals.
89. Of the 19 women/girls for whom educational level was indicated in the articles, seven had achieved an
educational level of high school or college. See, e.g., Jim Carlton & Sonni Efron, 0. C. Schoolgirl May Not Have
Meant Baby To Die, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1989, at A l (describing an incident of neonaticide involving a
15-year-old honor student). Given their ages, it is likely that most of the women/girls in the neonaticide sample
were in school. However, this information was not included in many of my sources.
90. The mode represents the most commonly appearing figure within a group of numbers. The mean age of the
subjects in the neonaticide sample is 21, while the median age is 20. See APPENDIX, Age Data.
91. Of the 37 women for whom living situation could be ascertained, more than half, 24 women/girls, lived
with their parents. Nine of the subjects lived with other relatives or roommates. See APPENDIX, Coding Table
Results.
92. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
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relationships to the men who impregnated them. Virtually none of the women were
married to or lived with their male partners at the time of the neonaticide. 93 In part,
this may reflect the relatively young age of this population and the fact that many
still lived with their parent(s). Additionally, when asked about their relationships
with their male partners, many of the women described highly unstable liasons.
This was particularly true of the high school-aged women, who commonly
reported that the relationship was a one- or two-week romance that ended before
they even knew they were pregnant. 94
An even more fundamental similarity among these cases is the accused
woman's seemingly self-imposed silence and isolation during pregnancy. Very few
of the accused women told their families or friends that they were pregnant.
95
Many of the other women and girls who did disclose their pregnancies did not
disclose them to people with whom they were intimate, such as their male partners,
their parents, relatives, or friends.96
The most profound similarities arising from modem neonaticide cases involve
the patterned circumstances that lead to the infants' deaths.9 7 All of the neonaticide
cases I identified presented the same basic facts: the women experienced severe
93. Marital status of the subjects was reported in 43 of the neonaticide cases. Of these cases, 35 subjects were
single. Only four subjects were married. Additionally, in only two cases of the 40 cases that included information
regarding the living situation of the subjects did the woman/girl live with her boyfriend/partner. See APPENDIX,
Coding Table Results.
94. It is difficult to make too many generalizations about the nature of these relationships, however, because
the articles and cases tell us remarkably little about the men who fathered these babies. In fact, an overwhelming
majority of the articles, 32 out of 47, fail even to mention the fathers. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
95. Of the 32 cases that discussed whether or not the subjects disclosed the fact of their pregnancy, only three
women/girls reported that they did not conceal their pregnancy at all. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
96. Of the 32 cases that noted whether or not the woman/girl had concealed the fact that she was pregnant, 19
of the articles reported that no one, including the accused woman/girl in many cases, was aware of the pregnancy.
Nine of the 32 subjects concealed their pregnancy only from their parents. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
97. In a recent New York case involving neonaticide, the defendant attempted to raise the defense of
"neonaticide syndrome." New York v. Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840 (1995). An expert was prepared to
describe this syndrome as a phenomenon wherein a woman denies that she is pregnant, and then, at the moment
she gives birth, is overcome with a reactive psychosis due to the mental and physical shock of the birth. Id. The
defense was not permitted to go forward because of the attorney's failure to establish it as accepted medical
knowledge. Id. at 840-41. In the course of the debate over this defense, however, it became readily apparent that
this defense, like the rape trauma syndrome and the battered woman's syndrome, quickly would be used against
defendants. Anticipating the defense expert's testimony that the defendant suffered from this syndrome, the
prosecution called an expert who testified that the defendant's behavior actually was atypical of neonaticide
syndrome, and that she therefore was not psychotic at the time she delivered her baby. Id. at 843 (Friedman, J.,
dissenting).
The fact patterns in the neonaticide cases identified by my research are considerably more varied than this
"syndrome," which seems to represent a subset of cases involving the denial of pregnancy. For discussions about
denial of pregnancy, see Laura Miller, Psychotic Denial of Pregnancy: Phenomenology and Clinical Manage-
ment, 41 Hosp. & CoMITurrY PsvcmATRY 1233, 1233-36 (1990) (discussing psychotic denial of pregnancy
treatment and case studies and comparing them with nonpsychotic denial) (1990); A. Spielvogel & J. Wile,
Treatment and Outcomes of Psychotic Patients During Pregnancy and Childbirth, 19 BrTH 131, 132-33 (1992)
(discussing women "with delusions or psychotic denial about pregnancy").
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cramping and stomach pains, which they often attributed to a need to defecate.
They spent hours alone, most often on the toilet, often while others were present in
their homes. At some point during these hours, they realized that they were in
labor. They endured the full course of labor and delivery without making any
noise.
After delivering the baby, the women's actions range from exhaustion to utter
panic. Many of the women temporarily lost consciousness, leaving the baby to
drown in the toilet. 98 Others left the baby in the water while they frantically
cleaned the messy remains of the delivery from the floors and walls of the
bathroom. Still others immediately pulled the baby from the toilet and actively
contended with their situations. In several cases, the women threw their babies out
of bathroom windows.9 9 More commonly, the women suffocated or strangled the
babies in order to prevent them from crying out.' 00 A few of the women silenced
the baby with blows to its head or stab wounds inflicted with scissors.' 0 '
The women disposed of their babies' bodies in a number of ways, demonstrating
a range in understanding of what had transpired. One girl simply took the bundle to
bed with her, and fell asleep holding it. 10 2 Many more placed' the bundle
somewhere in or near their homes-more often than not, in the trash. 10 3 The
women did not necessarily endeavor to hide the baby's body, as a significant
number of these cases came to the attention of the authorities when someone
discovered the bundle in passingi'n
2. Neonaticide in the Criminal Justice System
Neonaticide elicits a surprisingly wide range of responses as the cases work
their way through the criminal justice system. This range extends from the
investigative phase in a possible case of neonaticide, where it is evident that
98. Nine of the 44 cases that included information regarding the method of the crime reported that the infant
drowned in the toilet in which the mother had given birth. In two other cases the baby drowned in the bathtub.
Five subjects simply did not attend to the infant, leaving it either on the bathroom floor or someplace else
unattended. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
99. Four of the 44 cases that reported the method by which the infant was killed reported that the women/girls
threw the baby out of the bathroom window. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
100. Sixteen out of the 44 cases that noted the method by which the infant was killed reported that the subject
suffocated her baby, either with a towel, plastic bag, or her hand. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
101. Two of the women/girls stabbed the infant to death, typically in an effort to cut the umbilical cord. Only
one case reported death of the infant due to bludgeoning. Thus, in only three cases did the subject utilize violent
means to kill her infant. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
102. See infra text accompanying note 269.
103. See, e.g., Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 840 (finding that the mother wrapped her baby in a garbage bag and
had a friend throw it away for her).
104. Of the 44 cases in which information was available regarding the discovery of the crime, 17 involved an
"accidental discovery." In 11 of these cases, the crime was discovered only after the subject sought medical
treatment. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
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criminal charges are not always brought, to the sentencing phase, where punish-
ment ranges from probation to life imprisonment. 10 5
The range of criminal charges brought against the neonaticide defendants in my
sample varies from unlawful disposal of a body, a misdemeanor, to first degree
murder. Of the forty-two accounts that reported the specific criminal charges
brought against the accused women, only twenty-nine revealed murder charges.
An additional and perhaps unsurprising observation is that prosecutors were more
likely to seek the most severe criminal sanctions when the newborns' bodies were
mutilated in some fashion.10 6
The process of gathering definitive information regarding the outcomes of the
neonaticide cases is challenging due to the fact that many such cases probably
ended in pre-trial plea bargains, many others are still pending trial, and still others
simply do not receive media coverage. Moreover, appeals of neonaticide decisions
are rare; therefore, there are few reported opinions in modem neonaticide cases.107
As a result, I was able to ascertain the dispositions of only seventeen of the
neonaticide cases in my sample. Because the outcomes in the other cases are
unknown, there is a significant risk of inaccuracy in attempting to make inferences
based upon the sub-sample of cases that proceeded to trial. It nevertheless is
instructive to note the range of sentences imposed upon those who either pled
guilty or were convicted of infanticide-related charges. The sentences imposed
ranged from intensive therapy, parenting classes, and probation to incarceration for
thirty-four years. Convictions were reported in only fifteen of the forty-seven
cases. Thus, despite the fact that at least twenty-nine of the defendants were
charged with murder, far fewer were convicted. Still, at least ten of the fifteen
women whose convictions were reported presently are serving prison sentences.108
105. In any criminal investigation, prosecutorial discretion permits a range of factors to influence the decision
to indict, as well as the crime with which the defendant is charged. For example, research suggests that the
decision to prosecute a suspected rapist may be influenced by the state's perception of the victim's credibility,
because this affects the chances of obtaining a guilty verdict. See Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims'
Allegations of SexualAssault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 Soc. PRoBs. 213, 213 (1991) (citing
four separate studies).
106. See APPENDIX, Coding Result Tables.
107. There were only six reported appeals in my sample: Jones v. Washington, 836 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ill.
1993), affid, 32 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 1994) (habeas appeals following a murder conviction in state court); Ohio v.
Hopfer, No. 15345, 1996 WL 391756 (Ohio Ct. App. July 12, 1996); Illinois v. Ehlert, 654 N.E.2d 705 (I11. App.
Ct.), appeal denied, 660 N.E.2d 1274 (I11. 1995); Illinois v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Vaughan v.
Virginia, 376 S.E.2d 801 (Va. Ct. App. 1989); Pennsylvania v. Reilly, 549 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1988). The scarcity of
appeals in these cases may reflect an acknowledgment that the outcomes are relatively lenient.
108. For evidence of this same trend in another jurisdiction, see Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 85, n.2:
Given that between 1982 and 1987 in England and Wales only 44 women were convicted of the
murder, manslaughter or infanticide of their children under 12 months, and yet it is estimated that
at least four children (mostly under 12 months) in Britain die from abuse or neglect each week, it is
likely that at least some women who kill their children are not convicted.
(citation omitted).
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3. Ambivalence About Neonaticide: A Case Study
The broad range of charges brought against these defendants and the widely
ranging dispositions of their cases reflect America's confused response to neonati-
cide. An additional indication of ambivalence emerges from the public debate
surrounding well-publicized neonaticide cases.
A recent Ohio case illustrates all three of these factors. In August 1994,
seventeen-year-old Rebecca Hopfer gave birth to an infant in the bathroom of her
home, which she shared with both of her parents.' 0 9 Following the delivery, she
wrapped the baby in a towel, concealed the bundle in plastic bags, and placed it in
the garbage. Two days later, she told a friend what she had done, and the
prosecution was set in motion.
The case was on a roller-coaster long before it went to trial. Because of her age,
Hopfer initially was arraigned in juvenile court. The judge, however, found that
"the safety of the community requires... [that she] be placed under legal restraint,
including, if necessary, the period beyond her majority" and determined that she
should be tried as an adult.1 t ° Public sympathy for Hopfer in response to the
decision to try her as an adult was overwhelming. One reporter summarized the
collective community sentiment: " 'What are they thinking?' people wondered.
'Wasn't this a classic example of an adolescent's poor decision-making in a
crisis?' ""I' The case went to a grand jury, which indicted Hopfer on charges of
abuse of a corpse and first degree murder. She was released on home arrest in time
for Thanksgiving." 12
Hopfer's release on home arrest precipitated a reversal in public sentiment, as
many speculated that she had received preferential treatment because she was
white, suburban, and middle-class.' 1 3 Over the course of the months between the
indictment and the trial, the community debated the Hopfer case in a manner that
one reporter referred to as "a 10-month community talk show." 114
The scope of these debates, as recorded in the local news media, is somewhat
surprising. Letter writers and reporters paid little attention to Hopfer's actions or to
the circumstances surrounding the crime. Nor did they address questions about the
baby's father and whether he should be regarded as responsible or culpable."t 5 No
109. Rob Modic, A Friend" Hopfer Admitted Killing; Teen's Testimony Details Phone Call, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, June 14, 1995, at A l [hereinafter Modic, A Friend].
110. Wes Hills, Judge Sends Teen to Adult System; Hopfer Case Goes to Grand Jury, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 18, 1994, at A] (quoting Montgomery County Juvenile Court Judge Michael B. Murphy).




115. In fact, the only article about the baby's father appeared after the verdict. Even though his identity was
known, the press made no mention of him until the day Hopfer was found guilty. The article begins, "[hie's the
mystery person in the sad and confusing case of Rebecca Lynn Hopfer." Wendy Hundley, Hopfer Baby's Dad Still
in Shock, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 24, 1995, at Al.
1996]
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one speculated about the parents, teachers, or doctors who saw Hopfer on a regular
basis yet claimed they never noticed the signs of pregnancy. Instead, this case
became the focal point for a broad-scaled debate about responsibility and moral
decay. Hopfer's pregnancy was seen alternately as the result of permissive sexual
norms, parental failure to discipline, or inadequate sex education. Some attributed
the baby's killing to legalized abortion; others to the failure to teach children the
difference between right and wrong.' 16
A local cable television station took advantage of the community's fascination
and confusion by providing live coverage of the trial. The two-week trial escalated
and intensified the dialogue. Expert witnesses disagreed over whether the baby
was asphyxiated by the umbilical cord, and therefore not born alive, or whether it
lived for two to six hours inside the plastic bags before it suffocated.1 1 7 The jury
heard testimony from Hopfer's former best friend, who claimed that Hopfer told
her that the baby had cried." 8 Then Hopfer testified that the baby was born
expressionless and did not cry because its umbilical cord was wrapped tightly
around its neck. She was unable to loosen or cut the cord and, believing that the
baby was dead, she wrapped it in towels and bags and said a prayer for it.t t 9
The closing arguments were emotional. Defense attorneys argued that Hopfer
had been demonized by the trial, and claimed that "[s]he's a jewel.... Some of
you would be proud to have her as a daughter."' t2 Prosecutors used a plastic
garbage bag to act out the manner in which Hopfer allegedly took the baby's
life.1 2 ' The jury convicted Hopfer on both counts, and the judge issued the
mandatory sentence: fifteen years to life.
22
116. Lamb, supra note 111, at B1.
117. Cheryl L. Reed, Expert Says Baby Lived 2-6 Hours, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 17, 1995, at A 1.
118. Modic, A Friend, supra note 109, at Al.
119. Rob Modic, Hopfer Denial: Baby Dead at Birth, She Says, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 20, 1995, at Al.
120. Modic, Guilty, supra note 80, at Al.
121. One journalist captured the moment as follows:
Franceschelli slowly pulled a fresh plastic trash bag from a box taken as evidence from Hopfer's
home. In the silence of the courtroom, he snapped it open with a flick of his hands. He knelt, taking
the package of blood-stained towels that once enveloped Hopfer's baby and slid it into the bag.
The jury leaned forward to watch.
Franceschelli took the end of the bag and began to twist it at the opening, once, twice, three
times around, and then knotted the end just as the bag had been found by investigators .... As he
looked up at the jurors, knotted bag in one hand, he said: "That's purposeful. That's intent. That's
the taking of a life of an innocent baby."
id.
122. Id. One can only speculate about the impact that Ohio's statutory sentencing guidelines had on the penalty
Hopfer received. The amount of community support for a merciful resolution well might have led a judge not
bound by such guidelines to mete out a lesser sentence. Perhaps the most articulate critique of sentencing
guidelines, albeit at the federal level, is found in Charles Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938 (1988). Ogletree argues that the laudable goals of the
U.S. Congress have been undermined by the Sentencing Commission: "the Sentencing Commission's obsession
[Vol. 34:1
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The debate over Hopfer's culpability did not end with the verdict. Defense
attorneys filed an appeal and succeeded in freeing Hopfer on an appeal bond,
which permits her to remain under house arrest pending the appeal of her
conviction. In granting the bond, the Ohio Appeals Court wrote that
[a]lthough this court does not customarily grant bail to persons convicted of
murder, this appeal does not involve a typical murder case.... It does not
diminish the gravity of the crime of murder to say that this particular murder,
without (prior criminal history), is not impressive evidence that Hopfer poses a
danger to others or to the community. 123
Not surprisingly, the decision to free a convicted murderer pending an appeal
intensified the debate over Hopfer's blameworthiness. Many wrote letters to the
Dayton Daily News decrying Hopfer's special treatment.124 Many more responded
by questioning whether the case should ever have gone to trial 125 and by defending
the court's treatment of Hopfer.126 Although the outcome of Hopfer's appeal
remains pending, the decision is unlikely to resolve the ambivalence surrounding
this crime. 27 It is not unheard of for a homicide committed by a minor to generate
with justice in the aggregate, with identical treatment regardless of individual differences, will eviscerate our
more refined notions of individual justice, and the belief that 'justice is blind' will yield to the reality that, in fact,
blind justice is injustice. Id. at 1960.
123. Rob Modic, Hopfer FreeforAppeal, Judges Rule, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 1, 1995, at Al.
124. See, e.g., Ruth L. Pennington, Letter to the Editor, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 17, 1995, at A6 ("Whether
Hopfer is guilty or innocent, she has been found guilty in a court of law, and she should be treated as such.");
Michael A. Scott, Letter to the Editor, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 17, 1995, at A6:
There have been several cases right here in the Miami Valley in which young mothers have been
accused and convicted of killing their children .... Why is it that these girls were not afforded the
same special treatment as Hopfer?.. . Could it be because her parents have influence and money?
Could it be because Hopfer is white?
125. See, e.g., Randi Potasky, Letter to the Editor, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 17, 1995, at A6 ("The only real
crime here was ignorance.... No one paid enough attention to this girl to even realize that she was pregnant....
The only thing this girl deserves is some mental-health treatment.").
126. See, e.g., David Cream, Letter to the Editor, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 19, 1995, at A 10 ("It seems to me
that the 'outpouring of community sympathy' toward Hopfer is responsible for the court's leniency."). One
exceptionally thoughtful editorial writer noted that Hopfer's special treatment was justified, and that the real
problem with the case was that the court's lenience was unlikely to be extended to teens of a different race and
social class than the judges:
Certainly, Ms. Hopfer is no ordinary murder convict. Whether black, white, poor or affluent, the
circumstances of her crime are unusual and don't suggest that she is a threat to society.
It is an indisputable tragedy that a teen who appears to have had a promising future would come
face-to-face with the prospect of a long prison term.
But it is an indisputable tragedy whether it happens to a suburban teen, such as Ms. Hopfer, or an
inner-city teen by any other name. Ms. Hopfer isn't the first young adult to come before
Montgomery County courts worthy of compassion.
Caroline Brewer, Editorial, Hopfer Shown Exceptional Kindness, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 1, 1995, at A 10.
127. On July 12, 1996, the Ohio Appellate Court affirmed Hopfer's conviction, and Hopfer began serving her
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public debate about the blameworthiness of the family, the community, and society
at large. '28 Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the community would have
nearly this level of sympathy had Hopfer murdered her best friend, rather than her
baby.
C. Infanticide
Although the ambivalence surrounding neonaticide cases may be surprising, it
is not incomprehensible. As the Hopfer case demonstrates, juries and judges might
be sympathetic toward the neonaticide defendant for a number of reasons. In
contrast, when a mother kills her child after the first day of its life, there is little
reason to expect a similar response. At a visceral level, the horror of infanticide
seems to grow as the victim's age increases.' 29 Thus, there is a strong temptation to
regard the killings of infants after the first twenty-four hours of life as ordinary
murders and to distinguish neonaticide alone as uniquely problematic.
To do so would be to tell a half-truth at best, for there are similarities between
neonaticide and infanticide-and among the various forms of infanticide-that
extend far beyond the fact that all of the perpetrators share the status of mother.
The most important of these similarities is that, despite the increased sense of
horror and outrage, when infanticide cases reach the criminal justice system, they
generate almost exactly the same dialectic of condemnation and mercy associated
with neonaticide. 130 Therefore, in spite of the wide variety of fact patterns and the
limited extent to which one can generalize about these homicides, the infanticide
cases fall squarely within the scope of this Article and must be considered together
with neonaticide. In this section, I will describe certain commonalities present in
modem infanticide cases and discuss the confusion and ambivalence that accompa-
nies their dispositions.
15-year sentence. Ohio v. Hopfer, No. 15345, 1996 WL 391756 (Ohio Ct. App. July 12, 1996). Her attorneys are
appealing the case to the Ohio Supreme Court.
128. See, e.g., Grim Reality Check on Youth Crime, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 1996, at 14, zone N (editorial on the
proper treatment of 10- to 12-year-old killers, noting in part that the Illinois legislature had reduced the minimum
age for imprisonment from 13 to 10); Gary Marx, Brother's Testimony Opens Trial in Eric's Death, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 18, 1995, at 1, zone N (covering trial of 10- and 11-year-olds charged with first degree murder for dropping a
five year-old from a 14th story window).
129. Philosopher Michael Tooley discusses society's tendency to place a higher value on the lives of persons as
they grow beyond infancy. His analysis begins by focusing on attitudes toward severely disabled newborns. He
notes that 55% of Australians who were surveyed believed it was morally permissible to "allow life to be
painlessly terminated in the case of babies who [were] either 'mentally abnormal' or 'physically seriously
deformed,' " yet it is virtually unheard of to advocate the same for a "mentally abnormal" or "physically
seriously deformed" adult. MIcHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 311 (1983). From this, Tooley deduces
an underlying rationale reflecting a belief that infants do not enjoy the same moral status as adults. This leads
Tooley to posit that "[i]f it is correct [that] ... infanticide is not to be treated as a crime in the case of infants
suffering from certain defects, and, even in the case of normal infants, [then it] is not wrong to the same degree as
the killing of a normal adult human being." Id. at 311-12.
130. See infra notes 194 through 240 and accompanying text.
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1. Infanticide Described
The circumstances surrounding infanticide deaths, unlike those surrounding
neonaticide deaths, are quite varied. In many ways, infanticide cases bear seem-
ingly little resemblance to one another, and even less resemblance to neonaticide.
In order to describe the patterns associated with contemporary American infanti-
cide, it is first necessary to define the population encompassed by this term.
Although the word infanticide would seem to refer to the killing of infants, there is
no established age limit for victims of this crime. Many countries have infanticide
statutes, yet even these do not have consistent definitions of the crime. 13 ' While
there are significant differences between the circumstances surrounding a mother's
killing of a ten-year-old child and that of a six-month-old, there is no readily
apparent principle by which one might distinguish between the two situations
other than drawing an arbitrary line. Moreover, drawing a line at one year of age,
for example, would hide the important similarities linking cases involving older
victims to those involving children under the age of one. The differences due to the
victim's age seem far less significant than one might expect when considering the
circumstances giving rise to the crime and the criminal justice system's disposition
of these cases. As a result, I have chosen not to set a definitive chronological line at
which a mother's killing of her child should no longer be considered "infanti-
cide."
Even beyond issues of the victim's age, it is difficult to generalize about
infanticide cases. The women in my sample of forty-nine cases, drawn from the
same span of years as the neonaticide cases, reflect a broad range of back-
grounds. 32 They are far more likely to be married or living with a partner than
those who commit neonaticide, and many of them have more than one child. 33
The modal age of the mothers in my sample, twenty-one, is higher than that of the
131. Recall that the British infanticide statute pertains to mothers who kill their children within the child's first
year of life, while New Zealand's law includes any child killed by its mother before age ten. Infanticide Act, 1938
2 Geo. 6, ch. 36 (Eng.); New Zealand CriminalAct of 1961, supra note 4, at 158. See supra notes 67 through 73
and accompanying text (discussing the scope of infanticide statutes from around the world).
132. The most dispositive factor limiting my sample is that I excluded all cases in which the mother killed her
child along with her partner, as well as those in which the partner killed the child, but the mother was named as an
accomplice. I opted to include only women who killed their children while acting alone because of my sense that
these crimes were qualitatively different from those involving other adults. Cases involving children who died
from abuse and neglect perpetrated either by the mother's partner, or by the mother together with her partner,
trigger a broad set of issues involving intimacy and violence that are somewhat, although not entirely, tangential
to this Article. For a thorough analysis of the overlap between domestic violence and maternally-inflicted child
abuse, and a critical evaluation of the trend toward holding mothers criminally accountable for their failure to
protect their children from an abusive partner, see Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive
Families: Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. Cm. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 13 (1995).
133. Of the cases that included information regarding the subject's living situation, 22 of the 41 subjects lived
with their significant other, 16 with their husband, and six with their boyfriend or partner. Twenty-six cases
reported that the woman had other children. In 14 cases, the woman lived alone with her children. See APPENDIX,
Coding Table Results.
1996]
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neonaticidal mothers. 134 The ages of the infanticide victims in my sample range
from six weeks to eight years, with the modal age being five months. Although
deaths by suffocation predominate, the causes of death range from chronic neglect
to overt acts of aggression. 135 Several of the women were accused of killing more
than one of their children, either in the same incident or over the course of time. 1
36
Despite their many dissimilarities, women who commit infanticide all manifest,
to a greater or lesser extent, consistent vulnerabilities in terms of mental health
status, economic stability, and social support. Most of the women in my sample
were poor and socially isolated. At the time of their crimes, only five of the women
accused of infanticide were employed outside of their homes. In virtually all of the
cases, the women were the full-time caretakers for their children. 13 7 Thus, the vast
majority of these women were economically dependant upon either their partner's
income or public assistance. 138
The issues of mental health status and social isolation are more complex. At a
common sense level, it may seem self-evident that "[m]others in our society
simply do not kill their children unless they are seriously disturbed individuals,
usually psychotic." ' 39 Indeed, many women who commit infanticide do so while
suffering from an identifiable mental disability, that renders them temporarily or
permanently incapable of caring for themselves and/or their children without
considerable outside assistance. It is critical to note at the outset that it is not the
fact of mental illness or disability alone, but rather the combination of a vulnerable
134. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results. This is consistent with the findings of other researchers on this topic.
See d'Orban, supra note 54, at 561 (stating that mothers committing neonaticide averaged 21 years of age,
youngest of any category in d'Orban's study).
135. Two of the cases reported that the infant/child was starved to death, while one reported the mother
running a six-week-old child over with her car. Larry King Live: A Mother Tells Why She Killed Her Son (CNN
television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1994) [hereinafter Larry King Live] (Michael Jackson sitting in for Larry King,
interviewing Sheryl Lynn Massip and her defense attorney, Milton Grimes).
136. For example, Susan Smith confessed to killing both children in what she described as a failed
suicide/homicide attempt. Rick Bragg, Carolina Jury Rejects Execution for Woman who Drowned Sons, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 1995, § 1, at 1. At the other extreme, in September 1995, Waneta Hoyt was convicted of killing
five of her children over the course of six years, all of whom were originally thought to have died of SIDS.
William Kates, Mom Convicted Of Killing 5 Kids Gets Prison Terms, Denies Guilt At Sentencing, THE RECORD,
Sept. 12, 1995, at A4; see also JOYCE EGGINTON, FROM CRADLE TO GRAvE: THE SHORT LivEs AND STRANGE
DEATHS OF MARYBETH TINNIN'S NnE CHILDREN (1989) (describing in depth the case of Marybeth Tinning,
eventually convicted for the ninth death of one of her children).
137. This fact is striking in light of current statistics indicating that 52.2% of single mothers of children under
age six work outside the home, 61.7% of married women with children under age six are employed outside the
home, and 58.8% of married women with children aged one or younger are working outside the home. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 406 (indicating the
employment status of women by marital status and presence and age of children).
138. Although it is difficult to ascertain socioeconomic status on the basis of newspaper reports and legal
records, there was only one obviously middle-class woman in the sample. See Larry King Live, supra note 135
(noting that Sheryl Massip killed her six-week-old son by driving over him with her Volvo).
139. Amy L. Nelson, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis: A New Defense?, 95 DICK L. REV. 625, 625 (1991)
(quoting report prepared for sentencing hearing in Pennsylvania v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
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mental health status and social isolation that leads to infanticide. My analysis
begins by addressing issues of mental health status, and then explores the
intersection of social isolation, mothering, and mental health.
Infanticide cases can be classified according to the mental health status of the
mother. I have classified these cases into four categories based on mental health
vulnerabilities associated with infanticide: postpartum psychosis, chronic mental
disability, affective disorders with postpartum onset, and addiction-related disor-
ders. These classifications are not necessarily mutually exclusive-for example, a
woman may be both mentally disabled and addicted-but for purposes of this
discussion, I will address each category separately.
a. Infanticide and Postpartum Psychosis
Out of every one thousand women who give birth, one or two will suffer from
postpartum psychosis.' 40 Postpartum psychosis has received considerable atten-
tion from the medical and legal communities, and the vast majority of academic
articles on the subject of infanticide relate to this disorder. 141 Postpartum psychosis
represents the far end of a spectrum of psychiatric ailments that may be triggered
by childbirth. 42 The timing of onset varies, but symptoms usually appear within
140. Debora K. Dimino, Comment, Postpartum Depression: A Defense for Mothers Who Kill their Infants, 30
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 233 (1990).
141. See, e.g., A. Kathleen Atkinson & Annette U. Rickel, Depression in Women: The Postpartum Experience,
5 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 197, 205 (1983) (summarizing postpartum psychosis studies conducted
from 1957 to the present); Michael W. O'Hara, Postpartum 'Blues, 'Depression, and Psychosis: A Review, 7 J.
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 205 (1987) (providing a comprehensive study of postpartum
psychosis). Indeed, the only mention of infanticide in the law review literature is found in the various articles
addressing postpartum psychosis as a criminal defense. See, e.g., Anne Damante Bmsca, Note, Postpartum
Psychosis: A Way Out for Murdering Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1133 (1990) (contending that current insanity
statutes should be relied on in pleading postpartum depression as a defense, and when insanity is not found,
arguing that evidence of postpartum psychosis should be a mitigating factor in sentencing); John Dent, Comment,
Postpartum Psychosis and the Insanity Defense, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL E 355 (using California law as a model and
proposing a reduced burden of proof for those defendants asserting the postpartum psychosis defense); Dimino,
Comment supra note 140, at 231-64 (proposing legislation to make infanticide a distinct crime and postpartum
depression a defense similar to insanity); Nelson, Comment, supra note 139, at 625-50 (concluding that more
education of judiciary and the public about postpartum depression is best way to deal with the issue).
142. Postpartum disorders range from mild, fleeting anxiety and depression to hormonally-induced psychosis.
By far the most common form of postpartum mental health ailment is mild postpartum depression, commonly
known as the "baby blues." This fleeting form of depression, beginning on the third to the tenth day after delivery,
and lasting at most several days, occurs with such frequency that it is regarded as normal. Irvin D. Yalom et al.,
"Postpartum Blues" Syndrome: A Description and Related Variables, 18 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 16, 16
(1968) (estimating that between 5% and 80% of women experience some postpartum psychiatric disorder). While
postpartum depression is widely recognized in medical and lay literature as a phase consisting of "unhappiness,"
"irritability," and "exhaustion," current scientific understanding indicates that the rate and the quality or intensity
of postpartum depression is utterly indistinguishable from the incidence of transient depression rates within
society at large. Maier-Katkin & Ogle, supra note 57, at 906. In other words, the "baby blues" are not that
different from the "going to work blues" suffered on Sunday nights by most of the population, and in late August
by law professors and students. Id.
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the first three months after delivery, and most often within the first two weeks. '4 3
Some experts believe that postpartum psychosis is more commonly experienced
by women with a prior history of mental illness and that it is less likely to occur in
mentally healthy women.'" All agree that a mother who experiences postpartum
psychosis after the birth of her first child is at higher risk for recurrence with her
second childbirth. 1
45
Although experts are divided on the etiology of postpartum psychosis, 46 there
is general agreement on the symptoms associated with this disorder. Postpartum
psychosis is characterized by a dramatic break with reality accompanied by "a
grossly impaired ability to function, usually because of hallucinations or delu-
sions."' 47 One of the primary markers of postpartum psychosis is delusional
fantasies related to the newborn. Most women report auditory hallucinations, in
which voices urge them to kill the child. 148 In addition to having psychotic
hallucinations, women suffering from postpartum psychosis characteristically
display other unusual behavioral tendencies. They tend to isolate themselves, they
stop speaking to others, and they are observed talking to themselves in an agitated
fashion. They are severely sleep-deprived and emotionally labile.
149
Women who kill their infants during an episode of postpartum psychosis tend to
143. LAURENCE KRuCKMAN & CHRIS ASMANN-FINCH, POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION: A RESEARCH GUIDE AND
INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY XV (1986). The earliest estimate for possible onset of symptoms is the third day
postpartum, since many theories attribute the ailment in some measure to hormonal fluctuations following
childbirth. See generally Christine A. Gardner, Note, Postpartum Depression Defense: Are Mothers Getting Away
with Murder?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 953, 960-66 (1990) (discussing the definition, causes, and symptoms
associated with postpartum depression).
144. Atkinson & Rickel, supra note 141, at 205 (citing several studies finding that women with other mental
illnesses were more likely to develop postpartum psychosis); d'Orban, supra note 54, at 562 (finding that 41% of
women studied in postpartum psychosis study previously had been treated for psychiatric illness); Gardner, Note,
supra note 143, at nn.88-89 (citing Dr. Stuart Asch, Crib Deaths: Their Possible Relationship to Post-Partum
Depression and Infanticide, 35 J. MT. SINAI Hosp. 214, 215 (1968); Marianne Yen, Women Who Kill Their
Infants: A Bad Case of the 'Baby Blues'?, WASH. POST, May 10, 1988, at A3; The Darkest Side of Postpartum
Depression, THE SUNDAY NEWS (Auckland, New Zealand), May 31, 1987, at E3).
145. Yalom et al., supra note 142, at 26; see also Gardner, Note, supra note 143, at 964 (noting that "in the
cases in which women have killed their infants and claimed insanity as a defense, every infant killed was a second
child").
146. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS] (containing the psychiatric profession's official classification of mental disorders, but not
listing postpartum psychosis as a distinct psychiatric ailment; instead, considering postpartum psychosis to be a
variety of mental illness that happens to occur in the postpartum phase).
147. O'Hara, supra note 141, at 217.
148. Mary E. Lentz, A Postmortem of the Postpartum Psychosis Defense, 18 CAP. U. L. REV. 525, 532 (1989).
Some report a belief that the child is a phantom, or was "conceived from unnatural processes such as
impregnation by the devil." Id.
149. See d'Orban, supra note 54, at 567 (noting depression, irritability, exhaustion, and apathy as symptoms
displayed by many women in the study); O'Hara, supra note 141, at 217-18 (noting inability to function,
hallucinations, delusions, confusion, and agitation as symptoms of postpartum psychosis).
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manifest these characteristics at an extreme level. For example, consider the case
of Sheryl Massip, a California woman who was charged with killing her six-week-
old son. At her 1987 murder trial, the evidence showed that she threw her son into
oncoming traffic, picked him up and carried him to her garage, hit him over the
head with a blunt object, and then finally killed him by running him over with her
car. 1
50
The events that preceded her son's death reflect Massip's deteriorating psycho-
logical condition. Her lawyer noted that
[flor two weeks, Sheryl Massip's family recognized something was wrong
with her. Her husband, five days before she killed her child, sent her away to
her mother's home to spend a night, to get some rest, because they thought that
would solve the problem. She came back, he sent her away again. On the 27th
of April, the Monday before she killed her child, she came home from spending
the night with her mother, and she went to the doctor and said, "Doctor, what's
wrong with me? I'm hallucinating. I can't sleep. Something is wrong with me.
Help me." He looked at her and said, "Oh, you're just suffering from baby
blues," [and] gave her a couple of Mellarils ... [w]hich aggravated her
psychotic state.15'
Massip's story is fairly typical of postpartum psychosis-related infanticides. She
continued to manifest severely disordered thinking after she killed her child,
telling investigators that a black object, who "wasn't really a person," with orange
hair and white gloves, had kidnapped the baby.15 2 By definition, postpartum
psychosis is brief in duration and, even if untreated, symptoms virtually always
disappear within several months of onset.'53 Therefore, by the time of her trial,
Massip was no longer psychotic. The jury found Massip guilty of second degree
murder, and Massip was jailed. Two months later, the judge overturned the verdict
and acquitted Massip on insanity grounds. '54
There is no doubt that during her psychotic episode Massip was incapable of
caring for her infant. Nevertheless, it is critical to note the many missed opportuni-
ties for intervention. Massip gave notice of her inability to cope to her husband,
mother, and physician. None of them took the time to evaluate in a serious fashion
the gap between her present abilities and the caretaking tasks she was required to
perform when left alone with her child. Had any one of these three people
recognized Massip's needs, he or she could have identified a myriad of ways in
150. Eric Lichtblau, Appeal Argued in Postpartum Case, Los ANGELES TMES, May 24, 1990, at B 1.
151. Larry King Live, supra note 135 (interviewing Milton Grimes, criminal defense attorney for Sheryl
Massip).
152. Id.
153. O'Hara, supra note 141, at 220.
154. Larry King Live, supra note 135 (interviewing Milton Grimes, criminal defense attorney for Sheryl
Massip).
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which to assist her. Therefore, it is evident that Massip's son's death was not
simply the result of her mental illness, but also of her social network's failure to
provide her with any meaningful support.
b. Infanticide by Mothers with Chronic Mental Disabilities
Although a diagnosis of postpartum psychosis may help us to understand why a
mother committed infanticide, only a small percentage of infanticides are commit-
ted by women suffering from this ailment. One study surveyed eighty-nine women
charged with infanticide during a six year period and found that, at most,
-twenty-four of the women were mentally ill, and fewer still suffered from
postpartum psychosis.' 55 Thus, even within the narrow category of women who
commit infanticide while suffering from a mental illness, postpartum psychosis
accounts for only a portion of the cases. Nevertheless, to the extent that postpartum
psychosis makes infanticide comprehensible, so too does a diagnosis of a severe
chronic mental disability.
In order to discuss infanticides committed by women who are chronically
mentally disabled yet living and parenting independently, a clear definition of
mental disability is needed. There is no consensus, however, on what constitutes a
mental disability. Rather than focusing on a medical categorization, I use the term
"chronically mentally disabled" to refer to those mothers whose mental disabili-
ties were sufficiently pronounced that, at the time they killed their children, the
state was on notice that they had marginal ability, at best, to care for a child without
assistance.
These cases are uniquely frustrating in that hindsight reveals many missed
opportunities for intervention.1 56 There were only four infanticide cases in my
sample that involved women who suffered from medically-diagnosed chronic
mental disabilities. Two discussed these mental health issues in particularly rich
detail, illustrating the range of women falling into this category. One mother was
schizophrenic; the other was mildly mentally retarded, suffered from manic
depression, and had attempted suicide several times. 157 Both women lost custody
155. d'Orban, supra note 54, at 560-62.
156. The case of six-year-old Elisa Izquierdo is representative of this phenomenon. Although she apparently
was abused by her step-father as well as her mother, and I therefore have not included her in my sample, the media
coverage of the case bears witness to the frustration borne of the difficulty in allocating blame. New York state's
child protective services long had been wary of Elisa's mother's ability to parent, and yet they scarcely followed
up on the case after reuniting Elisa with her mother. David Van Biema, Abandoned to Her Fate; Neighbors,
Teachers, and the Authorities All Knew Elisa Izquierdo Was Being Abused. But Somehow Nobody Managed to
Stop It, TINM, Dec. 11, 1995, at 32; Marc Peyser & Carla Power, The Death Of Little Elisa, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11,
1995, at 42.
157. The second of these cases, involving a woman named Simone Ayton, is discussed in detail infra, at notes
308 through 318 and accompanying text. There is a rich literature on the support mechanisms that can assist
parents with mental disabilities to raise children. For a general description of them, see Linda Dowdney & David
Skuse, Parenting Provided by Adults with Mental Retardation, 34 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 25 (1993).
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of their babies shortly after birth, when state child protection agencies found that
they were unable to care for the children. Many months later, the babies were
returned to their mothers. In both cases, the state failed to provide the mother with
any assistance or supervision, and in both cases, the children were dead within a
matter of days.
The first of these cases is particularly poignant, as it involves Amanda Wallace, a
schizophrenic woman whose mental illness was so pronounced that, from the day
of his birth, her son had been almost constantly in the care of the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services. 158 Because of a series of bureau-
cratic errors, the agency released Joseph Wallace three and half years later to the
unsupervised custody of his mother for the first time. Several days later, he was
found hanged in her apartment. When the state originally brought murder charges
against Amanda Wallace, she was found legally incompetent to stand trial. She was
then institutionalized, and a judicially-appointed committee conducted an official
inquiry into the various state agencies that had failed to protect the child. 159 In
1995, state psychiatrists found Wallace fit to stand trial, and she was convicted of
murder. 160 The state's decision to seek the death penalty astonished many observ-
ers. A psychologist who knew Ms. Wallace since she was seven years old
remarked, "[i]t's absolutely ridiculous to even think of executing someone like
Amanda Wallace. She is ill. What is society's excuse. How did we become so.
mean?''t61 After the judge announced a life sentence without parole, Patrick
Murphy, the Cook County Public Guardian, remarked that "[e]veryone in the
system failed Joey Wallace, including me.... She is very, very insane. But we're
all getting off scot-free. She's going to spend the rest of her life in prison." 162
The Wallace case illustrates the complicated nexus between a parent's mental
158. Starting at age 11, after she survived years of abuse and several suicide attempts, Amanda Wallace was
institutionalized in a state mental facility. She was in her late twenties, still living in a state mental hospital, when
her son Joseph was conceived and delivered. For a full description of the Amanda Wallace case, see REPORT OF
THE INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE IN TO THE PRACTICES, PROCESSES, AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE JUVENILE
COURT As THEY RELATE To THE JOSEPH WALLACE CASES, Oct. 1, 1993 [hereinafter JOSEPH WALLACE COMMITEE
REPORT] (on file with the author).
159. The committee's report is a stark condemnation of the state of Illinois' dysfunctional bureaucracy:
Over a period of 3-1/2 years, five judges in Cook and Kane Counties presided over the Joseph
Wallace cases. Four of those judges and at least a score of Assistant State's Attorneys, guardians ad
litem (including Assistant Public Guardians), and DCFS caseworkers actively or passively
participated in sentencing Joseph to the unsupervised custody of a very dangerous mother. The fact
that Joseph did not die earlier was strictly fortuitous. The Wallace cases reveal so many errors in
judgment by so many people that statistical inference compels the conclusion that the system itself
is responsible for the human error. This conclusion does not let any of the foregoing participants
off the hook; it merely adds to the list of responsible people who inhibit meaningful systemic
change.
Id.




HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 37 1996-1997
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
illness and the threat to a child's well-being. Amanda Wallace never was well
enough to undertake the tasks of raising Joseph alone. Society was aware of her
limitations as a parent long before she gave birth to her first child. Its attempts to
intervene, however, were incomplete and inadequate. As a result, although
Wallace's son's death was tragic and horrifying, it was not a surprise. And although
Wallace's actions were the immediate cause of her son's death, it is far from easy to
establish who is to blame.
c. Infanticide as a Manifestation of an Affective Disorder with
Postpartum Onset
In addition to women with easily identifiable mental disorders who commit
infanticide, a larger category of women kill their children in seemingly unpro-
voked displays of violence. These homicides tend to be impulsive, disproportional
reactions to some emotionally stressful event in the mother's life. Psychiatrist
Laura Miller, an.expert in treating postpartum mental disorders, refers to this
phenomenon as a manifestation of "affective disorders with postpartum onset." 163
Dr. Miller notes that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV) recognizes mood disorders following pregnancy by using generic
diagnoses, accompanied with a "postpartum onset" qualifier. 1" The DSM-IV
limits this category to episodes with an onset within four weeks after birth. 165 In
contrast, Dr. Miller's experience with these disorders has led her to conclude that
they are not solely biological in nature, but that they often arise out of a woman's
response to the "sociocultural and economic" influences in her environment. As a
result, symptoms may persist long after the birth of a child.
Of the forty-seven infanticide cases in my data base, at least three might be
viewed as falling into this category.166 These cases are dissimilar in terms of the
circumstances of the children's deaths, but similar in terms of the circumstances of
the women's lives, both prior and subsequent to childbirth. In spite of the
incomplete nature of the newspaper accounts of these cases, two common themes
emerge. First, these women had histories of considerable physical, emotional, and
sexual abuse.' 67 Second, at the time they committed infanticide, these women
lived alone with their children and had little or no outside financial or emotional
support.
163. Interview with Dr. Laura Miller, University of Illinois Hospital, in Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 11, 1996).
164. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, supra note 146, at 386.
165. Id. at 387.
166. Because newspaper coverage is incomplete, I have not included several additional cases that appear to fall
into this category.
167. Eight of the cases in my sample falling into this category mention that the woman was abused as a child or
an adult. See APPENDiX, Coding Table Results.
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The legacy of abuse is a complex one. 16 8 Although it is clear that many
survivors of abusive childhoods go on to become perfectly competent parents, a
growing body of evidence indicates that the majority of parents who are abusive
were themselves abused as children. t 69 Low self-esteem, poor impulse control,
depression, anxiety, and antisocial behavior, including aggression and substance
abuse, are among the personality characteristics observed in survivors of abuse. 170
It is not difficult to envision how these particular characteristics might complicate
parenting. By definition, parenting requires tremendous feats of patience, energy,
endurance, and maturity. If one combines the preexisting vulnerabilities of a
woman who has been abused with the challenges of parenting in socially isolated
and economically vulnerable circumstances, it is unsurprising that some of these
mothers abuse and even kill their children.17t
Perhaps the most striking of these cases in my sample involves Guinevere
Garcia, an Illinois woman who spent five years on death row before her sentence
was commuted to life imprisonment in January 1996.172 From the time that she
was six years old, Garcia was raped repeatedly by an older male relative with
whom she lived.173 Her mother, who also had been raped by this man, committed
suicide when Garcia was eighteen months old.174 Garcia began drinking heavily at
age eleven. Between ages eleven and nineteen, she suffered numerous traumas,
168. There is a growing literature exploring the tendency of survivors of abusive childhoods to replicate
abusive family patterns as adults. For a summary of this literature, see FATAL CHILD ABUSE, supra note 78.
169. Id. at 13 (finding that "the average abusive parent is in his or her mid-twenties, lives near or below the
poverty level, often has not finished high school, is depressed and unable to cope with stress, and has experienced
violence first hand"); see also Nora Dougherty, The Holding Environment: Breaking the Cycle of Abuse, 64 Soc.
CASEWORK 283 (1983) (describing a treatment program for abusive and neglecting parents, who often were
themselves denied a nurturing environment in their early lives); Brandt Steele, Reflections on the Therapy for
Those Who Maltreat Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 382-84 (Ray E. Helfer & Ruth S. Kempe eds., 1987)
(stating that an important source of childcare behavior is patterns acquired from one's own childhood experience).
But see Susan L. Smith, Significant Research Findings in the Etiology of Child Abuse, 65 Soc. CASEWORK 337,
344 (1984) (stating that research does not substantiate the "overwhelming conclusion of earlier writings" that
indicated that a majority of abusive parents were themselves victims during childhood).
170. See Sally Cantor, Inpatient Treatment ofAdolescent Survivors of Sexual Abuse, in CHILD SURVIVORS AND
PERPETRATORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 24, 25-26 (Mic Hunter ed., 1995) (discussing findings about the dangers of
repeated abuse, including substance abuse, self mutilation, suicidal tendencies, and eating disorders); Ruth S.
Kempe, A Developmental Approach to the Treatment of an Abused Child, in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note
169, at 362 (listing poor self-esteem, social isolation, dependent relationships, and poor coping abilities as long
term effects of child abuse).
171. Studies have noted a correlation between child abuse fatalities and household isolation, whether in rural
or urban areas. Abusive behavior not only is more likely to occur when the primary caretaker receives no
parenting support from neighbors, friends, and relatives-it is less likely to be discerned and thereby prevented by
others. FATAL CHILD ABUSE, supra note 78, at 125-26 (citing National Research Council, Understanding Child
Abuse (Washington, D.C., 1993); Smith, supra note 169, at 338.
172. Eric Zorn, Prison in Life; For Garcia, Commutation May be Ultimate Punishment, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17,
1996, at 1, zone N.
173. Kathryn Kahler, Women on Death Row: A Chilling Sign of the Times, PLAIN DEALER, May 26, 1993, at Al.
174. Zorn, supra note 172, at 1, zone N.
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including being gang-raped and being forced into a sham marriage with an
undocumented man. 175
At age nineteen, Garcia gave birth to a daughter and was struggling to support
herself and her daughter by prostitution and nude dancing.' 76 By the time her
daughter was eleven months old, Garcia became terrified that she would lose
custody and that her daughter would be raised in a home environment similar to
the one she and her mother had lived in. 177 One day, overwhelmed by these fears,
she smothered her daughter.178 The police did not discover the crime until they
came to interview Garcia two years later regarding two fires that had occurred in
her apartment building. 179 She told the police that she had set the fires on the first
and second anniversaries of her daughter's death.' 80 Garcia confessed to having
killed her daughter and led the police to the spot where she had buried her
daughter's body.' 8'
Not all of the women whose infanticides fall into this category killed their
children with the deliberateness manifested by Garcia. Many of these cases
involve impulsive actions such as suffocating or fatally beating a crying child. 182 A
few involve women who were struggling with depression and who intended to kill
themselves as well as their children.18 3 Read together, these cases all involve
women who simply lacked the internal and external resources that enable other
mothers to withstand the pressures associated with being the sole caretaker for an
infant or child. These cases reflect a disturbed mother's spontaneous or irrational
and disproportionately violent response to the very real challenges of parenting in
isolation.
d. Addiction-Related Infanticide
The final category of infanticide involves women who are substance abusers and
whose crimes are an indirect result of their addictions. Of course, substance abuse
may be a contributing factor in all of the other categories of infanticide as well. 184
175. Id.
176. John Carlin, Wife on Death Row Spurns Clemency Plea, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 1, 1996, at 11.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Illinois v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 115 (Il. 1995) (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. For a discussion of one such case, the Latrena Pixley case, see infra notes 205 through 220 and
accompanying text.
183. See Joe Chidley, "I have put my faith in God," MACLEAN'S, July 31, 1995, at 41 (indicating that, at the
time of her crime, Susan Smith was being treated with Prozac for depression).
184. For example, there is considerable evidence indicating that a high percentage of women who are addicts
suffered violent and abusive childhoods and developed drug habits in order to cope with the symptoms of this
abuse. See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant
Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 512 (1992) [hereinafter Oberman, Sex, Drugs] (noting that
between 70% and 100% of all female drug abusers are victims of incest or sexual violence).
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The effect of addiction upon a woman's capacity to parent is always harmful in that
the addiction, by definition, renders the parent both less attuned to, and less able to
respond to, her child's needs.' 5 When a parent is addicted to an illegal substance,
there is the additional complication of financing and securing a steady supply of
the drug.' 8 6 As a result, it is not surprising to find that as many as 50% of child
abuse and neglect cases referred to juvenile court involve allegations of parental
substance abuse.' 87
There are numerous stories of women whose children died, either directly or
indirectly, as a result of the women's addictions. The most common scenarios seem
to involve cases like that of Pamela Rother, who was sentenced to ten years'
imprisonment for the crime of felony child neglect after her two-month-old infant
starved to death."' An expert witness testified that Rother, who lived alone with
her daughter in "a dilapidated and unkempt trailer," was delusional and paranoid,
and that her deep psychological problems were aggravated by her addiction to
methamphetamine. ' 89
There is a growing literature describing the psycho-social problems relating to
drug addiction in women. Unlike male addicts, who tend to describe their
substance abuse as recreational, female addicts tend to describe their addictions as
therapeutic-as coping mechanisms that enable them to bear the overwhelmingly
difficult circumstances in their lives.' 90 Indeed, the life circumstances of most
addicts are, by any objective measure, challenging.' 9' Moreover, once they have
children, these women are not miraculously transformed into "supermoms." They
still face the same demons that led them to anesthetize themselves in the first place,
and still need help to quit, but now they also need child care, more money, more
patience, and self-control.' 92
185. Shoni K. Davis has constructed a profile of the chemically dependent woman and explains that her
addiction (as well as the problems that contributed to the addiction such as childhood trauma and financial
problems) impairs her ability to parent. She generally will have problems with parental self-concept, maternal
attitudes, bonding, and frustration tolerance. Shoni K. Davis, Chemical Dependency in Women: A Description of
its Effects and Outcome on Adequate Parenting, 7 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 225, 226-27 (1990).
186. Oberman, Sex, Drugs, supra note 184, at 513 (noting that addicted women often obtain their drugs in
exchange for sex).
187. J. Michael Murphy et al., Substance Abuse and Serious Child Mistreatment: Prevalence, Risk, and
Outcome in a Court Sample, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 197, 207 (1991).
188. Paul Elias, Woman Gets 10 Years in Baby's Death, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 26, 1995, at B 1.
189. Id. In a similar case, a Chicago woman whose daughter starved to death was charged with first degree
murder. Allegedly, the mother had sold her baby's formula coupons from the federal Women, Infants and Children
program in order to support her cocaine habit. Phillip J. O'Connor, Public Guardian Rips DCFS Over Deaths of 2
Kids, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at 61.
190. Beth G. Reed, Developing Women-Sensitive Drug-Dependence Treatment Services: Why So Difficult?, 19
J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 151, 152 (1987).
191. In my earlier work on pregnancy and substance-abusing women, I noted that addicted women "often
report extreme levels of depression and anxiety, in addition to very low self-esteem .... [They] are often involved
in abusive relationships.... [T]his vulnerability to physical abuse may stem from a history of being abused as
children." Oberman, Sex, Drugs, supra note 184, at 512-13.
192. See Davis, supra note 185, at 226-27 (describing a profile of the chemically dependent woman in which
19961
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 41 1996-1997
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Social isolation also plays a role in the infanticide deaths of the children of
addicted mothers. These children commonly are neglected while the parent is
either on drugs or in search of drugs. Family, friends, and the state often are fully
aware of this neglect long before the child is physically harmed. Tragically,
however, the failure to intervene seems to be a consistent theme in these cases. In
fact, in several of the seven cases in my sample that involved evidence of maternal
substance abuse, the state department of child protection already was on notice of
the potentially abusive situation, but failed to intervene in time to save the child's
life. 1
93
2. Ambivalence in Punishing Infanticide: The "Mad" and the "Bad"
Unlike in the neonaticide cases, there is considerable uniformity in the criminal
charges brought against women suspected of infanticide. The vast majority of the
women in these cases were charged with first degree murder. Nevertheless, the
case outcomes are remarkably varied. At one end of the spectrum, at least two
women convicted of infanticide have been sentenced to death, while at the other
end, there are several women who were convicted, but released without a prison
sentence. '
94
Although the outcomes are varied, the cases tend to reflect a pattern of
lenience. 195 This pattern has been noticed by criminal law experts, who have come
to view infanticide defendants as "empathy outliers"--defendants "to whom
jurors have appeared to be inordinately (and, perhaps, even inappropriately)
sympathetic," in spite of the increasingly limited reach of the insanity defense. 1
96
This phenomenon was reported in a New York study of the insanity defense that
concluded:
[w]hile from psychiatric reports, it is apparent that some of these mothers were
childhood trauma, psychological characteristics, socioeconomic factors, and pregnancy issues impinge on the
capacity to parent); Kelly Kelleher et al., Alcohol and Drug Disorders among Physically Abusive and Neglectful
Parents in a Community-Based Sample, 84 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1586 (1994) (comparing frequency of substance
use disorders and symptoms between adults reporting child abuse and neglect and match controls); Dianne 0.
Regan et al., Infants of Drug Addicts: At Risk for Child Abuse, Neglect, and Placement in Foster Care, 9
NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TIERATOLOGY 315 (1987) (comparing pregnant drug-dependent women and comparable
drug-free women and suggesting that failure to resolve the conflicts resulting from childhood sexual trauma
and/or the use of illicit drugs to cope with these feelings appears to disrupt the ability of women to parent their
own children); Lynn Singer et al., Increased Psychological Distress in Post-Partum Cocaine-Using Mothers, 7 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 165 (1995) (describing psychological distress as reported postpartum by poor women who
used cocaine during pregnancy).
193. See, e.g., Nathan McCall, Child's Death a Tragedy in Waiting, Neighbors Say, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 199 1,
at Dl (describing the routine visits of Washington, D.C. social workers to the apartment of Judith Coleman in
response to reports by neighbors that Coleman was abusing her children).
194. For a sense of the breadth of case outcomes for women charged with infanticide, see APPENDIX, Coding
Table Results.
195. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results.
196. PERLIN, supra note 43, at 192.
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grossly insane at the time of the infanticidal acts (e.g., believed child was
turning into evil beings), there are others whose primary difficulty seemed to
be one of personal inadequacy and, more specifically, an inadequacy in the
wife-mother-homemaker roles, with resulting stress. Basically, it is our belief
that society, in its desire to preserve an illusion of "mother love", is hesitant to
carefully scrutinize the mother-child relationship and recognize realistically
that the most reasonable target for a mother's frustration and anger is her child.
Instead, to preserve our illusions about "mother love", we categorize women
who murder their children as "insane". 97
Yet, it also is clear that not all infanticide defendants are treated with lenience.
Instead, it seems that the criminal justice system and the media cast these diverse
defendants as either crazy women, who are punished leniently, if at all, or evil
women, who are punished rather harshly.
Others have identified the criminal justice system's general tendency to polarize
female defendants by portraying them as either "mad" or "bad." 98 It is hypoth-
esized that "the reasons for women's crimes are sought within the discourse of the
'irrational' and the 'pathological' " because violent criminal activity is not
consistent with stereotypically feminine behavior.' 99 One study of images of
infanticidal women found that this dichotomization was particularly evident in
these cases. Professor Wilczynski of Cambridge University studied a sample of
twenty-two British cases, and found that in virtually all the cases, "the women
were clearly viewed as either 'mad' or 'bad' ":
[i]n 14 cases, the women were seen as "mad" and as fulfilling the female
stereotype of having mental or psychiatric problems. These offenders were
viewed as essentially good women and mothers, for whom something had
gone tragically wrong. Their responsibility was, therefore, lessened, and hence
they were treated sympathetically.... In the other eight cases the women were
perceived as "bad" and as having behaved in a way inconsistent with the
female stereotype (e.g., as neglectful, uncaring or sexual). They were seen to
have committed "wicked" acts for which they were totally responsible and
were treated punitively. All were given prison sentences. There did not appear
to be anything between these two extremes.
The cases falling into the "mad" category of infanticidal mothers do not
197. Henry J. Steadman et al., The Use of the Insanity Defense, in A REPORT TO Gov. HUGH L. CAREY ON THE
INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK 37, 68-69 (1978) (prepared under the direction of William A. Carnahan, Deputy
Commissioner and Counsel).
198. Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 72.
199. Id.; see generally Susan M. Edwards, Neither Mad nor Bad: The Female Violent Offender Reassessed, 9
WOMEN'S STUDIES INT. FORUM 79, 79 (1986) (stating that women who are "suspects, defendants or offenders" are
"dealt with in accordance with the degree to which their criminal and social behavior deviates from appropriate
gender role expectations").
200. Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 74.
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necessarily involve women who meet the legal definition of criminally insane.2"'
Rather, "madness" refers to an intuitive understanding, evidenced by those who
pass judgment upon the defendant, that she was crazy. 20 2 The vast majority of the
women in my study who were perceived and portrayed as "crazy" by the media,
the lawyers, and the judges or juries did not plead an insanity defense, nor were
they psychotic.
The broad scope of madness in infanticide cases is illustrated by the case of
Latrena Pixley, a nineteen-year-old woman who admitted that she suffocated her
six-week-old baby "because no one was helping ... take care of it."'20 3 In her
statement to the police, Pixley said that on the morning of her baby's death, she
made breakfast for her one-year-old son, but had no baby formula in the house to
feed her crying newborn. 2° She fed the baby a bottle of water, but the baby
continued crying.2 °5 She went to a neighbor's to use the phone, but the neighbor
was not home.20 6 When she returned, the baby was still crying.20 7 She picked her
up and began to rock her. When the baby failed to stop crying, Pixley put a blanket
over the baby's face.20 8
Afterwards, Pixley wrapped her dead baby in the blanket and placed the body in
a trash bin.20 9 Later that day, her boyfriend came home. She made him dinner, and
they went out to visit with his family.2 '0 A relative later recalled that the
conversation that evening was about what a shame it was that young mothers in the
District of Columbia were killing their babies. 21 1 Apparently, no one asked about
Pixley's newborn's whereabouts. The next morning, after making breakfast for her
201. Wilczynski notes that "[i]n most cases of infanticide ... the mental illness is usually not of sufficient
severity that it would be recognized by the law in any other context (e.g., as sufficient basis for a plea of
diminished responsibility)." Id. at 76 (citing d'Orban, supra note 54, at 570). Only one of the women in my
sample clearly met the legal standard for insanity, and she was found unfit to stand trial. Two other women pled
and were acquitted on insanity grounds after proving that they killed their children while suffering from
postpartum psychosis. See APPENDIX, Coding Table Results. Although the limited sample size affects the
significance of this success rate, this success rate actually is remarkably high in light of statistics suggesting that
the insanity defense is raised in only 1% of all felony cases, and results in acquittal (not guilty for reasons of
insanity) in only 26% of these cases. Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics ofInsanity Defense
Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIAT. LAW 331 (1991).
202. See Nelson, Comment, supra note 139, at 625 (noting that in absence of a serious mental illness, most
women do not kill their children).
203. Gabriel Escobar, Mother Charged in Killing, Infant's Body Found in SE Trash Bin, WASH. POST, June 21,
1992, at B 1.
204. Paul Duggan, Leniency in Baby's Death; Judge Gives D.C. Mother Weekends in Jail, WASH. POST, June 5,
1993, atAl.
205. Catherine Toups, Mother Gets Weekends in Jail for Killing Infant, WASH. TIMES, June 5, 1993, at AI0.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.; Duggan, supra note 204, at A 1.
209. Duggan, supra note 204, at Al.
210. Id.
211. Toups, supra note 205, at A10.
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boyfriend and her one-year-old son, Pixley began crying and told her boyfriend
that she had killed the baby. 2 12 He did not believe her, but went out to check the
trash, whereupon he found the baby's body, and called the police.213
Pixley was charged with first degree murder, but pled guilty to second degree
murder, which carried with it a possible prison term of fifteen years to life. At her
sentencing hearing, the state asked the judge to impose the maximum sentence,
arguing that "it is impossible to imagine any more depraved and heinous behavior
than that of Latrena Pixely.... Ms. Pixley is a murderer and should be treated like
a murderer."- 214 The defense presented expert testimony that Pixley suffered from
postpartum depression. Although this term was never defined, the description of
Pixley's behavior falls far short of a diagnosis of postpartum psychosis.215 Instead,
the defense expert testified that Pixley was extremely depressed, and that her
depression was both pregnancy-related and an outgrowth of her deprived back-
ground: Pixley was a high school dropout who had been emotionally and
physically abused as a child of two drug-addicted parents.216
Judge George Mitchell followed the defense attorney's recommendation and
imposed a sentence of weekends in jail for three years. In sentencing Pixley, he
remarked that people seem more inclined to "understand these psychological
phenomenons [sic] [when they occur] in high-level people, but it becomes
un-understandable in a poor person sometimes. I don't want to be victimized by
that kind of thinking.... I want to treat all people the same, whether they be poor,
rich or whatever.' 2
17
Given that the law generally does not reduce the penalties for homicide when a
defendant establishes that she was depressed, 1 8 the judge's claim that he was
treating all people alike is ironic. Nevertheless, it demonstrates that, having
classified the defendant as mad, it became permissible to treat her with extraordi-
nary lenience.
Unlike the "mad" infanticide defendants, those who are viewed as "bad" are
portrayed as "ruthless, selfish, cold, callous, neglectful of their children or
domestic responsibilities, violent or promiscuous." 2 19 In addition to being tried for
infanticide, the media "tries" these women for all "crimes" relating to their lack of
maternal altruism.220
212. Duggan, supra note 204, at Al.
213. Id.; Toups, supra note 205, at A 10.
214. Toups, supra note 205, at A 10.
215. For a description of this disorder, see supra notes 140 through 154 and accompanying text.
216. Duggan, supra note 204, at Al.
217. Id.
218. For an overview of criminal law defenses related to a defendant's mental state, see PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 161, 171, 173 (1984 & Supp. 1996).
219. Wilczynski, supra note 7, at 78.
220. Note that this categorization may be seen in the media, long before the trial occurs. For example, Jennie
Bain, a 20-year-old single woman living in a trailer park in Tennessee was indicted for first degree murder in the
1996]
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For example, consider Sabrina Butler's story. Butler was indicted for capital
murder in the death of her nine-month-old son. 221 At around midnight on April 12,
1989, Butler noticed that her son was not breathing, and brought him to a local
hospital.222 The baby was pronounced dead on arrival, and the doctors suspected
that child abuse may have led to his death.223 An autopsy revealed that death
occurred as a result of an infection following from a perforation in the small
intestine. Doctors inferred that a "substantial blunt force to the abdomen" caused
the perforation. 224 The police were summoned, and Butler was questioned through
the night by several detectives.
Butler gave numerous conflicting stories about the circumstances of the prior
evening, first telling the authorities that the baby had been left with a babysitter,
then admitting that the baby was with her throughout the day.225 Butler was
similarly vague about how she discovered that her baby was not breathing. It is not
clear whether she found the baby dead, or whether it stopped breathing while she
was with it. Her stories include the fact that she went out for a brief jog around the
block at around 10:00 p.m., and that she was expecting a male visitor that evening,
although the timing of both of these events remains uncertain.226
As a result of these inconsistent stories and the ambiguities surrounding the
baby's death, Butler's public defender sought funds from the court to hire a
psychiatrist and an investigator.22 7 The judge denied both of these requests,
asserting that an investigator was not legally necessary, and that sufficient
information about the defendant was obtained from the brief psychiatric evaluation
conducted by the state's psychiatrist, who found her competent to stand trial.228
The judge likewise denied defendant's request for a manslaughter instruction.
229
The jury convicted Butler of killing her son while engaged in the commission of
felonious child abuse, and sentenced her to death. 3 °
deaths of her two children, ages 23 months and one year. According to the news accounts, she left the children
unattended in her parked car for eight to 10 hours on a Saturday evening while she was inside a motel room
partying with some friends. When she returned to the car in the morning, the boys had died of dehydration and
suffocation. The father of Bain's children was a truck driver who was infrequently present in the lives of Jennie
and her children. The first line of one article covering the story reads, "Jennie Bain just wanted to have fun."
Charles Laurence, Parent First, Child Last: The Mother Who Left Her Two Babies to Die in a Hot Car is the
Latest Child Neglect Case to Shake America, DAILY TEkLEGRAPH (London), June 9, 1995, at 21.
221. Butler v. Mississippi, 608 So. 2d 314, 315 (Miss. 1992).
222. Id. at 316.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 316-17.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 321.
228. Id.
229. Id. at319.
230. Id. at 318. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court overturned the conviction and remanded for retrial
because the prosecutor, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, asked the jury to infer guilt from the fact that Butler
did not testify at trial. Id.
[Vol. 34:1
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 46 1996-1997
MOTHERS WHO KILL
Everything about the case against Butler called out for explanation, especially in
view of the penalty she received. There were questions concerning what led to the
baby's death, what role Butler played in the baby's death, and what Butler's
background was. Even the Mississippi Supreme Court, which ultimately granted
Butler a new trial on procedural grounds, rejected defense claims of error based on
the trial court's refusal to provide funds for a psychiatric evaluation. 23 1 Interest-
ingly, Butler was acquitted upon retrial after the judge heard expert testimony that
Butler could not have caused the infant's death, which was attributable to either
cystic kidney disease or sudden infant death syndrome.232
Although it is useful to observe the binary pattern of madness and badness in
considering the broad range of penalties assigned to infanticide cases, upon closer
inspection, the categories are not particularly descriptive or discrete. First, despite
the association between the perceived madness of a particular defendant and
lenient treatment, the concept of madness is so nebulous as to be meaningless. So
little is reported about the women's mental status and capacity that one gets the
sense that the defendant's actual mental health is almost beside the point in these
cases, and that madness is simply a way for judges or juries to explain actions they
view as otherwise inexplicable, and to justify the mercy shown to those defendants
whom they find sympathetic. The cases in my sample in which infanticide
defendants received particularly harsh sentences (life imprisonment or death)
predominantly involved poor women and/or women of color. Although my data is
insufficiently complete to permit an analysis of the extent to which maternal race
and class affects case outcome, it is quite likely that the harsh treatment visited
upon poor women of color in other areas of the criminal justice system also is
manifested in infanticide cases.23 3
Second, a more critical scrutiny of the cases reveals that, particularly in high
profile cases, the categorization process is not an immutable one. Instead, the
infanticide defendant's image may alternate between "mad" and "bad," and
ultimately, the jury's decision may reflect a sense that the woman is both mad and
bad. In other words, the dialectic of madness and badness is simply another
manifestation of jury ambivalence about allocating blame in infanticide cases.
231. Id. at 321. The Mississippi Supreme Court remanded for retrial on the basis of only one error: that the
prosecutor asked the jury to infer guilt from the defendant's failure to testify.
232. 56 Inmates Executed in 1995, Most Since 1957; U.S. Total is Expected to Rise Further with 3,000 on
Death Row, BALT. SuN, Jan. 2, 1996, at A3.
233. The exceptionally severe punishment visited upon poor women of color by the criminal justice system is
discussed in the following works: Annette Appell, On Fixing "Bad Mothers" and Saving Their Children; Four
Stories (June 26, 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Oberman, Control, supra note 6; Oberman,
Sex, Drugs, supra note 184; Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IowA L. REv. 95 (1993) [hereinafter
Roberts, Motherhood]; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts who have Babies: Women of Color Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1991). See also Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Monster Stories:
Women Charged With Perinatal Endangerment, in UNCERTAIN TERMS 282 (Faye Ginsburg & Anna Lowenhaupt
Tsing eds., 1990) (neonaticide study suggesting different outcomes for young white women, whose actions often
went unpunished, as opposed to older women and all women of color, who received stringent punishment).
19961
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 47 1996-1997
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Thus, the shifting characterizations of an infanticide defendant from bad to mad,
and sometimes back again, reflects a systemic struggle to devise an appropriate
punishment for her.234
Perhaps the quintessential "bad" infanticidal mother is Susan Smith, whom the
media relentlessly portrayed as bad, even when the jury ultimately voted to spare
her life. In the fall of 1994, after having led the nation on a phony manhunt for a
mysterious black man who she claimed had kidnapped her children, Susan Smith
shocked the nation by confessing that she strapped her two children into their car
seats, and then rolled the car into a pond. In the immediate aftermath of Smith's
confession, crowds screamed for her death.2 35 And yet, as the case went to trial,
David Smith, Susan Smith's former husband, released a book detailing Susan's
sexual exploits, explaining that "his only motive is to ensure that public sympathy
remain with the boys rather than Susan. ' 23 6 He won that battle, as 63% of
Americans surveyed by the Princeton Survey Research Associates favored the
death penalty in her case.237
But upon closer examination of this rough classification, we see familiar signs
of strain and ambivalence. David Smith felt compelled to write his book, in part,
because he feared that public sympathy was shifting toward Susan. Indeed, soon
after the immediate shock of the story wore off, some commentators began to view
Susan Smith as an extraordinarily troubled young woman who had intended to take
her own life, not just those of her children. These stories portrayed an image of
madness at odds with the original images of Smith's evil nature. 38 When it finally
came time for the jury to rule, it seemed to view her as both mad and bad rather
than choose between .these two images. They saw her life in context-the abusive
step-father, the social isolation, the limited options, her failure to reach out for
help, her vindictive, immature behavior,239 and despite having been carefully
234. The attempt by jurors to resolve the mad or bad dilemma concerning the mother who kills her child, and
as a result determine the appropriate punishment for her, also was evidenced in the case of Rebecca Hopfer. See
supra notes 109 through 128 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Linda Ellerbee, Smith will live-Does white make right?, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 6, 1995
(Outlook), at 6 (stating that Susan Smith should have received the death penalty).
236. Gail Wescott, The Reckoning, PEOPLE, Aug. 7, 1995, at 73.
237. Brad Warthen, Editorial, Jury's Wisdom Beats 'Dittohead Justice', DENVER POST, Aug. 10, 1995, at B 11.
In one of its cover stories on Susan Smith, NEWSWEEK magazine called her a "promiscuous, sexually exploitive
adult... [who] ended her marriage to the poor boy who loved her and gambled on a rich boy who didn't. When it
all came apart she committed an act of savagery that defies understanding." Tom Morgenthau, Condemned to Life,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 19.
238. Perhaps the most thoughtful essay on the subject was written by Barbara Ehrenreich, Susan Smith:
Corrupted By Love?, TIME, Aug. 7, 1995, at 78.
239. See Mona Charen, The Lessons of the Susan Smith Verdict; Children are Like Property, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 7, 1995, at A6 (arguing that society views strangers who mistreat children more harshly than mothers
who mistreat their own children); Mike Doming, Abusive Stepfather Testifies for Smith; He Says He Must Share in
Her Guilt, Pleads for Her life, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1995, at 4, zone N (describing how Susan Smith's step-father
admitted to abusing her as a child and pleaded for leniency on her behalf); Robert Scheer, Small-Town Values Like
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death-qualified,24 ° they refused to sentence her to death.
IV. THE LEGACY OF AMBIVALENCE ABOUT INFANTICIDE
The preceding sections point to a widespread pattern of ambivalence about
whether, how, and whom to punish for the crime of infanticide. This pattern seems to be
consistent throughout much of Western culture and history. Therefore, this Article could
end here with the simple conclusion that, like other societies, modem American society
differentiates infanticide from murder. Because it seems that the United States is not
alone in its ambivalent response to this crime, it might be argued that our impulse
toward mercy is somehow "natural" and, therefore, not necessarily objectionable.
As is the case with other societies, the impulse toward exceptionalizing
infanticide cases is just that-an impulse. There is no dialogue about the sources of
our ambivalence, nor is there any formalized justification for the generally
sympathetic treatment these defendants receive. For those inclined to be sympa-
thetic with these defendants, there might be a sense of taboo in recognizing the
tendency toward lenience-as if it is so lacking in legitimacy that it must be
overcome. For those opposed to such sympathetic treatment, articulating this
phenomenon as a pattern only reconfirms what they already suspected: that
without any apparent explanation, these crimes get special treatment.2 41 Regard-
less of whether one is inclined for or against sympathy for women who kill their
children, there are dangers inherent in this unarticulated impulse to exceptionalize
infanticide. There are at least four pernicious results that follow from the failure to
acknowledge or explain why infanticide is different from other forms of homi-
cide. 42 After describing the various dangers inherent in treating these cases
differently without acknowledging how or why, this section undertakes a direct
exploration of the ways in which these cases are exceptional.
A. Exploring the Legacy of Ambivalence
The failure to explain or justify treating infanticide cases as exceptional may
Hiding Terrible Secrets, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 6, 1995, at FI (discussing how moral corruption is often hidden,
as exemplified by the sexual abuse to Susan Smith at the hands of her step-father); Alice Steinbach, Why Mothers
Kill: Two women confessed to murdering their children, and now the question remains: How could they?, BALT.
SuN, Dec. 12, 1994, at D1 (discussing characteristics common to women who kill their children).
240. See Eric Zorn, "Wtherspooning' May be the Death of Susan Smith, Cmtl. Tkm., July 20, 1995 at 1, zone N
(discussing how 16 potential jurors were kept off the jury in the Smith trial because they would not impose the death
penalty on her); see also David C. Baldus, Keynote Address: The Death Penalty Dialogue Between Law and Social
Science, 70 IN. LJ. 1033 (1995) (discussing the relationship between social science research and death penalty decision
making).
241. See, e.g., Brusca, Note, supra note 141, at 1133 (arguing that infanticide is excusable only when the
defendant meets the pre-existing insanity defense); Gardner, Note, supra note 143, at 953 (arguing that
postpartum depression should not receive special recognition under the law).
242. See infra notes 243 through 249 and accompanying text.
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yield a host of unfounded and problematic inferences. First, one might interpret the
reluctance to punish infanticide as an indication that society values the lives of
children less than those of adults. In fact, this line of cases could be seen as
evidence to support the argument made by abortion opponents that a society that
tolerates abortion devalues not only fetal life, but life in general.2 43 The fallacy in
this reasoning lies in the fact that, generally speaking, most states penalize the
killing of a child at least as harshly as the killing of an adult. In fact, in American
death penalty jurisprudence, the killing of a child under a certain statutorily
prescribed age, by definition, renders the defendant eligible for the death pen-
alty.244 Moreover, research suggests that when men kill their children, there is no
pattern of ambivalence or mercy in terms of the punishment they receive.245
A second danger inherent in the unarticulated impulse toward exceptionalizing
infanticide is that it threatens to undermine the credibility and integrity of the law.
At the very least, the wide range of responses to infanticide in the United States
reflects an arbitrary and incoherent approach to the crime. The range of outcomes
points to the inescapable conclusion that society not only is unsure about how
severely to punish women who kill their children, but that at times, it is unsure
whether to punish them at all. To the extent that society punishes law-breakers in
order to deter criminal activity, the unjustified and sporadic tendency toward
lenience in these cases risks undermining deterrence. More importantly, the
reluctance to penalize those who break this particular law indirectly calls into
243. In her study of a series of neonaticide prosecutions, Anna Tsing notes that
[v]alue statements from the abortion debate have emerged in practically every case I have found in
which a white high school or college student has been charged with perinatal endangerment. For
those who oppose abortion, the connection is simple. As the sheriff who arrested one college
student put it, 'This was just a nine month abortion to her. She's been told it's legal and she
stretched it all the way.'
Tsing, supra note 233, at 290.
244. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1994) (declaring that murder of an individual under 12
years of age makes certain defendants eligible for the death penalty).
245. P.T. d'Orban's study of women who killed their children found that "[le]ighty per cent received a
noncustodial sentence." d'Orban, supra note 54, at 569. He contrasts these results with sentences received by 29
battering fathers who killed their children. Id. (citing P.D. Scott, Parents Who Kill Their Children, 13 MED.
SCIENCE & L. 120 (1973a)). "In Scott's study, 86% of the fathers were given a prison sentence, only one Probation
Order was made (without a treatment condition), and none of the men received a medical disposal." Id.
Additional evidence of our lack of mercy for nonmothers who kill children is found in the fact that we readily
punish the killing of infants, and even fetuses, when the perpetrators are not mothers. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 14:32.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996):
A. Feticide is the killing of an unborn child by the act, procurement, or culpable omission of a
person other than the mother of the unborn child. The offense of feticide shall not include acts
which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion to
which the pregnant woman or her legal guardian has consented or which was performed in an
emergency as defined in R.S.40:1299.35.12. Nor shall the offense of feticide include acts which
are committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic
testing or therapeutic treatment.
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question the legitimacy of punishing those who break other laws.246
Third, the effect of this ambivalence is to create a set of cases involving women
defendants that are treated differently from similar cases involving men. Those
critical of the frequently lenient outcomes in these cases may argue that the law is
"sexist" and displays an antiquated chivalry in this reluctance to convict and
punish women. Despite the fact that, as a general matter, there is little evidence that
the law treats women defendants differently from men, because the lenience in
these particular cases is neither explained nor justified based on gender, it is
difficult to respond to these claims.24 7 Moreover, history teaches that there is reason for
caution and skepticism whenever the law determines that women should be treated
differently from men-even if such determination arises out of an ostensibly benevolent
impulse.248 As Professor Coughlin observes, exceptionalizing women threatens to
deny them the "same capacity for self-governance that is attributed to men."' 24 9
246. Recall that this was precisely the concern that led Parliament to enact the modern British Infanticide Act.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
247. There is considerable debate about gender differences in the enforcement of criminal law. In many cases,
women are sentenced more harshly than are men who commit comparable crimes. For a comprehensive
exploration of the criminal justice system's differential treatment of women, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The
Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2151 (1995). Ania Wilczynski and Allison Morris
summarize this research in their article on parents who kill their children, noting that
[a] continuing debate in both conventional and feminist criminological writings is whether or not
women are dealt with more leniently than men throughout the criminal justice system. There is
little agreement. The closest there seems to be to a consensus is the answer: it depends (for
example, on the offence, the offender's race or class and so on).
Wilczynski & Morris, supra note 2, at 31. Although it nevertheless is possible that the ambivalence about
punishing infanticide reflects vestiges of paternalism, it seems likely that this impulse arises out of the gendered
structure of parenting. In other words, because the tasks of mothering differ dramatically from those of fathering,
the system differentiates between mothers and fathers who kill their children. See infra notes 297 through 323 and
accompanying text (exploring the structure of motherhood as it relates to infanticide).
248. There is a long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases illustrating the double-edged sword of laws ostensibly
designed to protect women. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding exclusion of women
from mandatory draft registration); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding law that limited the
number of hours women could work daily); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding state's
refusal to grant married woman a license to practice law). The pernicious effect of such laws was memorialized by
Justice Brennan, who noted that "[t]raditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic
paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (striking down federal law that automatically granted housing and medical benefits to married men
in the military, but required married women to demonstrate husband's dependence in order to receive the benefits).
249. Anne Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1, 6 (1994). Professor Coughlin elaborates on this
point, noting that
if women achieve leniency by exploiting, rather than challenging and revising, the existing
categories of excuse, they not only leave the theory of criminal responsibility intact, they also
leave intact the competing life stories that the theory constructs and makes available for excused
actors and responsible human beings to experience. The experience of the responsible actor is one
that resonates powerfully in our culture and, by securing excuse, women assure that it is one that
will continue to be denied to them.
Id. at 25.
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Fourth and finally, because there is no explanation for why we treat infanticide
differently, or even an acknowledgment that we do so, there is no opportunity to
view these cases as interrelated. Indeed, the unexamined impulse toward lenience
has obscured the very patterned nature of these cases. The intensity and exclusivity
of our focus on the wisdom of punishing the defendant channels society's attention
away from the remarkably patterned circumstances that surround these crimes.
Thus, despite the patterned nature of these circumstances, each case generates the
same tired dialogue regarding the defendant's culpability and the merit and utility
of punishment. Society becomes trapped in this ongoing dialogue and, therefore,
never comes to grips with the role played by families and communities in
contributing to these infants' deaths. Simply put, the failure to articulate the
justifications for exceptionalizing infanticide leads to the failure to identify
circumstances latent in society that contribute to and perpetuate this crime.
B. Identifying the Sources of Ambivalence
The only way to avoid the problems arising out of the unexamined impulse
toward exceptionalizing infanticide is to attempt to identify and acknowledge the
reasons for our ambivalence about infanticide. This process requires that we
reexamine the various forms of modem American infanticide in order to under-
stand exactly what makes these cases seem different.
1. Exploring the Exceptional Nature of Infanticide
At its foundation, the response to infanticide is ambivalent because society
simultaneously expresses moral outrage at the offense and treats the offenders with
lenience. This ambivalence reflects a difficulty, not with condemning the act, but
rather with condemning the actor. The problem with infanticide lies not in the
crime itself, but rather, in isolating the blameworthy party in these cases. 25 0 Thus,
the facts surrounding the women's lives and their infants' deaths lead us to treat
these cases as exceptional.
In order to begin exploring the circumstances surrounding the lives of the
women who commit infanticide, it is necessary to return to the distinction between
neonaticide and infanticide. As I noted in describing the two types of infanticide,
there are significant factual differences between infanticides occurring within the
first twenty-four hours after birth and those occurring thereafter. Therefore, this
section will begin with an exploration of the circumstances surrounding neonati-
cide and will then turn to a discussion of infanticide stories.
250. This is consistent with historical accounts of the resistance to punishing infanticide. See supra notes 34
through 50 and accompanying text (regarding Victorian juries' reluctance to punish the infanticide defendant due
to their sense that one of the guilty parties was missing).
[Vol. 34:1
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a. Getting Beyond the "Gory Part": Understanding the Sources of
Neonaticide
In considering how best to explore the circumstances surrounding the lives of
those who commit neonaticide, I found myself struck by the eerie consistencies in
the stories. Surprisingly accurate representations of these stories are found in
contemporary literature25' and in film. 252 Although the use of narrative in legal
scholarship has generated considerable controversy, it is certain that narratives
help to provide a more nuanced understanding of a given situation to those outside
of it.25 3 Moreover, the patterned nature of neonaticide cases lends itself to
narrative, as the seemingly incomprehensible nature of the crime cries out for
explanation. I was fortunate enough to find a woman willing to share her story with
me.
i. A Neonaticide Narrative
In November 1991, a suburban Chicago high school senior was arrested and
charged with first degree murder in the death of her newborn daughter. I became
aware of A.'s a5 4 case as a result of my involvement with a similar case in
Illinois. 25 5 I followed A.'s case over the months preceding trial, eventually meeting
her lawyer and working peripherally with him as he prepared A.'s defense. I
attended the trial in May 1992, in which A. was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter and given a probationary sentence. In September 1995, A. agreed to
meet with her former lawyer and me to talk about her recollection of the
circumstances that led up to the terrifying events of November 1991.256
At the time of our meeting, A. was twenty-one years old and living with her
grandparents in Chicago. She was extremely reluctant to speak about the incident,
251. See, e.g., BARBARA KINGSOLVER, ANIMAL DREAms (1990) (although the narrator refers to the incident as a
miscarriage, the circumstances surrounding the "birth" are similar to neonaticide in that the teenage pregnant girl
told no one that she was pregnant, delivered her six-month-old baby in the bathroom, failed to obtain medical
assistance, and secretly disposed of the body).
252. See, e.g., JUST ANOTHER GIRL ON THE IRT (Paramount 1992) (depicting a high school student's conflicts
over how to resolve her unplanned pregnancy and illustrating the manner in which denial becomes a daily coping
mechanism; an impulsive decision to abandon a newborn becomes a comprehensible, if not a reasonable,
response to an unattended delivery).
253. For an excellent evaluation of narrative's unique role in legal scholarship, see Kathryn Abrams, Hearing
the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991).
254. A. agreed to speak with me only on the condition that the utmost efforts be taken to maintain her
anonymity. She explained to me that, ever since the trial, all that was private about her has become public. She
feels extraordinarily vulnerable to public scrutiny and judgment, and worries constantly that people recognize and
despise her. Therefore, I have elected to use the initial A., which is not her first initial, but evokes the sense of
public branding experienced both by Hester Prynne in Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, and by this
woman. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE ScARLET LETTER (Alfred A. Knopf 1992) (1850) (fictional tale of adultress
sentenced to wearing the letter "A").
255. For a description of this case, see Oberman, Control, supra note 6, at 2-4.
256. Interview with A., Chicago, I11. (Sept. 21, 1995).
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 53 1996-1997
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
and indicated that in the years since the trial, she had not discussed that time in her
life with anyone. Despite the fact that A. thinks about what happened "almost
constantly," neither her family nor her best friend has ever asked her about what
happened, nor attempted to explore where things went wrong.
7
The story A. told unfolded haltingly and nonchronologically, almost as if we
were circling around her pregnant seventeen-year-old self from a distance, then
quietly and slowly moving increasingly closer. We began by talking about how she
came to live with her uncle and his fianc6, which is where she lived throughout
most of her pregnancy and where her baby was delivered. A.'s parents were
divorced when A. was young. A. lived primarily with her mother, but frequent
personality clashes led to A.'s temporary residence with her father and step-
mother, and also with her grandparents. When she was fourteen, the situation at
home became particularly tense. A.'s mother became involved in a relationship,
and A. frequently was left to babysit her eleven-year-old and two-year-old sisters.
After months of fighting, A. went to live with her grandparents.258
A. describes her grandparents as being "of a different generation." Having
immigrated to this country years before, they remain balanced between two
cultures, with perhaps the larger part of their ways reflecting the reserved
demeanor common to their country of origin. A. was then, and remains today, an
exceptionally quiet person, with few close friends. She spent most of her time with
her best friend, S., a classmate of hers. She frequently slept over at S.'s house, and
had relatively little contact with her mother.259
In the summer between her sophomore and junior years of high school, when A.
was sixteen, she went to live at S.'s house for several months. She recalls that S.'s
mother was concerned because A.'s mother did not know where A. was living and
never called to see how A. was doing. Finally, S.'s mother called A.'s mother, told
her that A. had been living with them, and asked for some financial support. This
apparently was not forthcoming, and A. moved back to her grandparents' house. At
some point shortly thereafter, A.'s uncle asked her to come live with him and his
fianc6. A. was upset and nervous about this, as this uncle was an intimidating man
regarded by everyone in the family as having a fierce temper. Nevertheless, A. felt
pressured to accept his offer and, in the early spring of her junior year, she moved
n 260
By the time she moved into her uncle's house, A. was pregnant. During the
winter of her junior year, A. had had a brief relationship with B., who was her
second boyfriend. B. attended a different school, and they had met each other
through a mutual friend. Although they were sexually intimate on several occa-






HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 54 1996-1997
MOTHERS WHO KILL
late, she told B. that she suspected she might be pregnant. B. responded by
breaking off the relationship.26'
The early months of her pregnancy were filled with doubt, denial, and confu-
sion. A. recalls living day-to-day, believing that her condition was not real or that it
would somehow go away. She was terrified to tell any of the adults in her life that
she suspected she was pregnant. She felt it would be impossible to tell her uncle or
her grandparents because they never communicated with her about anything but
the most superficial matters. What most terrified her was the thought of telling her
mother, since she feared that her mother would hate her for this and banish A. from
her life. Although she had occasional contact with her father and her step-mother,
their interactions were distracted and brief, and A. was afraid that they, too, would
hate her.262
A.'s fears were based in part upon her family's reaction to her teenage cousin
Leslie's pregnancy during the previous year. Leslie was treated with ridicule and
was considered a failure by the entire family. On occasion, relatives would warn A.
not to become a "fuck up" like Leslie. Additionally, A. recalled a conversation
with her mother when she was fifteen, in which she asked her mother how she
would respond if A. got pregnant. Her mother first inquired whether she was, and
then responded that, if A. became pregnant, she would "kick her ass and throw her
out and send her and her baby to live with her boyfriend." Finally, A. was afraid to
reveal her pregnancy because B. was African-American. A. is Latina, and because
her family often made racist generalizations against African-Americans, she feared
that her family would be doubly angered if they learned who had fathered her
baby.
26 3
As her pregnancy advanced, A. began to hope that someone would notice. She
recalls that her face swelled with the pregnancy, and that her chest and hips grew
considerably. A. is not a heavyset person, but she tended to wear loose clothing,
which continued to fit her throughout the pregnancy. She reports that others
commented on her chest size, and that she occasionally noticed her uncle and his
fiancd staring at her chest. Once a girlfriend in gym class said to her, "You know,
from far away, you look like you're pregnant. But up close, it's different. ' '26
When A.'s family failed to acknowledge her condition, A. began "dropping
hints." A. recalls asking her mother whether she thought A. was getting fat. Her
mother paid little attention to this, although A. remembers that on one occasion late
in her pregnancy, her mother responded to A.'s inquiry by touching her belly,
feeling its roundness, and then simply telling her she was fine. A. tried other hints
as well. She recalls repeatedly telling her mother and her father and step-mother
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insurance. No one picked up on these remarks, other than to ask what her hurry
was.
265
Throughout the pregnancy, A. discussed her pregnancy only with her friend S.
"It was like our little secret," A. remarked wryly, although she often wished that
someone would find out. Once, while hanging out in S.'s bedroom with S. and S's
boyfriend, A. lifted up her shirt and exposed her belly. S. told her to pull her shirt
down. "Someone's gonna find out," she warned A. A. recalls hoping that someone
would notice, and would call her family and just tell them, "You know, A. is
pregnant. " 2
66
Despite the fact that she "just kept wishing and hoping someone would say
something," no one ever did until late in her pregnancy, when A.'s mother took her
to a school nurse to get a booster shot. The nurse looked at A. and asked her
whether she had made arrangements for the baby. A. recalls shrugging and looking
away in shyness and shock, because this was the first time any adult had
acknowledged her pregnancy. The nurse said nothing further, and A. left the
examining room. Her mother noticed that A. seemed shaken up, and said to her,
jokingly, "What happened in there? You look like someone told you were pregnant
or something." A. did not know how to respond, so she said nothing.267
From the fifth through the ninth months of her pregnancy, A. worked with her
father at a local warehouse. She spent considerable time with her father and her
step-mother, and on the day that she went into labor, she was at their home. She
told them that she was having terrible cramps, and they asked her if she wanted to
stay with them. It was her friend S.'s birthday, though, and A. wanted to return to
her uncle's so that she could see S. On the bus ride home, A. became increasingly
uncomfortable. Upon arriving at her uncle's home, she withdrew to her bedroom
and labored alone until the early morning hours of the next day, when she went into
the bathroom and delivered the baby into the toilet.268
A. did not want to talk with me about the "gory part" of her story-about what
happened and how she felt during those long hours in the bathroom. What I know,
then, is what she testified to at trial. Although her uncle and his girlfriend were in
their bedroom, which adjoined the bathroom, A. made no noise during the labor
and delivery. She later told police officers that she was afraid of her uncle, and did
not cry out because she did not want him to find her. As soon as the baby was
delivered, A. got up from the toilet and, leaving the baby in the water, began
cleaning the blood she had lost during the delivery from the bathroom floor and
walls. After several minutes, she took the baby out of the toilet and placed it on a
towel on the floor. The baby did not cry or move, and A. realized it was dead. She
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asleep cradling the bundle against her body.169
Later in the day, S. called A. to see why she hadn't come by to celebrate S.'s
birthday. A. told S. what had happened, and S. told her parents. Toward evening,
the police arrived at A.'s house and asked her uncle if they could question A.
Moments later, A. was arrested for the homicide death of her daughter.27 °
At trial, the state accused A. of deliberately concealing her pregnancy and
intentionally drowning the baby. The jury nevertheless refused to convict A. of first
degree murder, and instead found A. guilty only of involuntary manslaughter.27'
The judge sentenced her to probation, including one thousand hours of community
service.272
After the judge announced his sentence, A. was stunned and unemotional. She
recalls feeling overwhelmed by the pressure of the trial and sentencing, by the
result, and by the thought that it was now over. A.'s mother, who had attended the
trial and sentencing, thought that A. should have been more emotional at the
outcome. She told A. that she should be "grateful" at the result. A. responded
quietly, "I'm sad. I just had a baby." Her mother and uncle left her at the
courthouse to take the bus home. As they left, her mother shouted back at her, "It's
not my fault-I'm not the one that slept with B." 273
ii. The Road to Neonaticide
A.'s story leaves many puzzling questions unanswered. In order to understand
why this entire nightmare occurred, it is necessary to examine the various factors
that contributed to A.'s actions and reactions throughout the extended crisis. This
analysis begins with questions about A. herself, then extends to her family and
support system, and finally reaches issues of the broader community she lived in.
Although there are many possible starting points for considering how A.'s
predicament came to be, perhaps the most obvious place to begin is with the act of
unprotected intercourse. There is nothing exceptional about A.'s having had
intercourse without contraception. In fact, particularly for girls who are just
becoming sexually active, the failure to contracept is the norm. 27 4 Moreover, the
269. Id.
270. id.
271. Illinois law defines involuntary manslaughter as follows:
[a] person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary
manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to
cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in
the case in which the cause of death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle, in which case the
person commits reckless homicide.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(a) (West 1994).
272. Interview with A., supra note 256.
273. Id.
274. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modem Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 15, nn.270, 278 (1994) [hereinafter Oberman, Turning Girls].
1996]
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fact that A. was sexually active tells us nothing about her level of maturity. As I
have summarized elsewhere, psycho-social research consistently reveals that "for
girls, adolescence is a time of acute crisis, in which self-esteem, body image,
academic confidence, and the willingness to speak out decline precipitously.
275
This self-doubt manifests itself in many venues, including adolescent sexuality.
276
As a result, many girls become sexually active not out of feelings of autonomy and
maturity, but rather out of a sense that sex will bring them greater security.
Just as many girls seek sexual relations in order to obtain the emotional and
social validation they need, they frequently are harmed by another uniquely
adolescent phenomenon: the difficulty in appreciating the long-range conse-
quences of their actions. 277 A. did not necessarily "will" her pregnancy, nor did
she even anticipate it; instead, she experienced it with shock and denial.
By virtue of pregnancy, a teenage girl is not miraculously transformed into a
mature woman, aware of her alternatives and able to make comprehensive,
long-term plans for the pregnancy and beyond.278 Some girls may possess this
capacity-they probably had it before they conceived-but most pregnant girls do
not attempt to develop these abstract plans on their own. Instead, upon discovering
that they are pregnant, most girls seek the assistance of a parent, friend, or
counselor.2 79 Equipped with this support, the girls decide to have the baby and
either raise the child or give it up for adoption, or they obtain an abortion.
As we know, A. did not seek support and did not pursue any of these options.
275. Id. at 22.
276. Id. at 65-66:
Girls express longing for emotional attachment, romance, and respect. At the same time, they
suffer enormous insecurity and diminished self-image. These two factors are clearly interrelated-
the worse girls feel about themselves, the more they look to males for ratification of the women
that they are becoming.... Girls negotiate access to the fulfillment of these emotional needs by
way of sex.
277. One tragic but unsurprising result of this is that teens between the ages of 15 and 19 suffer not only high
rates of unplanned pregnancies, but also the highest rates of sexually-transmitted diseases and the fastest growing
rates of new cases of HIV of any age group in the United States. Karen Hein et al., Comparison of HlV+ and
HIV- Adolescents: Risk Factors and Psychosocial Determinates, 95 PEDRIATRICS 96 (1995); Steven Shelov et al.,
Sexuality, Contraception, and the Media, 95 PEDIATRICS 298 (1995); Robert M. Siegal et al., The Prevalence of
Sexually Transmitted Disease in Children and Adolescents, 95 PEDIATRICS 1090 (1995); James E. Strain, Jacobi
Address-Pediatrics: Where Do We Go From Here?, 95 PEDIATRICS 924 (1995).
278. For a critical evaluation of the mature minor doctrine and the confusion and ambiguity surrounding the
law's understanding of adolescent maturity, see Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J. LAW MED. &
ETHics 118 (1996).
279. A substantial proportion of pregnant minors voluntarily consult with a parent regardless of the existence
of a notification requirement. See, e.g., Torres et al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of
Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 287-88, 290 (1980) (stating that 51% of
minors discussed abortion with parents in the absence of a parental consent or notification requirement), cited in
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 464-65 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part). Minors 15 years old or younger are even more likely voluntarily to discuss the
abortion decision with their parents. Id. at 290 (finding that 69% of such minors voluntarily discuss abortion with
parents), cited in Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 464-65.
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Instead, she shared her secret with someone who was equally ill-equipped to
devise a long-term plan.280 A.'s behavior reflected a uniquely short-term calcula-
tion wherein the immediate costs associated with acting on any of the alternatives
available to her, including seeking the advice of an adult, seemed far higher than
the costs of simply postponing any decision. Thus, she found herself paralyzed,
and she lived from day-to-day, much as she did before she became pregnant.2"'
In order to make sense of A.'s short-term calculation, it is important to explore
what A. feared would follow from taking action regarding her pregnancy. As noted
above, A. feared that her family would abandon her if they found out she was
pregnant.282 A.'s family held traditional social, cultural, and religious values
regarding teenage sexuality and disapproved of teenage pregnancy as well as
abortion.283 Thus, despite the fact that A. lived in a society relatively permissive
about sexuality, pregnancy, and childbearing by unmarried women, she felt that
her pregnancy posed a direct and serious threat to her immediate social network.284
280. Recall the Hopfer case, described supra at notes 109 through 128 and accompanying text. In Hopfer, like
A.'s case, the defendant told her best friend that she was pregnant. The girlfriend, who ultimately reported Hopfer
to the police, testified that Hopfer had told her that she was pregnant several months earlier, but that their
conversation never reached the issue of what Hopfer planned to do about the pregnancy.
281. In his article on neonaticide, psychiatrist Phillip Resnick noted that this phenomena occurs among
passive, less mature girls:
[wiomen who seek abortions are activists who recognize reality early and promptly attack the
danger. In contrast, women who commit neonaticide often deny that they are pregnant or assume
that the child will be stillborn. No advance preparations are made either for the care or the killing
of the infant.
Resnick, supra note 83, at 1416.
282. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (regarding A.'s conversations with her mother and other
family members about out-of-wedlock births).
283. In a recent article, Latina writer Sandra Cisneros sheds light on the manner in which such a background
might shape a girl's attitude toward her body and her incipient sexuality:
I am overwhelmed by the silence regarding Latinas and our bodies. If I, as a graduate student, was
shy about talking to anyone about my body and sex, imagine how difficult it must be for a young
girl in middle school or high school, living in a home with ... no information other than
misinformation from the girlfriends and the boyfriend. So much guilt, so much silence, and such a
yearning to be loved; no wonder young women find themselves having sex while they are still
children, having sex without sexual protection, too ashamed to confide their feelings and fears to
anyone.
Sandra Cisneros, Guadalupe the Sex Goddess, Ms., July/August 1996,43,44-45.
284. There are several reasons for believing that A.'s fear and her decision to avoid making a decision are
frighteningly common tendencies among adolescents. Certainly, we know that teens commonly fear the
repercussions that might follow should their parents find out that they are sexually active. It is largely in response
to the negative consequences that might follow from this fear that the law facilitates minors' access to family
planning, treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, and abortion. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
(declaring unconstitutional a law requiring a minor girl seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of both parents
before the procedure could be administered); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (granting
minors privacy rights, including those related to procreation and contraception). But cf. Peck v. Califano, 454 F.
Supp. 484 (D. Utah 1977) (holding that restrictions on minor's ability to be surgically sterilized are constitu-
tional); Voe v. Califano, 434 F Supp. 1058 (D. Conn. 1977) (same).
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In a curious way, one might find evidence to support A.'s fear in the fact that no
one noticed her pregnancy. Although in A.'s case, as in virtually all of the
discussions of neonaticide, the media and the criminal justice system viewed A. as
having "concealed" her pregnancy, no one ever questioned how she managed to
accomplish this.285 The fact that those most intimately involved in the lives of
women who commit neonaticide claim not to have noticed that the women were
pregnant tells us something about them and about their relationship to the women.
A. was neither morbidly obese nor inventive-she simply grew bigger and
bigger, and nobody commented on her condition. A. was worried that, once she
had her baby, there would be nowhere for her to live. Given her shifting living
arrangements, this fear was not at all irrational. A.'s remarks indicate reason to
believe that several, if not all, of the adults in her immediate family suspected that
A. was pregnant, yet found it easier not to mention it. 28 6
Whether they chose not to intervene out of politeness, uncertainty, embarrass-
ment, or a fear that, once the issue was identified, they would be forced to become
more involved in A.'s life, their failure to reach out meant that A. lived in a world
Throughout the 1980s, I served as a volunteer counselor at various Planned Parenthood clinics. During that
time, I was struck by the number of teenage girls who, upon happily learning that they were pregnant, asked
whether we would be notifying their parents. I always responded that their medical status was entirely
confidential, but that their families would most certainly discover that they were pregnant sooner or later. Still,
even the girls who were not worried about their ability to care for a child dreaded having their parents find out that
they had had sex. Many girls shared the belief that, if and when they disclosed their pregnancy, they would be
kicked out of their homes.
285. The media descriptions of neonaticide often attribute the defendant's success in concealing her pregnancy
to the fact that she wore loose clothing or was somewhat obese. Several of the articles indicate that the defendants
invented explanations for their changing body shape-telling others that they had a tumor, or that they had
recently gained weight due to a job in an ice cream parlor or to prescription oral contraceptives. See, e.g., Illinois
v. Ehlert, 654 N.E.2d 705, 707 (I11. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 660 N.E.2d 1274 (1995) (stating that the defendant
told her hairdresser, who testified as a defense witness, that she had a cancerous tumor and "she had been unable
to get the hospital to have it removed" when the hairdresser told defendant that she looked pregnant).
Nevertheless, the vast majority of neonaticide cases in my sample involved defendants whose pregnant bodies
had been visible to many different people. There were many whose parents passed them in the halls of their homes
and saw them at meal times, whose classroom teachers and gym coaches watched them over the course of
semesters, whose teammates showered with them in locker rooms, and whose boyfriends saw them and even slept
with them in narrow twin beds of college dormitory rooms. See Tsing, supra note 233, at 286-88 (describing the
1985 case of Donna Sloan, who left her boyfriend asleep in her dormitory room twin bed while she delivered a
full-term newborn in the dormitory bathroom); Janine DeFao, Woman is Charged in Baby Case, SACRAMENrO
BEE, Jan. 10, 1996, at B I (noting that the defendant's husband said he did not know she was pregnant, perhaps
because she was overweight).
286. Interview with A., supra note 256. In addition to A.'s mother's occasional cryptic references to
pregnancy, A. had a conversation with her step-mother sometime after her arrest in which A.'s step-mother told
her that she and her father had noticed that A.'s "stomach was getting bigger." Her step-mother added that she
noticed that A. used to fall asleep with some frequency while at their home, and that her father reported that A. had
napped while at work. Her step-mother reminded her of a time, several months earlier, when she had said to A.,
"You know, girls can get pregnant the first time they have sex." She told A. that she had been trying to broach the
conversation, but that A. had not responded so she did not push her. A.'s step-mother also told her that, when they
asked her to stay at their house on the day that she was in labor, it was because they suspected that A.'s "time" had
come.
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of silence and isolation-a world not of her own making. The deafening silence of
those around her had the effect of reaffirming A.'s strategy of passivity and denial. Her
refusal to acknowledge her pregnancy and her vain efforts to prompt others to take the
initiative in addressing her situation were mirrored by the responses of those around her.
The final questions that haunt A.'s story stem from A.'s failure to act. Given her
conviction that her family would not welcome this new addition, she might have
elected to terminate the pregnancy, to arrange for the baby to be adopted, or to
move out and become a single parent. A., however, was extraordinarily ambivalent
about the pregnancy itself. To the extent that she felt unnoticed and unloved by her
family (and there is every reason to believe that this was the case), A. may have
viewed the baby as a potential source of unconditional love. 87
A second possible reason for A.'s inaction has to do with the numerous factors
that limit the accessibility and attractiveness of all of the available options. Given
that A. could not imagine her family adjusting to the fact that she was pregnant,
and that she was convinced that having the baby would shatter the fragile bonds
that held her family network intact, adoption and single parenting did not seem like
real possibilities to her.
A.'s failure to consider adoption as a potential solution to her dilemma is not
atypical, particularly for a young woman with her background. First, less than 3%
of all adolescents resolve an unplanned pregnancy by opting to relinquish their
children.288 Second, the girls and young women who do give their children up for
adoption can generally be described as those young women who have the
information necessary to do so; have made rather definitive decisions about their
future in terms of education and employment (and, thus, see raising a child as an
obstacle to the completion of those goals); and have the clear and definitive
support of family or friends (specifically in that the family's cultural background
and beliefs do not forbid such a choice). Thus, most of the young women who fit
this profile are relatively well-to-do Caucasian girls with supportive families who
are committed to the girl's future success.2 8 9
287. Some recent studies among African-American teens indicate that, for poor Black adolescents, teenage
pregnancy and parenting are viewed as developmentally appropriate and as rites of passage into adulthood. Kari
Sandven & Michael D. Resnick, Informal Adoption Among Black Adolescent Mothers, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIA-
TRY 210, 211 (1990); see also Evelyn Landry et al., Teen Pregnancy in New Orleans: Factors that Differentiate
Teens who Deliver Abort, and Successfully Contracept, 15 J.YouTH & ADOLESCENCE 259 (1986) (explaining study
indicating that many black teens became pregnant because they wanted to have a child).
288. Kerry J. Daly, Adolescent Perceptions of Adoption: Implications for Resolving an Unplanned Pregnancy,
25 Youm & Soc. 330,330 (1994).
289. See Christine A. Bachrach et al., Relinquishment of Premarital Births: Evidence from National Survey
Data, 24 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 27, 27 (1992) (according to 1982 and 1988 National Survey of Family Growth data,
the decision to relinquish a child is positively associated with being a caucasian girl with a well-educated mother,
being in school at the time of conception, and having no labor force experience); Rosalind J. Dworkin et al.,
Parenting or Placing: Decisionmaking by Pregnant Teens, 25 YouTH & Soc. 75, 76-77 (1993) (citing studies
showing that placement for adoption is associated with sociodemographic characteristics such as race, class, and
education level, with poorer, minority girls being less likely to place their children).
19961
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 61 1996-1997
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Clearly, A.'s situation does not match the generil profile of the young woman
who chooses adoption for her child. It is not evident that A. even considered
adoption as an option. As unbelievable as this may sound to some, acquiring
information about how to give up a child for adoption is not easily obtained in
general (as I discovered while trying to find the information myself), let alone in a
community that discourages it as a solution. Moreover, A. had no definitive plans
for her future. She refused to accept that the pregnancy was real and that she had to
choose a means of handling the dilemma. Finally, A. did not have the support of
her family or a stable living situation.
The assertion that A.'s behavior regarding adoption was not unusual is further
supported by evidence about teens' attitudes concerning adoption. When teens
were asked how they would resolve a pregnancy, only 23% indicated that they
definitely or probably would relinquish their child, whereas 40% said they would
not. Studies show that, among pregnant teens, "adoption is the least discussed
option," and only 13% of the girls interviewed "indicated that they knew how to
go about placing a baby up for adoption.
' 290
Abortion, on the other hand, might have been an option. A woman who
successfully obtains an abortion has overcome numerous obstacles--obstacles that
may range from financial and geographic to psychological and religious. In order
to obtain the most affordable and least medically risky abortion, a woman must
acknowledge that she is pregnant within the first twelve weeks and decide to
terminate her pregnancy within that time.291 As Resnick noted in his article, the
girls who commit neonaticide tend to lack the maturity and responsibility to take
the necessary actions of locating an abortion clinic, gathering the necessary funds,
and transporting themselves to and from the clinic. 292 If the girl is a minor, she also
may face the intimidating problem of mandatory parental notification, depending
on her state of residence.293 Even if state law does not require parental notification,
there is such extensive misinformation among minors about their rights to
confidentiality that they often assume that their parents will be told about any
290. Daly, supra note 288, at 330.
291. Although it sounds rather obvious, this actually may be the biggest hurdle for neonaticidal girls. As I have
noted, they are consumed with denial of their pregnancy and denial of the inevitable need to take action. Many
come from families that, in addition to opposing premarital sex and contraception, view abortion as murder. As a
result, the pregnant girl may be ambivalent or even opposed to abortion, and therefore the abortion option may
generate enormous internal dissonance. Thus, a course of action that may seem logical and easy is rendered less so
when viewed through the psychological lens of one whose entire social network and cultural identity may be
threatened by it.
292. Resnick, supra note 83, at 76. After the first trimester, the woman will require an inpatient procedure,
which is much harder to come by and far more costly. For a description of the limitations on access to abortion, see
Carole A. Corns, Note, The Impact of Public Abortion Funding Decisions on Indigent Women: A Proposal to
Reform State Statutory ConstitutionalAbortion Funding Provisions, 24 U. Mict. J. L. REF. 371, 384-88 (1991).
293. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of mandatory parental
notification provisions for minors seeking abortions); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (same); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (same); H.L. v.
Matheson, 445 U.S. 959 (1980) (same).
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reproductive health care they request. 294 Of course, these barriers are overcome by
those girls and women who become pregnant and who ultimately obtain abortions.
But the fact that many obtain abortions does not minimize the significance of the
barriers. Those women who commit neonaticide represent some small fragment of
the number of women who find the barriers to abortion too steep.295
In light of this analysis, A.'s failure to obtain an abortion is not surprising.
Likewise, her failure to make plans for the baby, either through parenting or
adoption, is viewed more easily as a part of her general failure to take action-a
failing that was reinforced by her family and by all of those who surrounded A.
There simply was no one around who cared enough about A. to make sure that the
horrible, inevitable disaster did not come to pass.
This story certainly is incomplete. There were family members at trial whose
sympathetic demeanor may have contributed to the favorable verdict. There was
testimony from witnesses who spoke on A.'s behalf, such as her employer from a
high school vocational program, who testified to her quiet, yet extremely respon-
sible and competent manner, and an emergency room nurse, who testified to A.'s
distressed state upon admission, during which time she repeatedly asked for her
baby. Yet even the basic facts suffice to permit an understanding of the challenges
inherent in assessing culpability in such a case.
The language of murder statutes varies across jurisdictions, but these laws
generally center on the defendant's intent to kill or intent to do serious bodily
29injury. 96 Although it is possible to view A.'s failure to take action during her
pregnancy as tantamount to an intent to harm or kill her baby, this interpretation is
far from dispositive. One might just as easily reason that, having never truly
acknowledged her pregnancy and the need to take action, by definition, A. never
formulated an intent to harm the child. The circumstances surrounding this crime,
extending back for long months prior to the child's death and encompassing the
roles played by others in A.'s life, complicate the process of determining responsi-
bility and allocating blame. Because A.'s background and story are typical of the
294. See supra note 284 (describing the author's experiences volunteering at Planned Parenthood); see also
Tina L. Cheng et al., Confidentiality in Health Care: A Survey of Knowledge, Perceptions, and Attitudes Among
High School Students, 269 JAMA 1404 (1993) (concluding that a majority of adolescents have health concerns
that they wish to keep confidential, and that a high percentage of these adolescents indicate that they would not
seek health services because of these concerns).
295. The major barriers are financial and geographic. A recent Florida case involving a 20-year-old woman
named Kawana Ashley serves as a grim reminder of these barriers. Ashley could not afford a mid-trimester
abortion and was determined to terminate the pregnancy. Finally, when she was seven months pregnant, Ashley
obtained a handgun and shot herself in the stomach in order to end the pregnancy. The state charged her with third
degree murder, but eventually a judge threw out the murder charges, only allowing a charge of manslaughter to
stand. See, e.g., David Barstow & Tim Roche, Life Appeared to Hold Few Options, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept.
9, 1994, at BI-B2 (noting that Ashley was unemployed and ill-equipped to handle a newborn); Craig Pittman,
Abortion it may be, Murder, no, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995, at A l (noting that the death of the baby was
caused by its premature birth, not the bullet wound directly).
296. See infra notes 367 through 379 and accompanying text (describing first degree murder charges as they
apply to neonaticide).
1996]
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neonaticide cases in my sample, her story helps to illuminate the ambivalence
these cases generate when they reach the criminal justice system.
b. Exploring the Circumstances Surrounding Infanticide
As Section HI of this Article described, the defendants in modem infanticide
cases tend to be perceived as either mad or bad.29 7 Yet, because these defendants
only infrequently plead insanity, this dichotomy reveals far more about the source
of jury sympathy than it does about the women's actual mental health status. 298
The tendency toward mercy in these cases reflects not so much a legal conclusion
as an intuitive sense that the mother had diminished capacity. This sense permits
juries and judges to reach a merciful ruling without ever expressly acknowledging
the circumstances in the woman's life that contributed to her supposed diminished
capacity.
By all accounts, we are not a society that recoils from holding accountable
individuals of limited mental capacity who commit crimes.29 9 Thus, there is a
puzzle in our tendency to forgive infanticide defendants their crimes. I believe the
answer to this puzzle lies in our tacit awareness of and sensitivity to the
circumstances that surround infanticide-the circumstances of motherhood.
Although there are at least four basic infanticidal scenarios, reflecting a
spectrum of mental health vulnerabilities, there is one constant across all of these
situations: all of these cases involve women who, at the time of their children's
deaths, were their primary caretakers. As much as these cases are about mental
health vulnerabilities, they also are about motherhood. Many commentators have
written about the structure of motherhood, the half-truths of the cultural myths of
bliss surrounding it, and society's resistance to acknowledging the burdens and
difficulties of mothering. 30° The work associated with parenting tends to fall
297. See supra notes 194 through 240 and accompanying text (discussing the mad/bad dichotomy).
298. Id.
299. See PERLIN, supra note 43, at 192 (referring to infanticide defendants as "empathy outliers" in order to
make the point that, for the most part, the American criminal justice system does not excuse criminals on the
grounds of mental capacity). The Supreme Court has held that evidence of a defendant's mental capacity is
relevant to his culpability. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 304 (1989). Perlin notes that "[ejmpirical inquiries,
however, illuminate society's degree of ambivalence about this proposition." PERLIN, supra note 43, at 213.
Scholars express concerns that such evidence may suggest to a jury that the defendant continues to pose a risk to
society. Moreover, "fact-finders demand that defendants conform to popular, common-sensical visual images of
'looking crazy.' " Id. at 214. Thus, when they do not conform to such popular images, the jury often will opt for
capital punishment regardless of the defendant's actual mental capacity. Id. at 213-15.
300. For several thorough and informative overviews of this subject, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTFERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Katharine K. Baker,
Taking Care of our Daughters, 18 CARDozo L. REv. (forthcoming 1997) (reviewing FINEMAN, supra); Mary E.
Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, I S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 193-94,
203-23 (1992) [hereinafter Becker, Maternal Feelings]; M. Rivka Polatnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children: A
Power Analysis, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORIES (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); and Carol Sanger, M is
for the Many Things, I S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 15 (1992). The persistence of a norm of compulsory
maternal altruism generates a societal expectation that mothers are fully accountable for their children's
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overwhelmingly upon mothers. In her landmark article, Volunteers and Draftees:
The Struggle for Parental Equality, Professor Czpanskiy explores the division of
labor within the home by utilizing a military metaphor: fathers volunteer for
service, whereas mothers are conscripted.301 She notes that "[t]he average father
living with his child spends less than ten minutes a day caring for his child, while
the average mother spends several hours," and that "[t]hese figures do not change
significantly in families where both parents are fully employed outside the
home.", 30 2 Moreover, "in over 80% of families with two parents and young
children, mothers do far more child care and housework than do fathers." 30 3
The deaths in infanticide cases result in part from this division of labor, and from
society's fervent commitment to the notion that it is normal and healthy for
mothers to care for their babies in isolation in the home during the early months
and years of their babies' lives.3 ~a Consider the impact of the structure of
motherhood on women in each of the four categories of mental health vulnerabili-
ties associated with infanticide. It is obvious that women suffering from postpar-
tum psychosis, with its characteristic symptoms of sleep disturbances, hallucina-
tions, delusions, violent behavior, and frequent mood shifts, cannot tend to their
infants' needs without assistance. 30 5 Recall Sheryl Massip, whose husband recog-
well-being. The stress that accompanies the fulfillment of that expectation is extraordinary, even for a woman with
considerable emotional and financial support. Adrienne Rich's work on motherhood describes the pernicious
effect of these expectations:
[w]hatever the known facts ... it is still assumed that the mother is "with the child." It is she,
finally, who is held accountable for her children's health, the clothes they wear, their behavior at
school, their intelligence and general development.... Even when she herself is trying to cope
with an environment beyond her control-malnutrition, rats, lead-paint poisoning, the drug traffic,
racism-in the eyes of society the mother is the child's environment. The worker can unionize, go
out on strike; mothers are divided from each other in homes, tied to their children by compassion-
ate bonds; our wildcat strikes have most often taken the form of physical or mental breakdown.
RICH, supra note 46, at 53. The cumulative evidence of infanticide in modem America provides ample evidence of
these maternal "wildcat strikes."
301. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415
(1991).
302. Id. at 1435.
303. Id. at 1452. This extra load of work, particularly when undertaken by women who are fully employed
outside of the home, has been termed "the second shift." ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFr: WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989). When results of major studies are averaged together, the extra
workload of a working mother amounts to an extra month of 24 hour days each year. Czapanskiy, supra note 301,
at 1452.
304. As the authors of an article on depression in postpartum women conclude,
our cultural myths of 'blissful motherhood' and parenthood as 'doing what comes naturally' keep
us from acknowledging how difficult and potentially painful the adjustment to parenthood can
be.... [W]e are a society which provides increasingly little opportunity to learn parenting skills
and roles before parenthood and few available supports once parenthood is reached.
Atkinson & Rickel, supra note 141, at 215.
305. See supra notes 140 through 154 and accompanying text for a detailed description of postpartum
psychosis.
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nized that she needed help and sent her to stay with her mother for a night. 3°6
Nevertheless, when she returned home from her mother's in the morning, she once
again was expected to be her baby's full-time caretaker.
This expectation was not unique to the Massip family. There is a false
dichotomy inherent in societal assumptions about motherhood-one is either
wholly capable of assuming the tasks of motherhood, or wholly incapable. The
Massips knew that the latter choice-acknowledging that Sheryl was incapable of
mothering-brought with it severe censure. Sheryl would have been stigmatized
as a bad mother. Both she and her husband would have had to alter their
expectations of parenthood dramatically, either by arranging for the father to
become the primary caretaker, or by finding (and paying) someone else to care for their
child. Hence there were overwhelming social, economic, and interpersonal incentives for
everyone involved to pretend that Sheryl was capable of caring for her infant alone, for
hours at a time, even though her mother, her doctor, her husband, and ultimately the
judge all recognized that she never should have been entrusted with that task.
Infanticides committed by women who are chronically mentally disabled, yet
living and parenting independently, present very similar issues. Even without a
specific definition of mental disability, it is self-evident that some women, by
virtue of their mental health status, are less equipped than others to adapt to the
challenge of motherhood. The case of Simone Ayton provides an example of
this.3 °7 At the time she killed her infant son, Ayton was a mildly retarded, manic
depressive woman with cerebral palsy, living alone without financial or emotional
support from either the baby's father or her family.30 8 When her son was
twenty-two days old, Ayton brought him to a community hospital, where he was
diagnosed as suffering from dehydration and fever.3° She claimed he would not
eat because he did not like her. This triggered a custody hearing, at which the judge
ordered the child placed in foster care based upon his finding that Ayton was
"emotionally unable to care for the child.",31 0
Ayton spent the next several months working to meet the state's requirements
for reunification with her child. She ultimately earned the support of her casework-
ers, and her child was returned to her custody. 311 Less than two months later,
Ayton's son was dead.312 Ayton first told authorities that she had been bathing her
son when he slipped from her arms and fell into the water.31 3 Later, she admitted to
306. See supra notes 150 through 154 and accompanying text.
307. Laurence Hammack, Woman Accused of Murder; 7-Month-Old Son Died in Bathtub, ROANOKE TIMES &
WORLD NEWS, Dec. 6, 1994, at A I [hereinafter Hammack, Accused].
308. Laurence Hammack, Roanoke Mom Admits Drowning Son; Pleads No Contest to Infant's Murder,





313. Hammack, Accused, supra note 307, at Al.
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a detective that she was frustrated with the child's crying, so she held him under
the water until he stopped struggling.
314
It is difficult to view Ayton as solely responsible for her son's death. At the very
least, one might be inclined also to blame the state for returning Ayton's son to her
without supervision. After the fact, however, state officials insisted that they had no
other option under the law, and that they made similar decisions to release children
to their parents every day.
Here again, one sees the effect of the binary structure of motherhood: either
Ayton was fully capable of mothering in complete isolation, or she was wholly
incapable of so doing. Either option is absurdly extreme. It seems at least plausible
that Ayton, who was able to live and function independently, could have parented
her son if she had had such help, as through an assisted living situation or even a
day care program.315 Yet, because the work of parenting is entirely privatized,
there are no readily available intermediate options between full custody and no
custody. As a result, an entirely foreseeable and preventable death occurred.
Ayton was charged with first degree murder and chose to plead guilty to a
reduced charge of second degree murder.316 In the sentencing hearing, her attorney
urged the judge to spare Ayton a lengthy sentence, arguing that Ayton was not
solely responsible for her son's death. The judge reduced the standard forty year
sentence to eighteen years.3 17
This same ambivalence also is generated by the cases involving infanticidal
women who suffer from affective disorders with postpartum onset.3 t8 Of all
infanticide cases, these cases involving women who kill their children in seem-
ingly unprovoked displays of violence would seem to be the least likely to
engender a sympathetic response. Yet there is an increasing sense of ambivalence
about these cases as well. This ambivalence arises as those who are judging these
women come to understand the sociocultural and economic influences on these
women's lives and the way that these women's pasts impair their capacity to respond
appropriately to the pressures associated with being the sole caretaker for an infant.
For example, recall the Pixley case, in which the judge implicitly defended his
lenient sentence for a defendant who suffocated her infant on the basis of the
defendant's socioeconomic status and abusive childhood.31 9 Although he did not
condone her act, he found too simplistic the notion that a nineteen-year-old woman
314. Id.
315. There is a rich literature describing support systems that enable parents with mental disabilities to cope
with and even excel at child-rearing. Linda Dowdney & David Skuse, Parenting Provided by Adults with Mental
Retardation, 34 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED DISCIPLINES 25-47 (1993); see also Mona Hughes,
Group Offers Problem-Solving Guide With Equipment for Disabled Parents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 1996,
at 12 (describing a Berkeley, California organization called "Through the Lookingglass," which specializes in
clinical and support services, including training and research, for families with disabilities).
316. Hammack, Roanoke Mom, supra note 308, at Al.
317. Laurence Hammack, Motherhood Ends In Prison, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Sept. 16, 1995, A 1.
318. See supra notes 163 through 183 and accompanying text for a description of this category of cases.
319. See supra notes 203 through 218 and accompanying text.
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who had endured years of abuse at her parents' hands, and who, on scant income,
spent her days and nights caring for two children under age two, was solely to
blame when she silenced her screaming, hungry baby with a blanket.32 °
Perhaps the most ironic source of ambivalence in infanticide cases involves
women who kill their children while suffering from an addiction-related disorder.
Given the "war on drugs" and the societal tendency to view addiction as a
disfavored lifestyle choice rather than an illness, one might expect that judges and
juries would not be particularly sympathetic to women who killed their children
while they were using drugs. 32 1 In reality, though, women who kill their children
while abusing drugs tend to have lives that are so desperate that their children's
deaths come to seem almost foreordained.322 The more aware a judge or jury is of
the circumstances surrounding these women's lives and their children's deaths, the
less likely it is that they will find that these women intentionally brought about the
deaths of their children.323
Infanticide deaths are caused not simply by the mother's sudden and/or severe
mental disturbance, but also by the failure of those around her to recognize that the
mother was ill and that she desperately needed relief from the twenty-four hour a
day care that her infant was demanding of her. Our ambivalence in punishing these
women comes not so much from our sensitivity to issues of diminished capacity as
from our awareness that the mothers had precious few options. At the time they
killed their children, all of these women were emotionally, intellectually, socially,
and/or financially unable to cope with the demands of motherhood in isolation-
motherhood as it is structured in modem American society.
V. TOWARD RECONCILIATION: A COHERENT APPROACH TO INFANTICIDE
A critical analysis of circumstances surrounding infanticide helps to explain
what might otherwise seem to be an incomprehensible act. Likewise, the sense of
320. Duggan, supra note 204, at Al.
321. For discussions of substance abuse as a "disease," see Gordis Enoch, Critical Issues in Alcoholism
Research, 30 INT'L J. ADDIcTIONs 497 (1995); Gordis Enoch, The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism: Past Accomplishments and Future Goals, 19 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RESEARCH WORLD 5 (1995);
Douglas Frans, Social Work, Social Science, and the Disease Concept: New Directions for Addiction Treatment,
21 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 71 (1994); and Harvey Siegal, The Strengths Perspective of Case Management: A
Promising Inpatient Substance Abuse Treatment Enhancement, 27 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 67 (1995).
322. See supra notes 184 through 193 and accompanying text for a discussion of the psycho-social status and
life circumstances that correlate with drug addiction in women.
It is important to note that the majority of cases involving an infant's death at the hand of a substance abusing
mother also involve the mother's male partner. These cases generally involve child abuse as well as neglect. For
purposes of this study, however, I am considering only those cases in which the mother alone is accused of her
infant's demise. These cases tend to involve neglect, rather than abuse. At Least 2,000, supra note 2, at 21.
323. An example of this is the case of Pamela Rae Stewart, a pregnant woman so intimidated by her partner's
abusive behavior that she failed to obtain prompt medical care, despite the fact that she was hemorrhaging.
Oberman, Sex, Drugs, supra note 184, at 505-06.
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pathos these stories generate helps to explain the perennial ambivalence that
accompanies official efforts to sanction these women. Indeed, it seems that much
of the ambivalence associated with allocating blame for infanticide grows out of a
tacit communal awareness that the tasks of motherhood can be oppressively
difficult. Therefore, the legacy of these stories is one of profound uncertainty about
culpability-uncertainty that is manifested in the inconsistent treatment these
cases receive in the media, and more importantly, in the criminal justice system.
In this section, I will explore culpability in two distinct manners. First, I
undertake a broad-scaled analysis of the societal factors that contribute to infanti-
cide and propose structural reforms that, if implemented, could help to prevent
these deaths. Second, given that these reforms are long-term in nature and unlikely
to take effect any time soon, I propose an alternative construction of the crimes of
neonaticide and infanticide under current American law.
A. The Structural Components of Neonaticide and Infanticide
Discussing the factors that lead women to the edge of desperation necessarily
invites a critical analysis of the structure of motherhood-an analysis that extends
far beyond the scope of this Article.324 Yet, without at least noting the societal
mechanisms that contribute to infanticide, any attempt at legal reform only
deepens the legal system's involvement in the dialectic of moral outrage and legal
mercy, while leaving unaltered the various factors that contribute to the persistence
of these crimes.
In Southeast Asia, infanticide is widely acknowledged as a by-product of
cultural norms that devalue females. Deep-seated practices such as dowry contrib-
ute to a distinct preference for sons, who will bring money into the family upon
marriage, as opposed to daughters, who not only leave their families of origin upon
marriage, but who take considerable wealth with them when they leave. 325 Those
who have endeavored to reduce female infanticide in these societies have recog-
nized the manner in which these cultural practices create incentives to kill baby
girls. Therefore, anti-infanticide policies in these cultures have undertaken, albeit
with limited success, to protect and promote the status of girls and women and
have endeavored to dismantle systems such as dowry that perpetuate female
subordination.32 6
324. For several excellent discussions of the institution of motherhood and the law, see FiNEMAN, supra note
300; Baker, supra note 300; Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 300; Czapanskiy, supra note 301; Roberts,
Motherhood, supra note 233; Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1993); and Sanger, supra note 300.
325. See John Van Willigen & V.C. Channa, Law, Custom, and Crimes Against Women: The Problem of Dowry
Death in India, 50 HUM. ORGANIZATION 369 (1991) (describing the custom of dowry as it operates in modem
India).
326. See id. at 374 (noting that the "criminalization of dowry may have been a politically useful symbol, but it
has not curtailed the practice"). Sharon K. Hom's article on female infanticide in China provides another example
of the law's limited capacity to reverse the incentives that contribute to a society's devaluation of female children.
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In this country, infanticide occurs against a similar cultural backdrop of
normative behavior surrounding sex, pregnancy, and motherhood. Just as the
stories surrounding neonaticide and infanticide are distinct, so, too, are the societal
norms contributing to each. As in the preceding sections, my analysis will begin
with the societal contribution to neonaticide, and then turn to the structures
underlying infanticide.
1. The Culture of Neonaticide: Self-Esteem, Sex, and Pregnancy
Although infanticide can be seen in part as a horrifying by-product of the
structure of motherhood, it is far more difficult to isolate the structural factors that
contribute to neonaticide. Indeed, many of the factors that contributed to neonati-
cide in past centuries would seem to be greatly diminished today. The twentieth
century has witnessed a considerable expansion of options for women with regard
to pregnancy and single motherhood. First, the common law sanctions relating to
nonmarital children have been reversed. 32 7 Many speculate that a primary motiva-
tion for neonaticide throughout history was the stigma of illegitimacy. This stigma
permanently attached to the unmarried mother and her child, thereby diminishing
their status in society generally, and limiting their access to employment, housing,
and subsequent marriage.32 8 Second, the past century has witnessed the expansion
of child support laws to include men who fathered children out of wedlock.
Despite the fact that these laws are notoriously under-enforced, unmarried mothers
have the same legal entitlement to child support as do married mothers. 329 Finally,
the advent of effective contraception, accompanied by safe and legal abortion, has
undeniably reduced the impulse toward neonaticide.33 °
Horn, supra note 66, at 271; see also Susan Greenhalgh & Jiali Li, Engendering Reproductive Policy and Practice
in Peasant China: For a Feminist Demography of Reproduction, 20 SIGNS 601 (1995) (examining the
demographic consequences of reproductive politics inherent in China's one-child policy).
327. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized children born outside of wedlock as "persons" under the Equal
Protection Clause in 1968. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968). In subsequent decades, the Court slowly has expanded the legal rights of nonmarital
children. Nevertheless, at least one contemporary source demonstrates the continuing legacy of discrimination
against children born outside of wedlock. MARTHA T. ZiNGo & KEVIN E. EARLY, NAMELESS PERSONS: LEGAL
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARITAL CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES (1994).
328. For a description of the legal harms historically .inflicted upon children born outside of wedlock, see
HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (197 1); and ZINGO & EARLY, supra note 327, at 15-27.
329. Cf Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (granting same rights to children born out of wedlock as those born to married
parents, under the Equal Protection Clause); Glona, 391 U.S. at 75-76 (same).
330. One brief study attempts to prove this by using statistics gathered from the National Center on Vital
Statistics. David Lester, Roe v. Wade Was Followed by a Decrease in Neonatal Homicide, 267 JAMA 3027
(1992). Of course, it is important to remember that legalizing abortion does not guarantee access to abortion. See
supra notes 291 through 295 and accompanying text (regarding the barriers to abortion). Note also that the extent
to which abortion may be viewed as a successful strategy for preventing infanticide obviously depends on
whether one views abortion as murder. From the perspective of those who equate abortion with murder, its
legalization provides a false cover for what might otherwise be viewed as infanticide. From this perspective, we
still have relatively high rates of infanticide, some legal, and some illegal.
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The persistence of neonaticide therefore remains somewhat of a puzzle. The
neonaticide stories hint more at individual and familial dysfunction than at broader
societal disjuncture. At the individual level, the girls involved in neonaticide cases
possess so little self-esteem that they are incapable of acting to protect themselves.
Their insecurity almost certainly contributes to their becoming pregnant in the first
place, and it leads to their paralysis once pregnant. Diminished self-esteem is
commonplace for adolescent girls and seems to be a product of the socialization
process by which girls grow into women.33' Its manifestations include a growing
reluctance to speak out and take initiative, and a desire to be perceived as
"feminine" or compliant. 332 These characteristics help place in context the
passivity of the girls who commit neonaticide.
Although less is known about the families of the girls who commit neonaticide,
it seems likely that they, too, play a considerable role in contributing to these
crimes. Even if society has halted the legal discrimination against children born
out of wedlock, there still is considerable shame and guilt associated with a
teenager's pregnancy. The fear that these girls consistently express-that they will
be exiled from their families as a result of their pregnancy-speaks volumes about
family expectations. In an era when the majority of adolescents are sexually
active,333 it remains the case that the majority of parents would prefer their
daughters to be "good girls."' 33 ' Thus, there is considerable pressure associated
with confronting one's parents with the news that one not only has had sex, but
also is pregnant.
At a somewhat more abstract level, these cases show evidence of families that
are remarkably disinterested in their children's lives. Those who commit neonati-
cide lack relationships with open, caring, reliable adults-adults who will recog-
nize the signs of pregnancy, confront the girls about their situations, and initiate the
difficult conversations about the alternative resolutions to pregnancy, including
motherhood. This isolation from loved ones, even within the home, clearly
constitutes a structural factor that contributes to neonaticide.
At a societal level, there are both symbolic and pragmatic factors that contribute
to neonaticide. The repeal of common law discriminatory provisions against
nonmarital children has not been accompanied by a whole-hearted embrace of the
331. One survey found that, among elementary school children, 60% of girls and 69% of boys felt happy with
themselves, but by high school, the numbers had dropped to 29% of girls and 46% of boys. Although both boys
and girls experience difficulty in adolescence, girls consistently feel worse about themselves. Oberman, Turning
Girls, supra note 274, at 56.
332. Id. at 57.
333. See Teenage Pregnancy Myths Debunked, NEWS (The Alan Guttmacher Institute, New York, N.Y. and
Washington, D.C.), June 7, 1994, at 2 (most teenagers, regardless of race, income, gender, or religious affiliation,
begin to have sex in their middle-to-late teens). For a fascinating exploration of the myths and realities
surrounding teenage sexual activity, pregnancy, and related policy-making, see KRISTIN LUKER, DUBIOUS
CONCEPTIONS: THE PoLrrlCS OF TEkENAGE PREGNANCY (1996).
334. The persistence of slang terms like slut, for which there are no male equivalents, is but one indication that
the double standard for sexual behavior is alive and well. Oberman, Turning Girls, supra note 274, at 15-19.
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practice of single parenting. Indeed, society is rife with negative societal character-
izations of single mothers, welfare mothers, and teenage mothers.335 Contempo-
rary social pundits now recommend that the United States revive "illegitimacy" as
a concept and use stigma as a tool in the battle against teenage pregnancy.336 Even
President Clinton, in his 1995 State of the Union address, claimed that "[t]he
epidemic of teen pregnancies and births where there is no marriage" is "our most
serious social problem.", 337 Certainly, these characterizations contribute to the
sense of shame and anxiety these girls experience as they face (or rather, deny)
their options.
In addition to the impact of society's perception of single mothers, social
policies have concrete ramifications that limit these girls' options. Recall A.'s
principal concerns upon learning that she was pregnant.338 In addition to her fears
about her family's response, she was overwhelmed by worries about money,
insurance, housing, and work.3 3 9 These very practical concerns are dictated by a
society that ties health insurance to the workplace, tolerates shortages of affordable
housing, and privatizes the costs of child care. Without a full-time job, A. could not
afford child care, insurance, or a place to live. Had her family kicked her out, she
and her baby easily could have become homeless. 340 A.'s concerns only would
have been amplified had her story occurred today, amidst the ongoing efforts at
welfare reform, including proposals allowing states to deny welfare payments to
teenage mothers who are not in school or living with an adult. 34 1 Coupled with the
lack of family support and the costliness of abortion, these proposals might be
335. This is perhaps best exemplified by the series of responses to Vice President Dan Quayle's condemnation
of fictional television character Murphy Brown for being a single mother. Despite the initial ridicule generated by
his remarks (the character was impregnated by her ex-husband, and thus, the pro-life Quayle's opposition to her
becoming a single mother seemed to be an ironic endorsement of abortion), over time, many have voiced their
support for his position. See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April
1993, at 47 (describing the Dan Quayle/Murphy Brown debate and arguing that single motherhood and divorce
are harmful to children). For a thorough critique of these views, see Judith Stacey, The New Family Values
Crusaders: Dan Quayle's Revenge, THE NATION, July 25, 1994, at 119.
336. These commentators seldom explain how they think single women should resolve their pregnancies.
Their political conservatism usually makes it taboo to mention abortion, yet the reality is that many of the men
who impregnate them are neither willing nor able to support the child. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Defining
Deviancy Up: The New Assault on Bourgeois Life, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 1993, at 20 (discussing the
problem of single mothers, but offering no alternative suggestion). For a thoughtful critique of proposals to
"restigmatize" unwed motherhood, see Katha Pollitt, Subject to Debate, THE NATION, Dec. 12, 1994, at 717.
337. Charles Krauthamner, A Social Conservative Credo, PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1995, at 15-16. For a
fascinating exploration of the social (mis)construction of the "epidemic" of teenage pregnancy, see generally
LUKER, supra note 333 (demonstrating that the rates of teenagers bearing children have not risen since the 1950s,
but noting that the rates of teen mothers who marry has declined).
338. See supra notes 256 through 273 and accompanying text.
339. Id.
340. For a profoundly disturbing collection of the accounts of homeless families, see JONATHAN KozoL,
RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1988).
341. The Welfare reform debate, poverty, and some useful numbers, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at A12
[hereinafter Welfare Reform] (noting that the 1996 welfare legislation essentially eliminates Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) and replaces the program with federal block grants).
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viewed as a veritable prescription for neonaticide. 342
Although these varied factors-individual vulnerability, family dysfunction,
and societal rhetoric and structures-are wide-ranging, everything we know about
neonaticide points to a nuanced set of causes. Therefore, defining preventive
policies for neonaticide, like for infanticide, leads back to an analysis of family and
community. Neonaticide is not so much about a lack of economic resources as it is
about a lack of communication and community. As is the case with infanticide,
neonaticide is not merely an individual problem; it is a reflection of an atomized
society that places little value on the mental and physical well-being of its most
vulnerable constituents. Those who would prevent neonaticide must begin by
identifying and remedying girls' vulnerability long before they become pregnant.
2. The Culture of Infanticide: Motherhood in Isolation and Poverty
The isolation of mothers and infants is just one of the many consequences of the
gradual fragmentation of the extended family. Although there are both benefits and
detriments to living in close proximity to extended family members, certainly one
of the benefits is the considerable assistance available from family members upon
the birth of a child. In the United States today, many new mothers lack any such
community. Of course, there is enormous variation in terms of community, and it is
impossible to generalize about the experiences of new mothers given the diversity
of maternal experiences across class, race, and ethnic lines.343 Nevertheless, a
large number of women in the United States today are not merely the primary, but
essentially the only, caretakers of their infants.344 Even when intact, the nuclear
family structure presupposes this division of labor, and current figures indicate that
at least one-third of American children live in single parent families.345
The tasks associated with caring for an infant are extraordinarily demanding.
When performed by one parent, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week,
throughout the early months and years of a child's life, this work is arguably the
most difficult labor any human ever engages in. In a journalistic account of the first
year of her son's life, writer Anne Lamott provides a rare glimpse into the fused
joys and struggles of motherhood. As a single, self-employed parent in her
mid-thirties, Lamott was somewhat vulnerable to isolation and financial worries,
but she was surrounded by a supportive network of family and friends. In her diary,
342. See Cynthia A. Bailey, Workfare and Involuntary Servitude-What You Wanted to Know But Were Afraid
to Ask, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 285, 312-16 (1995) (discussing welfare reform and single mothers without
child care); Corns, Note, supra note 292, at 384-88 (discussing the impact on poor women of the lack of funding
for abortions).
343. This point is perhaps best illustrated in Carol Stack's classic study of African-American family structure in
impoverished neighborhoods. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMvlUNrT'
(1975).
344. See supra notes 297 through 323 and accompanying text.
345. More Americans marry later get divorced, census shows, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Mar. 13, 1996, at A5.
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 73 1996-1997
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Lamott records the exhaustion she experienced during her son's first four months.
He's so fine all day, so alert and beautiful and good, and then the colic kicks in.
I'm okay for the first hour, more or less, not happy about things but basically
okay, and then I start to lose it as the colic continues. I end up incredibly
frustrated and sad and angry. I have had some terrible visions lately, like of
holding him by the ankle and whacking him against the wall, the way you
"cure" an octopus on the dock.34 6
Despite Lamott's closely-knit community, she frequently found herself alone late
at night with a screaming baby.
I wonder if it is normal for a mother to adore her baby so desperately and at the
same time to think about choking him or throwing him down the stairs. It's
incredible to be this fucking tired and yet to have to go through the several
hours of colic every night. It would be awful enough to deal with if you were
feeling healthy and upbeat. It's a bit much when you're feeling like total dog
shit. When he woke me up at 4:00 this morning to nurse, I felt like I was
dying.
34 7
The fact that the work of mothering routinely is undertaken by the female half of
the population without financial compensation serves to minimize the strenuous-
ness of this work. Indeed, even calling motherhood "work" seems somehow
subversive and taboo. As a result, new mothers may view their physical and
emotional exhaustion as a personal failing, rather than as the result of their having
undertaken an overwhelmingly difficult task. It is therefore all the more challeng-
ing for these women to seek assistance and confide in others that they need help.
The isolation of mothers is reinforced by the paucity of nonpunitive community
support services for parents and children. The bulk of state child advocacy
agencies are punitive in nature, designed to identify children "at risk" of abuse or
neglect and remove them from their homes. 348 Although there is an obvious and
indisputable need for child protection agencies that intervene to remove children
from dangerous environments, there is an equally compelling need for agencies
that exist primarily to offer support to parents. 349 Not only are there very few such
346. ANNE LAmor, OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS 36 (1994).
347. Id. at 59.
348. Annette Appell, an attorney with Northwestern University's Center for Children and Family Justice, notes
that, although the enabling acts of many state child protection agencies require the agencies to strive toward
family preservation and reunification, in recent years law and policy have shifted away from this priority. In
Illinois, for example, the family preservation policy was blamed for several notorious deaths from child abuse,
and as a result, the agency is now bound by a "best interests" standard, rather than the former statutory mandate of
family preservation. Interview with Annette Appell, in Chicago, I1. (Aug. 23, 1995).
349. Anne Lamott describes the assistance she received from one such agency in the following passage from
her journal:
Last night was death. Vietnam. He was colicky from 10:00 till nearly 1:00. At midnight I broke
under the strain and called this organization called Pregnancy to Parenthood. They help stressed-
[Vol. 34:1
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agencies, but a parent who seeks support from existing child protection agencies
runs a risk of being punished, rather than assisted.35 °
In the Chicago area, I was able to locate two private, not-for-profit, nonpunitive
parental support organizations: Parents Anonymous and Child Abuse Prevention
Services. The former consists of eight city-wide support groups, each comprised of
approximately parents 35  Part of a national network that advocatesapoi yten a t.  anto   tavctsagainst
corporal punishment, each self-help group meets weekly so that members can
share stories and seek advice. Members use only their first names; the law,
however, requires the reporting of members who describe behavior that indicates
the possibility of child abuse or neglect.352 This necessity, along with the powerful
cultural taboos against acknowledging a need for help in parenting, makes it
challenging to recruit members and to encourage them to rely upon the support
group for comfort.3 5 3 The second agency, Child Abuse Prevention Services, runs
several support groups that differ from Parents Anonymous only in that they are
facilitated by a professional counselor, rather than a trained volunteer parent. In
addition, this agency sponsors a twenty-four hour "Parental Stress" hotline, which
receives an estimated 5,500 calls annually.354
Although these organizations represent a powerful positive force, clearly they
cannot fulfill the emotional, social, and financial support needs of millions of
isolated parents in the greater Chicago vicinity. Neither of these groups can offer
what is perhaps the most basic of services: the availability of an alternate caretaker
out parents and have a twenty-four-hour switchboard that I think is to prevent child abuse. I felt
humiliated calling and was crying quite hard, and Sam was crying quite hard, and I told the person
on the line that I didn't think I was going to hurt him but that I didn't think I could get through the
night. So the person rang the clinical director at home, spliced my call through, and we talked for
over an hour. Sam eventually went to sleep. She recommended I go on a wheat-free, dairy-free diet
to see if it helps. Mostly she was just there for me in the middle of the night. We talked until I was
okay again. Sam woke up a few hours later and nursed peacefully.
LAMOTT, supra note 346, at 71.
350. One poignant example of this involves Denise Perrigo, who in 1992 called a community volunteer center
in Syracuse, New York, seeking a referral for a question she had about breast-feeding. Lisa Levitt Ryckman, A
simple question leads to jail, CHI. T~tsa., Feb. 9, 1992, at 16, zone C. She wanted to know whether it was normal
for a woman to become sexually aroused while nursing her two-year-old daughter. Rather than referring her to the
La Leche League, a breast-feeding support group, (which incidentally would have informed her that this response
was completely normal, and that, although most American women stop nursing by age one, the international
average is 4.2 years), the agency reported Ms. Perrigo to a child abuse hotline. Id. The county Department of
Social Services took Perrigo's daughter into custody, and Perrigo was jailed under charges of criminal child abuse.
Experts were hired to investigate the case, and Perrigo's daughter was placed in foster care. Id. Despite the
department's family reunification policy, the child's grandparents were rejected as foster parents because "they
did not believe any abuse had taken place." id. It took eight months and a private attorney before Perrigo
recovered custody. ld.
351. PARENTS ANONYMOUS: STATEWIDE NEWS 11, Fall 1995 (on file with the author).
352. Interview with Maureen Blaha, Executive Director of Parents Anonymous, in Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 8, 1995).
353. Id.
354. Telephone interview with Claire Dunham, Counselor at Child Abuse Prevention Services, in Chicago, Ill.
(July 8, 1995).
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who might provide a brief respite to an exhausted parent. The child care shortage
has received considerable media attention, yet many fail to recognize the spiral of
problems created by this shortage. A parent who cannot find work that pays enough
to cover the costs of day care cannot afford to work outside of her home. And a
parent who lacks income cannot afford to hire someone to assist her in caring for
her child when she needs a break. 5 It is both natural and inevitable that a parent
will need to take breaks from her child, and in light of the foregoing, it is perhaps
unsurprising to find that many parents simply leave their children unsupervised
from time to time. In Illinois, over 80% of the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services' caseload consists of mothers who left their children unat-
tended.356
The difficulties associated with parenting are not created by poverty alone, but
in a fragmented community, money can buy a parent some respite. It may be that
economic supports to mothers, of the sort common throughout Europe, are part of
a solution.357 Yet, because part of the impetus toward infanticide derives from
social and emotional isolation, child allowances and maternity stipends are
incomplete solutions at best. Without dramatically increasing the number of
nonpunitive resources for parents, we will fail to address the problems inherent in
the solitary burdens associated with motherhood. This is not to suggest that the
solution to infanticide is to resurrect foundling homes or to train and employ
thousands of professional caretakers to take the place of mothers. 358 The isolation
355. One of the counselors at Child Abuse Prevention Services related to me an anecdote that illustrates the
widely-felt need for respite care. Her church, which is located in a Chicago neighborhood that borders both
Cabrini-Green, one of the city's poorest neighborhoods, and Chicago's wealthier Old Town neighborhood,
decided to provide a charitable "drop-off" afternoon day care service. They posted notices about their service in
the Cabrini-Green housing projects, and within several days, they had to begin turning away inquiries because the
program had reached capacity. The organizers were upset because rather than serving the poorer women in their
vicinity, they had been swamped by babies from Old Town mothers, who had heard about the program by word of
mouth and were thrilled at the idea of taking an occasional break. Id.
356. Interview with Benjamin Wolfe, Staff Attorney, Illinois ACLU, in Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 2, 1994).
357. Originally intended as wage supplements, and later as a mechanism for encouraging births in countries
concerned about declining population growth, family allowances exist as a statutory benefit in 67 countries,
including every industrialized country except the United States. Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, Notes on
Policy and Practice: Income Transfers and Mother-Only Families in Eight Countries, 57 Soc. SERVICE REV. 448,
459-60 (1983). Although they have failed to effect population increases, the allowances play a significant role in
the incomes of single-parent, female-headed families, constituting between 13% and 27% of family income for
mothers not working outside of the home, and between 10% and 24% for those with outside employment. Id.
358. Professor John McKnight's essay on "Professionalized Service and Disabling Help" discusses the danger
of developing solutions without recognizing the systemic nature of these social problems:
[a] study of children who became state wards exemplifies the process. The children were legally
separated from their families because their parents were judged to be unable to provide adequate
care for the children. Therefore, the children were placed in professional service institutions....
Quite correctly, officials who were involved in removing the children from their homes agreed that
a common reason for removal was the economic poverty of the family. Obviously, they had no
resources to deal with poverty. But there were many resources for professionalized institutional
service. The service system met the economic need by institutionalizing an individualized
definition of the problem. The negative side effect was that the poverty of the families was
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of mothers is not an individual problem, but rather, a structural one.359
Any anti-infanticide policy must begin by recognizing the way in which existing
policies and structures contribute to the problem. For example, consider the impact
on single mothers of the ongoing efforts at dismantling welfare.36 ° Ostensibly
designed as an effort to encourage mothers to seek paid employment, both the
federal and state governments have drastically reduced economic support to single
women and their children.36 ' Even the most conservative figures estimate that
these policies will result in an increase of at least one million American children
living in poverty.362 Few discuss the impact on the mothers. Unless accompanied
by a dramatic increase in subsidized day care, poor women will be forced to
choose between leaving their children inadequately supervised to earn money
working outside of their homes and sacrificing this potential income while trying
to survive on limited government assistance in order to keep their children
supervised.363 This trade-off carries with it a subtext of incipient desperation.
B. Rethinking the Crime of Infanticide Under Modern American Law
The magnitude of reforms required to alter the cultures of infanticide and
neonaticide is daunting in scope. It is therefore important, in the interim, to revisit
the current legal responses to these crimes and to identify necessary short-term
reforms.
The American approach to infanticide varies by jurisdiction, but essentially
consists of zealous prosecution in accordance with the maximum penalties
permitted under homicide laws. The states rely upon juries and judges to take into
intensified by the resources consumed by the "caring" professional services. In counterproductive
terms, the servicing system "produced" broken families.
JOHN McKNIGrrT, THE CARELESS SOCIETY: COMMUNITY AND ITS COUNTERFEITS 44 (1995).
359. For example, recall the circumstances surrounding the suffocation death of Latrena Pixley's six-week-old
child. See supra notes 203 through 218 and accompanying text. At the time of her baby's death, Pixley was an
unemployed high school dropout with two children under the age of one. She lived in a small apartment, without a
telephone, and although she had a live-in boyfriend and a family, they were so detached from the realities of
Pixley's life that they did not even notice the baby's absence until Pixley informed them that she had killed her
baby. Id. Pixley's isolation was by no means extraordinary. Indeed, similar conditions were evident in virtually all
of my infanticide cases.
360. See Welfare Reform, supra note 341, at A12.
361. Id.
362. The nonpartisan Urban Institute estimates that the actual number of children impoverished by the 1996
law will be closer to 3,500,000. Richard Merlyn Cook, A Terrible Price, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 1996.
Regarding the July 1996 welfare legislation, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan remarked, " '[in our confusion we are
doing mad things .... The premise of this legislation is that the behavior of certain adults can be changed by
making the lives of their children as wretched as possible.' " Clarence Page, Fearing the Best and Worst of
Welfare Reform, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1996, at 19, zone C.
363. For a discussion of welfare reform and single mothers without child care, see Bailey, supra note 342, at
312-16; Carla M. Da Luz & Pamela C. Weckerly, Will the New Republican Majority in Congress Wage Old Battles
Against Women?, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 501 (1995); and Sherri Kimmel, Champions of Family and Community,
PENN. LAWYER, May-June 1995, at 12.
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account the women's stories when determining culpability. This often leads to the
defendant being found either not guilty or guilty of a lesser offense than that
charged. 364 As we have seen, even if she is convicted, the defendant stands a good
chance of receiving a relatively lenient sentence.
The impetus toward lenience has resulted in an incoherent body of case law-an
incoherence driven not by difficulties in determining the defendant's guilt, but
rather by jury and judicial sensibilities regarding the defendant's blameworthi-
ness. 365 In making plain the patterns underlying these cases and their resolutions,
and in evaluating the complex factors that contribute to these children's deaths, we
recognize that cases involving mothers who kill their children not only are
unsettling, but also are distinctly unlike more "meditated" homicides. Hence, the
widespread consensus that it is morally wrong for a mother to take the life of her
infant is met with an equally widespread resistance to equating such a homicide
with murder.
There are both common law and statutory mechanisms by which we might
resituate the crime of infanticide as other than first degree murder. Nevertheless, if
this is accomplished without an accompanying explanation for why this crime
should be treated differently, it will perpetuate all of the problems of "exceptional-
ism" identified earlier.36 6 In order to explore these normative solutions in context, I
will first discuss neonaticide, and then turn to infanticide.
1. Neonaticide as Involuntary Manslaughter
Over the course of this project, many of my assistants, colleagues, and friends
have listened to the multiple accounts of neonaticide, and have begun clipping and
saving the stories themselves, reacting to each story with ever-increasing sorrow
and frustration at the tragic waste of lives. I have noticed that many of them make
an odd sort of "Freudian slip" when referring to a woman accused of killing her
child-they call her the "victim." In a sense, these women can be seen as victims,
and their actions understood as an almost inevitable, or at least comprehensible,
response to an oppressive environment. There is a spirit of mercy that inspires this
recasting of victim and perpetrator, a moral impetus that demands not that we
forgive the defendant, but rather that we recognize the source of her crime and
permit that to temper our judgment of her.
One might attempt to give legal effect to this moral recasting by arguing that
neonaticide be viewed as a crime of self-defense. In a rather literal sense, the fetus
poses an overwhelming threat to the woman's identity. Once the fetus is born, she
364. See, e.g., A's story, supra notes 256 through 273 and accompanying text.
365. Recall Perlin's "'empathy outlier" analysis, in which he notes the select categories in which juries seem to
over-apply the insanity defense, despite the fact that these defendants do not conform to our pre-reflective and
allegedly "common-sensical" views of the mentally disabled as "madmen" or "beasts." PERLIN, supra note 43, at
192-93.
366. See supra notes 247 through 249 and accompanying text.
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no longer will be simply a woman, she will be a mother. If she rids herself of the
fetus or baby, she still will be a woman, and she will have kept her identity
intact. 367 Strictly speaking, this defense stands little chance of success. Self-
defense is a limited legal defense that was devised to address cases in which the
defendant believed herself to be threatened in an imminent and life-threatening
manner.368 Thus, the woman accused of killing her newborn would need to
convince the trier of fact that the fetus was an aggressor who unjustifiably
threatened harm to her, and that her response was reasonable.369
To engage this argument further requires a thorough jurisprudential discussion
of the underlying purposes of criminal law that exceeds the scope of this Article.
Although there are philosophical and legal arguments that challenge the assump-
tion that neonaticide should be considered immoral and illegal, it remains the case
that neonaticide defendants frequently are charged with murder.370 This being so,
rather than discussing whether they should be charged at all, it seems far more
pressing to explore the applicability of murder charges, as opposed to lesser
offenses, to women who commit neonaticide.
First degree murder ordinarily implies an element of intent on the part of the
murderer.3 71 Although the precise language varies among jurisdictions, murder
codes generally require that the defendant possess an intent to kill or an intent to do
serious bodily injury, or else that the state demonstrate that the death occurred
while the defendant was committing a felony or engaging in conduct so extremely
reckless as to reflect a "depraved heart., 37 2 For example, consider the Model
367. The same reasoning also applies to the cases of infanticide, in which one might hypothesize that the
woman kills her children in order to free herself of her identity as "mother" and to recover her own identity.
368. The law of self-defense requires the defendant to establish that: (1) an aggressor unjustifiably threatens
harm to the actor; and (2) the actor engages in conduct harmful to the aggressor (a) when and to the extent
necessary for self-protection, and (b) that is reasonable in relation to the harm threatened. RoBINSON, supra note
218, at § 132.
There is some debate over the validity of psychological self-defense, but at the present, these claims remain
long shots. For an example, see Charles Ewing's proposal that we permit a psychological self-defense theory.
Charles P. Ewing, Psychological Self-Defense: A Proposed Justification for Battered Women Who Kill, 14 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 579 (1990). For a critique of Mr. Ewing's position, see Stephen.J. Morse, The Misbegotten Marriage
of Soft Psychology and Bad Law: Psychological Self-Defense as a Justification for Homicide, 14 L. & HuM.
BEHAV. 595 (1990).
369. A related argument that has been unsuccessfully raised in a neonaticide case is that of necessity. See
Illinois v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806 (I11. App. 1991) (discussing case of 15-year-old defendant who was unaware that
she had been pregnant and who claimed that killing her newborn was necessary to avoid disgrace of unwed
pregnancy).
370. Philosopher Michael Tooley contends that killing a neonate is not intrinsically wrong, because newborns
are not persons. He explains that neonates are not persons because their behavior does not indicate the existence of
higher mental capacities, such as the capacity for thought, rational deliberation, or self-consciousness. Moreover,
he argues that scientific evidence about neurophysical structures in neonates also proves they are not persons. This
is because data indicates that the neuronal circuitry thought to underlie higher mental functions is not present at
birth, but actually develops over a long period of postnatal development. TOOLEY, supra note 129, at 407.
371. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 603 (2nd ed. 1986) (tracing the evolution of the "malice
aforethought" standard).
372. Id.
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Penal Code's murder provision, which provides that criminal homicide constitutes
murder when:
a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life.
373
As the previous discussions of neonaticide demonstrate, most neonaticide
defendants do not plan to kill their babies. Quite to the contrary, everything about
the circumstances surrounding labor and delivery in these cases speaks to the
sudden and impulsive nature of the mother's response. Although one might argue
that the defendant was negligent in her failure to anticipate the impending birth of
a child, and in her failure to take precautions to insure the baby's survival, this
hardly can be seen as premeditated murder.374 At best, this failing makes her
reckless. The cases in which recklessness is so extreme as to constitute murder
involve defendants whose behavior is so calculated to produce harm that it is
otherwise inexplicable. We call these "depraved-heart murders" :375
firing a bullet into a room occupied, as the defendant knows, by several people;
... shooting into the caboose of a passing train or into a moving automobile;
playing a game of "Russian roulette" with another person; ... driving a car at
very high speeds along a main street.37 6
In order to accommodate neonaticide under modem murder codes, one must
equate an unattended birth-the most commonplace and natural event in human
history-with the pathological behavior of the depraved-heart murderer. So doing
has the curious effect of criminalizing the birth process when it takes place without
medical supervision.377 This marks a significant deviation from present law and
373. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962).
374. It is, of course, possible to imagine a neonaticide that demonstrates sufficient intentionality to constitute
murder. Typically, however, neonaticide defendants' behavior is reflexive and unplanned. Moreover, the legal
standard required to elevate a homicide to murder is not negligence, but extreme recklessness. Id.
375. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 371, at 617.
376. Id. at 619-20. LaFave and Scott also cite a 1956 case from England for the proposition that shaking an
infant so long and so vigorously that it cannot breathe should be considered a depraved-heart murder. Id. (citing
Regina v. Ward, 1 Q.B. 351 (1956)). If this were widely considered to be murder, then neonaticide arguably might
be analogized as murder also; however, the level of control and deliberateness demonstrated by the baby-shaker is
vastly different from the actions taken by many neonaticide defendants. See Joanne Wasserman, The Anger that
Kills: Doctors are Seeing a Rise in Fatalities and Brain Damage Caused by Shaking, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 23,
1996, at 37 (quoting several experts on the shaken baby syndrome). Dr. Margaret McHugh explains that "a gentle
shaking would not explain [the] retinal bleeding and brain hemorrhaging." Id. Lucinda Suarez, of the Queens
district attorney's office, notes that "[t]his is tremendous force .... Medical experts compare it to the velocity and
force of a high-speed car crash." Id. Nevertheless, one expert remarks that, "despite the medical evidence, it's
difficult to get juries to convict those accused of shaking babies." Id.
377. In her fascinating study of American women charged with endangering their newborns during or due to
unassisted childbirth, anthropologist Anna Tsing finds that
[u]nassisted childbirth, it seems, earns women a characterization as calculating criminals.... In
[Vol. 34:1
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from the reality that many thousands of women successfully deliver their babies
outside of the health care system, for reasons ranging from personal preference to
poverty to exceptionally speedy labors. 378 Are we to consider these deliveries as
cases of attempted murder?
Although neonaticide defendants frequently are accused of first degree murder,
they seldom are convicted of this crime. As one Chicago criminal defense lawyer
observed, there is a pattern of "over-charging and under-convicting" in neonati-
cide cases. 379 The result, as was seen in the second section of this Article, is that
the majority of these cases plead out before trial, and that those that proceed to trial
are more likely to result in convictions for the lesser crime of involuntary
manslaughter. Indeed, when one evaluates the range of factual situations governed
under the broad rubric of involuntary manslaughter, it is immediately apparent that
this crime is far more applicable to neonaticide than murder.
Most states' criminal codes do not define involuntary manslaughter with great
specificity, although all American jurisdictions undertake to punish it.380 At
common law, manslaughter was broadly defined to govern unlawful killings that
did not involve malice aforethought.3 8 1 Over time, several categories of manslaugh-
ter arose, including what is commonly known as involuntary, "unlawful-act," or
"misdemeanor" manslaughter.3 2 Despite the fluctuating homicide nomenclature,
involuntary manslaughter generally exists as a less severe offense than voluntary
manslaughter or murder, and is applicable in circumstances where the defendant's
conduct lacked a murderous intent, but involved a high degree of risk of death or
serious bodily injury to the victim. 383
This definition applies to neonaticide in that the pregnant woman who fails to
acknowledge her condition and to plan for her impending delivery poses a distinct
most of the cases I have studied, I found the events surrounding the childbirth open to varied
interpretations. Often the cause of death of the infant was unclear, with no evidence of trauma ....
Many of the women charged claimed they did not know they were in labor; some were unaware
they were pregnant. Yet rather than leading to a discussion of these ambiguities, the fact that a
woman gave birth alone was seen as evidence or cause of her criminal neglect of the newborn.
Tsing, supra note 233, at 282-83. A recent case from Columbia, South Carolina illustrates Tsing's thesis. Sheriff
Tommy Mims arrested Ms. Connie Williams after she delivered a baby in the bathroom of a Sumter County youth
club in December 1996. Although there was no evidence that Williams took any steps to kill the child, it seems
that the child died in the bathroom. Mims explained that "Williams was charged with murder ... because she
didn't get medical assistance during the delivery." Police say woman killed baby girl: Died after Birth in Sumter
Bathroom, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 7, 1996, at B3.
378. In 1993, of 4,000,280 total births in the United States, 40,000 were not in the hospital. 44 MONTHLY VITAL
STATISTiCS REr. 71 (Sept. 21, 1995).
379. Interview with Jeffrey Urdangen, criminal defense attorney, in Chicago, I11. (Oct. 15, 1995).
380. LAFAVE & Scowr, supra note 371, at 668.
381. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 450 (1994) [hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING].
382. Id.
383. Id. at 450, 483-86; LAFAVE & ScoTt, supra note 371, at 669. The Model Penal Code eliminates the
unlawful act doctrine, and recasts involuntary manslaughter as "criminally negligent homicide." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.4.
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risk to her offspring's well-being. Even if her behavior prior to the birth is both
legal and unintentional, it can be argued that, once the baby is born, the woman's
failure to seek assistance is either criminally negligent or reckless because a parent
has a legal duty to furnish medical care for her child.384
Of course, the applicability and availability of this lesser homicide provision
does not guarantee that neonaticide defendants will not be charged with and
convicted of murder. Moreover, even if it were the case that all neonaticide
defendants, including those charged with murder, ultimately were convicted of
manslaughter, this would be an absurd manner of dispensing justice. One defense
lawyer in a neonaticide case in which the client was tried for murder, but only
convicted of involuntary manslaughter, remarked, "[a]lthough we may take
comfort from the fact that these defendants seldom receive the maximum allow-
able penalties under the law, this is most certainly an unfair and arbitrary, as well as
a costly and time-consuming manner to handle these cases."
38 5
It is precisely the random, arbitrary nature of neonaticide cases that lends appeal
to the notion of creating a distinct statute to govern this crime. Although the
recognition of a separate crime for women who kill their children inherently
exceptionalizes women, there is no denying that such a statute would be the best
way to insure a uniform application of the law. The challenge, therefore, lies in drafting a
law that would incorporate the dominant lenient response to neonaticide without
simultaneously treating women, by virtue of their biology, as less than full citizens. 
386
One manner of accomplishing this goal lies in amending existing involuntary
manslaughter statutes. Many criminal codes list specific circumstances under
which a homicide will constitute involuntary manslaughter. For example, the
Illinois statute provides that "[i]n cases involving reckless homicide, being under
the influence of alcohol or any other drug ... at the time of the alleged violation
shall be presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to
the contrary.",387 Thus, an involuntary manslaughter statute might be amended to
include the following provision:
In cases involving a woman who causes the death of her newborn child under
the age of twenty-four hours, during which time the balance of her mind is
384. "[A] number of reported cases have concerned criminal negligence or recklessness in omitting to furnish
medical care for helpless, sick or injured persons to whom the defendant owes a duty of care." LAFAVE & Scorr,
supra note 371, at 671. The definition of criminal negligence includes one or both of the following principles:
(1) the defendant's conduct, under the circumstances known to him, must involve a high degree of
risk of death or serious bodily injury, in addition to the unreasonable risk required for ordinary
negligence; and (2) whatever the degree of risk required ... the defendant must be aware of the
fact that his conduct creates this risk.
Id at 669.
385. Interview with Jeffrey Urdangen, supra note 379.
386. See Coughlin, supra note 249, for a well-articulated argument regarding the hazards of laws that excuse
women for their actions on the basis of gender differences.
387. 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/9-3(b) (West 1994).
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disturbed by reason of the effect of giving birth or of circumstances consequent
upon the birth, the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence of no
more than a reckless or negligent act unless disproved by evidence to the
contrary.
This proposal may be criticized on several grounds. First, there is the somewhat
anachronistic "balance of the mind" language borrowed from the British Infanti-
cide Act.388 Modem criminal law does little to acknowledge that defendants who
are not insane may nevertheless demonstrate diminished mental capacity, whether
temporary or permanent, and thus the very concept of a temporary mental
imbalance is out of keeping with contemporary American law.389 Yet, the lenient
impulse in neonaticide cases results from just such a recognition. The "balance of
the mind" language is designed to acknowledge the extraordinary mental and
physical trauma inherent in an unattended labor and delivery, particularly when
this follows months of denial of pregnancy. The use of this language also operates
as a limiting factor, permitting the state to obtain murder convictions against
women whose actions were not the result of temporary mental imbalance, but
rather, reflected a knowing and purposeful intention to kill their newborns.
Second, a statute so narrowly defined is somewhat awkward. Certainly, there is
a tendency in legislating to allow juries great latitude in identifying reasonable
conduct and, therefore, criminal codes generally consist of broadly-defined stan-
dards of behavior and mental states rather than specific factual provisions.390
Nevertheless, there are myriad examples of criminal codes that identify objective
excusing components with great specificity.39' The need for such detailed descrip-
tion is amply demonstrated by the widely ranging outcomes observed in these
cases.
Finally, this proposal may be seen as a new effort to "medicalize" women's
responses to burdens placed upon them by virtue of their subordinated status in
society. The resort to scientific or quasi-scientific explanations for women's
criminal behavior helps cloak the social and structural constraints on women,
388. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
389. In his comprehensive study of the insanity defense, Professor Michael Perlin concludes that "[wihile we
have grudgingly allowed a few defendants to seek exculpation through the insanity defense, we usually limit it to
defendants 'utterly and obviously' beyond the reach of the criminal law." PERHiN, supra note 43, at 29-30.
390. Professor Dressier notes that excuse theory is hard to legislate:
[u]nder an excuse theory, what conduct society deems harmful is not at issue. Rather, the issue is
whether the actor lived up to a standard of how 'reasonable' people act. Although a legislature may
properly codify an objective excusing component, it is more plausible to leave its definition.., to
jurors, who represent that objective standard.
Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRlm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
421, 447 (1982) [hereinafter Dressier, Rethinking].
391. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 & cmt. (defining criminal attempt to include behavior "constituting
a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in [the] commission of the crime," and then
providing a detailed list of activities that constitute substantial steps).
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forcing women to attempt to excuse their illegal actions as crazy, rather than
permitting them to reveal these actions as rational responses to a crazy environ-
ment.
392
Furthermore, by offering a scientific explanation for neonaticide, this proposal
courts the risks identified by Professor Coughlin-it is gender-specific, and
therefore exceptionalizes women, potentially rendering them less than fully
accountable for their actions surrounding labor and delivery. 393 Although this
argument is no doubt true, it is not necessarily dispositive. It requires no stretch of
the imagination to argue that, during the process of labor and delivery, a woman's
focus becomes so intensely internalized that she should not be regarded as fully
competent. Support for this proposition might be found in federal and state
regulations pertaining to the sterilization of Medicaid patients. Specifically, these
laws stipulate that informed consent to an elective sterilization surgery may not be
obtained while the patient to be sterilized is in labor or childbirth.394 At least one
court has noted that "the clear implication of this requirement is that certain
circumstances, such as labor.., can impair an individual's ability to consent in a
fully informed manner. '" 39
Ultimately, one might respond to this entire constellation of arguments by
noting that, just as there are harms in adopting such a statute, so too are there harms
in not adopting a statute. Both approaches are limited and potentially harmful to
women. Therefore, if we are practically limited to these two models, as Professor
Margaret Radin observed, "the answer must be pragmatic. We must look carefully
at the nonideal circumstances in each case and decide which horn of the dilemma
is better (or less bad), and we must keep re-deciding as time goes on. ' 3 9 6
It is clear that the lenient impulse in neonaticide cases is integrally related to the
ambivalence evoked in us by the horror of these women's experiences in
childbirth. To insist that these women's actions be regarded and judged "equally,"
in some abstract sense, to the actions of men is as absurd as it is impossible.397
392. For two fascinating discussions on the dangers inherent in pathologizing women's behavior, see SusAN
SHERwiN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMNIsr E-mcs A&ND HEALT CARE 179-200 (1992) and Holly Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991).
393. See supra note 249 (quoting Professor Coughlin on the dangers of exceptionalizing women).
394. 42 C.F.R. § 50.204(e)(1) (1995); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 18, § 505.13(e)(2)(ii)(a) (1995). These
regulations require that, absent a premature delivery or emergency abdominal surgery, any consent to an elective
sterilization by Medicaid patients must be given at least 30 but no more than 180 days before the procedure is
performed. 42 C.ER. § 50.203 (d) (1995); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18 § 505.13 (e)(1)(v) (1995).
395. Butler v. Medical Ctr. of Del., Inc., No. 91C-06-205, 1993 Del. Super. LEXIS 65, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct.
Mar. 10, 1993). This proposal is entirely in keeping with the spirit of adoption contracts and the common law
resolution of many cases involving surrogate mothers, wherein women are permitted to avoid their contractual
promises because of their feelings in the aftermath of labor and delivery. See Carol Sanger, Separating from
Children, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 375, 442-45 (1996) (discussing various legal safeguards that insure birth mothers'
consent to adoption).
396. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1990).
397. For an exceptionally coherent explanation of the folly of pursuing a goal of abstract equality, see Mary E.
Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 201 (1987).
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2. Infanticide as Manslaughter
The varied stories of women who commit infanticide, like those of neonaticide
defendants, tend to reflect impulsive rather than conscious actions. Regardless of
which of the four subcategories of infanticide is involved, the vast majority of infanticide
cases demonstrate none of the deliberate, intentional behavior associated with murder.398
Although some infanticide defendants are insane at the time of their crimes,
many suffer from mental disturbances that fall short of the legal definition of
insanity.399 It is unnecessary, however, to broaden the definition of insanity in
order to provide a partial defense for these women. The common law contains a
more accurate and effective response-one that both acknowledges the despera-
tion that led to the homicide, and at the same time, treats the defendants as
autonomous, blameworthy actors. The "heat of passion" doctrine creates a partial
excuse to a murder charge, permitting a defendant who acknowledges having
killed her infant to argue that she is, at most, guilty of voluntary manslaughter.4"
Throughout history, "heat of passion" has lacked a consistent rationale and has
been invoked "largely for reasons of the heart and of common sense, not the
reasons of pure juristic logic."' 40 ' This sentiment fits neatly into the pattern of
lenience so consistently manifested in infanticide cases. The heat of passion
defense originally was developed in order to distinguish the intentional killings
committed during sixteenth century "drunken brawls and breaches of honor" from
premeditated murders.4 2 In more recent centuries, it has served as a legal
mechanism for differentiating and partially excusing homicides that "involve
relatives, lovers, and friends, as both perpetrators and victims." 40 3
398. See supra notes 140 through 193 and accompanying text (describing each subcategory of infanticide).
399. See APPENDIX, Infanticide Codes, Issues Existing Prior to Commission of the Crime, mental illness.
The infanticide defendant whose crime was committed during an episode of postpartum psychosis, and who
therefore plainly was incompetent at the time of her offense, may nevertheless find it difficult to establish an
insanity defense, as she almost always will be fully recovered by the time of her trial. Nelson, Comment, supra
note 139, at 633-36. Because postpartum psychosis is strictly time-delimited, once the postpartum phase has
passed, the woman returns to her former mental health status; in other words, she is no longer psychotic, nor even
mentally ill. Dent, Comment, supra note 141, at 363.
400. I have omitted from my study the many cases in which a mother kills her child entirely unintentionally, for
example, by causing a car accident in which her baby dies. These acts, assuming they involve defendants who manifested
no criminal intent, are entirely distinct from infanticide cases. Even if evidence suggests that the mother may bear some
fault, for example as a result of her failure to use a safety restraint (such as an infant car seat or a safety belt), states
consistently have refused to hold the mother civilly liable, let alone criminally responsible for the infant's death. See, e.g.,
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Donna Jean Holland, 380 S.E.2d 100 (1989) (holding that a driver could not win
summary judgment in a wrongful death suit on the grounds that the parents of the child-victim had not put the child in a
seatbelt); see generally Christoper R. Drahozal, Note, Liability for Nonuse of Child Restraints, 70 IowA L. REv.
945 (1985) (arguing that courts should impose liability on parents who do not put their children in seatbelts).
401. Dressier, Rethinking, supra note 390, at 423 (citing D.P.P. v. Camplin, 67 Crim. App. 14, 27 (1978)).
402. id. at 426.
403. Id. at 421-22. According to Professor Joshua Dressier,
[f]rom an early time in Anglo-American common law, such killings have been treated differently
from the meditated variety. The latter constituted murder. The former was denominated as the
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In order to raise a "heat of passion" defense, a defendant must establish that she
committed an intentional homicide, and that she did so
under extenuating circumstances which mitigate, though they do not justify or
excuse, the killing. The principal extenuating circumstance is the fact that the
defendant, when [s]he killed the victim, was in a state of passion engendered in
h[er] by an adequate provocation (i.e. a provocation which would cause a
reasonable [wo]man to lose h[er] normal self-control.)
40 4
A rigid reading of this defense may lead one to doubt whether it ever applies to a
crime like infanticide. Indeed, at common law "adequate provocation" was a
matter of law, and defendants were restricted to strictly-delineated categories.4 °5
Today, however, the categorial approach has been replaced by an "objective
standard," which requires juries to determine whether the reasonable person would
have been sufficiently impassioned by the provocation to kill.
40 6
The language of provocation commonly associated with this defense also might
lead one to question whether an infant could pose a sufficient threat to allow its
killer to raise this defense. There are two responses to this concern. First, although
the term "heat of passion" traditionally has been used to refer to rage, some cases
have pointed out that other intense emotions-such as fright or terror or 'wild
desperation'-will do.4 ° 7 In fact, the Model Penal Code dispenses with "provoca-
tion" altogether, and instead requires that the defendant be "under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance., 40 8 More importantly, scholars have
been careful to note that the "heat of passion" defense is not so much about the
actions of the provoker, but rather about the reasonableness of the defendant's
response to her circumstances. 409 As a result, the challenge for the infanticide
defendant is to explain why circumstances led her to lose her self-control.
Convincing a jury that her loss of self-control was a reasonable response to the
turmoil caused by her child would be an impossible task for most infanticide
defendants. Although even the "reasonable" mother or parent loses self-control
lesser crime of manslaughter. Today it remains a lesser crime than murder in England, 49 of the 50
states in this country, and in other portions of the world.
id. at 422.
404. LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 371, at 653.
405. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 381, at 490.
406. Id. at 491-92.
407. Id.
408. The Model Penal Code's manslaughter provision applies with even greater ease to infanticide defendants,
as it eliminates the "heat of passion" language and introduces a subjective component to the defense. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.3. The Model Penal Code, which has been adopted by a substantial minority of jurisdictions,
states that criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when it is "committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances as he believes them to be." Id.
409. See Dressier, Rethinking, supra note 390, at 443 (noting that "[tihe defense is theoretically applicable
even if the victim was not a provoker" ).
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with some frequency, and may scream or even hit her child, she does not kill her
child.41 ° It is critical to recognize, however, that the law does not require that the
mother's action in killing her child be reasonable. If a mother acted reasonably
in killing her child, she would not be guilty of a crime.4 11 LaFave and Scott
explain the distinction between self-defense and a heat of passion defense by
noting that
[w]hat is really meant by "reasonable provocation" is provocation which
causes a reasonable man to lose his normal self-control; and, although a
reasonable man who has thus lost control over himself would not kill, yet his
homicidal reaction to the provocation is at least understandable. Therefore, one
who reacts to the provocation by killing his provoker should not be guilty of
murder. But neither should he be guilty of no crime at all. So his conduct falls
into the intermediate category of voluntary manslaughter.4 12
Bearing this in mind, the heat of passion defense plainly is applicable as a partial
defense to murder charges in many infanticide cases. There is no guarantee,
however, that judges will permit these defendants to raise it. 413 Therefore, it is
once again important to consider the possibility of amending murder statutes to
provide a partial defense in the case of infanticide. This could be accomplished by
adding infanticide-related provisions to existing criminal codes. In so doing,
however, it is critical to bear in mind the Constitutional prohibitions against gender
410. A recent nationwide Gallup poll indicated that "[n]early I in 20 parents disciplined their children so
severely that they were committing physical abuse." Joseph A. Kirby, Survey: I in 20 Parents Committing Child
Abuse, Gallup Numbers Much Higher Than U.S. Data, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 7, 1995, at 22, zone N.
411. As Dressler notes, the law governing voluntary manslaughter differentiates between criminal and
noncriminal responses to circumstances that, by definition, are emotionally extenuating:
[t]he actor's moral blameworthiness is found not in his violent response, but in his homicidal
violent response. He did not control himself as much as he should have, or as much as common
experience tells us he could have, nor as much as the ordinary law abiding person would have.
Dressier, Rethinking, supra note 390, at 467.
412. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 371, at 654-55.
413. In one recent case, a defendant charged with murdering her newborn attempted to raise a "heat of
passion" defense. The judge refused to give the instruction, and the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. On appeal, the court upheld the refusal to permit a heat of passion defense, because none of the examples
listed by the state statute fit this crime:
An accused is guilty of second-degree murder when she commits first-degree murder, but is able to
prove either that she was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation, or she believed the circumstances, if they existed, justified the killing. There is no
evidence of either mitigating factor in this case.
The only recognized categories of serious provocation that, if proved, would reduce a killing
from first- to second-degree murder are substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or
combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender's spouse. None of these categories is present
here. Further, the supreme court has explicitly held that a young child cannot cause the serious
provocation required of second-degree murder.
Illinois v. Doss, 574 N.E.2d 806, 809 (I11. App. 1991) (citations omitted).
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discrimination 4 14 and to consider the extent to which infanticide truly is a
gender-specific crime.
Unlike neonaticide, which is integrally related to the biological experiences of
pregnancy, labor, and delivery, infanticide is tied to the culturally-dictated experi-
ences of primary caretaking. In our culture, this work overwhelmingly is per-
formed by women, and thus, throughout this Article, I have referred to infanticide
as a crime committed by mothers, and have distinguished these homicides from
those committed by a mother's partner or others who do not perform the Work
associated with primary caretaking for a child. Nevertheless, with the exception of
postpartum psychoses, it is conceivable that the infanticidal subcategories de-
scribed in this Article might apply to an adoptive mother, or a grandmother, or even
a father, who finds herself or himself permanently in the position of an isolated
primary caretaker for a child.415 Therefore, rather than utilizing gender-specific
language, infanticide should be acknowledged within criminal codes as a homicide
committed by one who maintains the permanent status of primary caretaker (as
opposed to those who undertake the time-delimited work of baby-sitting).
As an example, the Illinois homicide statute provides that:
A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he commits the offense
of first degree murder... and either of the following mitigating factors are present:
(1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed... ; or
(2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if
they existed, would justify ... the killing under [self-defense] .... but his
belief is unreasonable.416
In order to insure that primary caretakers charged with infanticide could raise a
partial defense to murder charges, this statute would need to be amended by adding
a subsection such as the following:
(3) The defendant is on trial for the killing of her or his child, and at the time of
the killing, the defendant was in a state of extreme emotional disturbance as a
result of psychological, social, or socioeconomic circumstances consequent
upon her or his status as the child's permanent primary caretaker.
414. The following line of cases illustrate the Constitutional limitations on prima facie gender-based
distinctions: United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982); Personal Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
415. It is critical, in moving to gender-neutral language, to differentiate between the adult cast in a temporary
baby-sitting role, who kills a crying baby during a football game, and the adult who is permanently cast as
-'mother," who retains the residual and constant obligation to care for her baby. For two enlightening discussions
of mothering as a practice, rather than a status, see FINEMAN, supra note 300, and SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL
THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989).
416. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-2(a) (West 1994). The statute further specifies that serious provocation is
to be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-2(b).
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This provision is by no means a guaranteed defense against murder charges
arising out of infanticide. Indeed, the defendant would bear the difficult burden of
persuading the trier of fact that her state of extreme emotional disturbance was
reasonably explained by the circumstances surrounding her status as primary
caretaker.4 17 Therefore, although one might criticize this approach as creating an
expansive loophole against murder charges, in effect, it should be no larger than
existing community norms permit it to be. In addition, this narrowly defined
defense is subject to many of the same criticisms as is the provision regarding
neonaticide.41 8 Ultimately, however, I believe that the abstract "costs" of such a
statute easily are outweighed by the benefits it offers in terms of providing a
consistent and just resolution to these cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
History reveals three basic societal postures toward women who kill their
children-denial, punishment, or prevention. Ignoring infanticide is probably the
most popular approach, as societies throughout history have found it less costly
simply to look the other way when poor women, or even poor families, find
themselves unable to support another mouth to feed.419 The punitive approach also
has made frequent but brief appearances in recent centuries, supported by those
who argue that infanticide, like any other violent crime, must be swiftly and
severely punished.42 ° Yet societies that have demanded harsh punishment for these
defendants find that it eludes them.4 21 As noted, broad-scale efforts at preventing
infanticide have been relatively short-lived, due not to their failure, but rather to
the extraordinarily high cost of their success.42 2
In our own era, American public policy is fairly seen as an amalgam of the first
two of these strategies. We so studiously ignore the frequency and similarity of
infanticide and neonaticide cases that the suggestion that America has an infanti-
cide problem sounds utterly absurd. And, when faced with a woman who has killed
her child, we charge her with the most severe crime applicable to her act. This
417. Recall that MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 limits this partial defense to homicides
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is
reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under circumstances as he
believes them to be.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (emphasis added).
418. See supra notes 388 through 395 and accompanying text.
419. Langer, supra note 9, at 354.
420. The Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Family Services,
recently issued a report calling for harsher penalties for parents who abuse their children. FATAL CHILD ABUSE,
supra note 78, at 43, 67-71.
421. See supra notes II through 33 (describing England's struggle to force juries to convict and punish
infanticide defendants).
422. See supra note 10.
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approach permits us to feel rather civilized compared to societies in the past. For
example, one commentator notes that
[d]espite the outcry [of nineteenth century Europeans against infanticide],
infanticide continued in England and throughout Europe. It persisted because
the same conditions that led a mother in 1580 to murder her child were still in
existence in 1880-social ostracism and financial concerns. However, at least
the upper and middle classes are now deeply offended by this occurrence.4 23
After my review of the subject, I am far from convinced that the American middle
and upper classes are in fact deeply offended by infanticide. But even assuming
this to be true, conditions present in 1580 and 1880 remain prevalent today. We
must change the law that isolates and blames only the mothers for this terrible
crime. We must begin to identify the myriad ways in which our society tolerates
and perpetuates infanticidal situations. We must acknowledge the role that all of us
play in driving these women to the edge of despair, where, with our blessing and
our curse, they take the lives of children who should, by right, have inherited our
future.
423. Moseley, supra note 9, at 361 (emphasis added).
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The following headings represent the general categories for which the subjects in
the study were analyzed. Within each specific category, a number of criteria were
identified for all subjects in the sample. These criterion were assigned a numerical
value, or code. Each sample was carefully analyzed so as to identify whether or not
the criteria identified within each specific category was present. For example, for
each subject, the "living situation" was ascertained and the appropriate code
assigned to that subject, i.e. "3" if the subject lived with her parents. The results
were recorded in the spreadsheet that follows, and the results calculated in the
subsequent tables.









4 = with grandparent(s)
5 =with other relative(s) or guardian(s)








1 =less than high school
2=high school
3 =college
4 = no formal education
19961
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 91 1996-1997























ISSUES EXISTING PRIOR TO COMMISSION OF THE CRIME:
ABUSE




4 =by partner as adult




















6= other diagnosed mental illness










2= no, others present during birth
METHOD OF CRIME
1 =drowned in toilet
2= drowned in bathtub
3= abandon alive
4= throw out window




9=beat/hit with blunt object
10= shoot w/gun while in-vitro
11 = stillborn
12 = neglect/inattention
POST-MORTUM DISPOSITION OF THE BODY
1 =buried
2 = put in plastic bag/container/wrap up & hide in house
3 = put in plastic bag/container & put in trash/garbage/dumpster
4= put in trash/garbage/dumpster (not wrapped up)
5 = threw out window
6 = put body in lake/body of water
7 =keep on person
8 =leave in toilet
9=put in neighbor's back yard
10= wrap up and leave outdoors
11 =brought to hospital/medical setting claiming stillborn
DISCOVERY OF CRIME
1= subject sought medical treatment
2=body found
3 =subject turns self in/confesses
4=others turn subject in
OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERVENTION
1 =others knew subject was pregnant
2 =others knew subject was "high risk"/in danger of harming child
3 =subject sought assistance of others to deal with pregnancy
CRIMINAL CHARGES
1 = 1 st degree murder
2=2nd degree murder
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3 = 3rd degree murder
4=murder
5 =manslaughter
6 = 1 st degree manslaughter
7 =2nd degree manslaughter
8 involuntary manslaughter
9 = 2 counts 2nd degree murder
10=unlawful disposal of body
11 = felony murder
12= aggravated murder
13 = capital murder
14=criminal homicide
15= criminally negligent homicide
16= attempted murder
17 = attempted 1 st degree murder
18 = felony aggravated battery
19 = abandonment
20= 2nd degree child abuse
DEFENSE CLAIMS
1 = stillborn
2 = insanity/temporarily insane
3=PPD







5 =jury could not reach verdict
6=reversed on appeal
7 =guilty on lesser charge
8=plead no contest
9 =plead guilty to lower charge, plea bargain
SENTENCE
1 =probation and counselling
2 = probation/counselling/community service
3=counselling
4 = 1-5 years prison
5 =5-7 years prison
6=7-10 years prison
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7= 10-15 years prison
8= 15-20 years prison
9=20-30 years prison
10= 30-40 years prison
11 =50-60 years prison
12=life
13 = death penalty
14= appeal pending-no sentencing hearing yet
15 = probation only
16= 1-5 years prison and probation
17=house arrest
18 =institutionalized for mental illness
19= retrial on remand pending
20= determination of insanity pending
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NEONATICIDE DATA
Faither
Uving Meril of ConnoeL Cansidr Consider
N.-a Situtio Emr, Educalon S2ia CGil EM Abonlhu Admt
Andrade 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
Asidy 4 2 0 1 2 3 1 0
Buel 0 I 0 2 I 3 0 0
Bi.ok 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Betamen 3 0 1 1 0 3 0 0
Chess 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Ciarella 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Cleveland Girl 3 0 I 1 0 1 0 0
Crow. 3 I 2 1 1 1 0 0
D0i. I 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Dolrzeleckl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doss 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Ehlert 7 0 0 3 2 1 0 0
Ellwod 3 0 I 1 1 0 0 0
Garcia. A. 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Gonmalez 2 I 1 1 0 1 0 0
Grant a 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Hary 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Nallaway 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Hesley 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
Hera 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Hooywood Girl 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Holee 3 0 1 I 3 13 0 0
Jimanez 2 1 4 0 0 0 0
Jones 5 0 1 0 1 0 0
Juarjo 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Kiog-Wdighl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lakewood Woman 7 0 0 2 2 I 0 0
UnIle 4 0 0 I 0 0 0 0
MakkS~do 3 0 1 1 1 3 0 0
Mason 3 0 0 1 0 2 0 0
Meriden Woran 3 0 0 1 0 I 0 0
Moon 3 0 0 2 4 2 I 1
MoOre 2 0 3 I 0 0 0 0
Patterson 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Peppe 0 I 0 0 0 0 0
Pdwr 3 I 0 0 0 0 0
Pleasant 3 1 3 0 3 0 0
Ro fy 2 0 0 I 0 1 0 0
Ribith 3 1 2 1 0 1 0 0
Roberts 5 0 0 1 0 3 0 0
Sandeffer 3 3 2 1 4 I 0 0
Va giln 3 0 1 I 3 1 1
Vielnlme., G2 3 0 I I 3 0 0
Washington Twp Grl 3 0 2 I 1 0 0
W=ncl 2 0 3 1 0 1 0 0
Wimlrns 0 I 0 1 0 0 0 0
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NEONATICIDE DATA (CONTINUED)
Prior issues p,M.
N.1I1- Drug mental Pl.ce .1 Unaltended Method IDOspoltl
do poos Au UU Ilmlnes am of Crime o
Anda 1 0 0 0 0 3 2
Asley 2 0 0 0 a 2 5 0
Beale 0 0 0 0 4 7
Bionek 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
Ban en1 1 1 5 7
ChM., 2 0 0 0 6 3
Citre, 0 0 0 0 2 6 4
Ctlal. Girl 2 0 0 0 3 2 2
Crowe 0 0 0 0 2 7 2
0101 0 0 2 0 1 4
0D6ot.Icjd 0 0 0 0 3 2
Doss 0 0 0 0 8 4
Ehler 2 0 0 0 2 7 6
Edwood 1 0 0 0 1 2 6
Garcia. A. 2 0 0 0 33 
Goazale" 1 0 0 0 a 4
Gran 2 0 0 0 1 2
Hardy 0 0 0 0 1 6
HaStway 1 0 0 0 30 4
Hensley 2 0 0 0 1 1 7 4
Herld 0 0 0 0 1 8
HolywdGirl 0 0 0 0 0 4
Hopler I 0 0 0 7 3
JinISnez 2 0 0 0 1 6
Jones 2 0 0 0 4 $
.harao 2 0 0 0 2 3 to
Kkg-Wfgt 0 0 0 0 3 4
Laks ood womna 2 0 0 0 1 2
Little 0 0 0 0 7 2
M.adndo 1 0 0 0 1 7
Meson 2 0 0 0 3 7 3
Merden Wornan 0 0 0 0 3 6 10
MoOn 2 0 0 0 1 1 7 4
Mows 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 3
Patterso 0 0 0 0 1 o
Ppe 0 0 0 0 7 II
Phit6tos 0 0 0 0 a 2
Plealwnt 0 0 0 0 7 !
Rely 2 0 0 0 9 2
Ai.lf4 1 0 0 0 7 2
Roberts 1 0 0 5 I 2 1
Sandeffe, 2 0 0 0 1 7 3
Va...n 1 0 0 0 1 12 3
Vieltnmes. Gl I 0 0 0 1 6
Washngton Tvvp Gir 1 0 0 0 I 1 7 3
WernICk 0 0 0 7 3
Willis- 0 a o I07 2
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NEONATICIDE DATA (CONTINUED)
Circum. Oppo.
of ftr Criminal Defense
us= Disc inevetin Chat Claime Conviction Senc
Andrade 1 0 1 0 0 0
Ashley 1 3 3 0 0 0
seale 2 0 2 0 0 0
Sienek 2 0 4 0 t 0
Buraln 4 0 2 1 I I
Choser 1 0 8 4 I 19
Citearea 1 0 I 2 9 16
Clevlend Girl 3 0 S 0 t
Crowe 4 0 0 0 0 0
Davis 2 0 10 1 0 0
Doa eleckl 0 0 0 0 3 7
0aa 2 0 I 4 1 a
Eh.1d 2 0 I 1 1 t
Elworod 2 I 7 0 1 5
Garcla. A. 2 0 a 0 0 0
Gonzalez 2 0 10 0 1 1
Grant 4 0 4 0 0 0
Hardy 3 0 11 2 0 0
Hathaway 2 0 4 0 0 0
Hentaley 4 0 2 t 0 0
Herald 4 0 8 4 2 0
HollywooGid 2 0 4 0 0 0
Hoper 4 1 12 0 1 17
Jimenez 2 0 2 2 1 14
Jortes 1 0 4 1 t 14
Juerdo 4 0 4 1 0 a
)(G-Wright 1 0 I 2 4 18
Lakewood Womnan 1 0 0 0 0 0
Little 4 0 I 0 0 0
Maldoerado 4 1 e 4 1 2
Mason 3 0 4 0 0 0
M riden Woarn 3 0 7 0 0 0
Moan 3 0 13 0 0 0
Moors 0 0 4 0 0 0
Patterson 1 0 0 0 0 0
Pepper 3 0 a a a a
Pi=r 2 0 00 1a9
Pleasant 2 I 4 0 0 0
Rely 1 1 14 2 t 0
Ribitch 0 0 4 0 0 0
Robertis i 0 0 0 0 0
SandalHer 2 0 2 2 7 0
Vaughan 2 I I 0 6 19
Vietnamese Girl 2 I 0 0 0 0
W as igton T p G t 4 1 4 0 0 0
Wernick 2 0 5 2 7 4
Williams 1 0 A 0 0 0
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INFANTICIDE CODES
The following headings represent the general categories for which the subjects in
the study were analyzed. Within each specific category, a number of criteria were
identified for all subjects in the sample. These criterion were assigned a numerical
value, or code. Each sample was carefully analyzed so as to identify whether or not
the criteria identified within each specific category was present. For example, for
each subject, the "living situation" was ascertained and the appropriate code assigned to
that subject, i.e. "3" if the subject lived with her parents. The results were recorded
in the spreadsheet that follows, and the results calculated in the subsequent tables.









4 = with grandparent(s)
5 =with other relative(s) or guardian(s)
6 = with boyfriend/partner
7= with husband







1= less than high school
2= high school
3 =college
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3 = mentioned generally




ISSUES EXISTING PRIOR TO COMMISSION OF THE CRIME:
ABUSE
1 =physical as child
2 =sexual as child
3 =both sex/phys
as child
4=by partner as adult




















6= other diagnosed mental illness





2 =drowned in bathtub
3 =abandon alive
4= throw out window








13 =locked in car in hot weather
14=bury alive
15 =scald with hot water
16=run over with car
[Vol. 34:1




POST-MORTUM DISPOSITION OF THE BODY
I =buried
2=put in plastic bag/container/wrap up & hide in house
3 =put in plastic bag/container & put in trash/garbage/dumpster
4=put in trash/garbage/dumpster (not wrapped up)
5 =threw out window
6=put body in lake/body of water
7=keep on person
8=leave in toilet
9=took baby to hospital/called 911 for help
10=wrap up and leave outdoors
11 =left unattended in house
12= show to others
13 =freeze and put in garbage
DISCOVERY OF CRIME
1 = subject sought medical treatment for baby
2=body found
3 = subject turns self in/confesses
4=others turn subject in
5 =told others baby dead, no claim of responsibility




2=others knew subject was "high risk"/in danger of harming child
3 = subject sought assistance of others to deal with pregnancy
4=child welfare agency intervention
5 = child/infant or other child/infant removed from home in past
CRIMINAL CHARGES
1 = 1 st degree murder
2 = 2nd degree murder





8=2 counts 2nd degree murder
9=felony child abuse
19961
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 103 1996-1997
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
10= criminally negligent homicide
11 =physical abuse of a corpse
12 = aggravated murder
13 = capital murder
14= aggravated child abuse
15 = child endangerment





4=mistake of fact, mother did not know pregnant





3 =guilty on lesser charge
4 =plead guilty
5 =plead guilty to lesser charge
6=guilty but mentally ill
7 =jury could not reach verdict
8 =judge reversed jury verdict on appeal
9 = insane-acquittal
10 =judgment N.O.V.
11 = unfit to stand trial
SENTENCE
I =probation and counselling
2 =probation/counselling/community service
3 =counselling
4= 1-5 years prison
5 =5-7 years prison
6=7-10 years prison
7= 10-15 years prison
8 = 15-20 years prison
9=20-30 years prison
10= 30-40 years prison
11 =40-50 years prison
12 = 50-60 years prison
13=60-100 years prison
[Vol. 34:1
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17= 1-3 years prison and probation
18=3-7 years prison and probation
19=25 years to life
20= institutionalized for mental illness
21 = 15 years to life
22= weekend in jail
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INFANTICIDE DATA
Father
Living Marriage of Primi-
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INFANTICIDE DATA (CONTINUED)
Prior Issues P.M. Discovery Opport.
Drug Mental Age of Method Disposition of for
Name Abuse Use Illness Baby of Crime of Bod Crime Intervention
Aylon 0 0 7 28 2 9 3 4
Batiste 4 0 0 4 9 9 2 1
Boell 0 0 0 36 7 0 0 0
Boykin 3 0 0 20 6 9 3 0
Burton 0 2 0 156 9 0 0 4
Butler 0 0 0 36 9 9 1 0
Byrd 0 0 0 4 3 11 3 0
Coleman 1 3 0 312 9 0 0 4
Ducker 0 1 4 104 13 9 1 0
Emiliano 0 0 0 0.5 14 1 4 0
Fewell 0 0 0 16 7 9 1 0
Foskett 0 0 0 3 7 0 0 0
Garcia 5 0 0 44 7 0 3 0
Gaston 0 3 0 3 11 9 1 0
Gentile 0 0 0 8 2 3 2 0
Gonzalez 0 0 0 260 15 6 3 0
Graves 0 0 0 12 7 12 6 5
Helms 0 0 0 26 7 0 0 4
Henderson 0 2 0 8 12 9 I 4
Householder 0 0 0 2 7 6 3 0
Lopez 4 2 0 352 9 9 6 5
Marlin 0 0 0 156 9 1 7 2
Massip 0 0 0 6 16 4 2 3
Mesa 3 0 0 92 9 3 2 1
Kibble 0 0 0 36 7 9 1 0
McCollough 0 0 0 1.5 7 11 2 t
McGee 0 0 0 1.5 3 11 4 4
Mitner 0 0 0 208 2 11 0 0
Moss 0 0 0 104 9 11 2 I
Nobles 0 0 0 104 2 11 3 8
Peters 0 0 0 56 3 11 1 0
Pixley 0 4 0 6 7 3 3 1
Quails 0 2 0 12 17 11 0 0
Raven 0 0 0 104 9 3 2 1
Reid 0 0 0 32 7 9 1 0
Remington 0 0 0 6 10 0 0 0
Rother 0 2 0 9 17 11 0 5
Savage 0 0 0 20 7 9 3 1
Shaw 0 0 0 44 18 0 0 0
Sims 0 0 0 6 2 13 3 0
Smith, SB.A. 0 0 0 0.5 7 3 2 0
Smilh, M. 0 0 0 16 15 9 1 0
Smith. S. 2 0 6 56 1 6 3 1
Turner 0 2 0 64 4 5 2 0
1996]
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INFANTICIDE DATA (CONTINUED)
Cmlibis Detana.
Ayton 2 0 4 a
i 1 3 3 0
Bore 12 5 0 0
Boylan 1 0 0 0
Beton 4 0 0 0
Butler 13 0 a 0
Byrd 4 0 4 10
colen 1 0 5 6
Ducker 14 0 1 8
Entlaro 2 0 3 0
Fwei 4 0 0 0
Fodkalt 2 6 1 8
Garia 4 0 1 10
Gaston 2 0 0 0
GeIe 1 0 0 0
Gonzalez 4 0 0 0
Graves 4 0 0 0
Helms 2 0 4 0
Heanders 4 0 3 5
Householder I 0 0 0
LOPez 4 0 0 0
Martin 1 0 1 19
Memo 2 3 10 3
Mea 4 0 5 1
Kble 4 0 0 0
McColough 4 0 0 0
McGee 1 0 0 0
M*er 4 0 0 0
Mos 4 0 0 0
Nobes 4 0 1 21
Peters 15 0 0 0
Pbdey 2 3 4 22
Quail 4 0 0 0
Raven 13 0 0 0
Reid 4 5 8 0
Rermb4on 4 3 8 0
Ror 16 0 1 6
Savage 1 0 3 0
51mw 4 0 0 0
Sims 4 0 1 14
Saft. BA. 1 0 0 0
SS1h.M. 4 0 0 0
Smhh, S. 4 2 4 10
Turner 1 0 0 0
uncles 4 0 0 0
Wallace 1 0 6 14
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